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ABSTRACT
This study investigates four key dimensions o f international joint venture (JV) activity 
in Ghana and Nigeria: strategic motives, host country location factors, finance and 
performance. These dimensions are explored in a multi-method empirical study. 
Drawing on official annual aggregate and project level data, the trends and patterns of 
FDI in Ghana and Nigeria are examined across several characteristics, trends over 
time, ownership type o f FDI, origin of foreign investor, geographical location of 
projects and distribution by sector. The result shows that the more preferred mode of 
entry for FDI is through the equity joint venture.
Primary data was collected by means of a self-administered questionnaire survey from 
a cross section sample of 57 JVs in Ghana and Nigeria, with partners from Western 
Europe, North America and Asia/Pacific. First, the relative importance o f a set of 
strategic motives and host country location factors influencing foreign investors’ 
decisions to form JVs in Ghana and Nigeria are identified. The main strategic motives 
o f the foreign partners are to overcome government-mandated barriers, risk and cost 
sharing and to facilitate international expansion. The study finds government policy 
towards foreign investors, political stability and market size as the main location 
factors. Exploratory factor analysis is employed to identify the underlying dimensions 
of strategic motives and host country location factors for the JVs. Hypotheses are then 
tested (using t-test or Anova) by considering strategic motives and host country factors 
in terms of the characteristics of the sample. Second, the manner in which JVs are 
financed, the relative importance of barriers to JV investment finance and the 
determinants o f the financial structure of JVs in Ghana and Nigeria are examined. 
Hypotheses are tested using contingency table analysis and t-test on the relative effects 
of the barriers and the factors influencing the capital structure o f JVs. Finally, 
measures and determinants of performance are examined. A multiple regression 
analysis is conducted to identify the main predictors of successful performance for JVs 
in Ghana and Nigeria. The study identifies capital adequacy, partners’ capabilities and 
congruity o f motives and goals of the partners as important determinants of 
performance. A paired sample t-test was also conducted to compare the performance of 
JVs with host government partners and those with private sector partners, the results 
indicate that JVs with private sector partners are perceived to perform better.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
1.1 Introduction
One issue that has provoked considerable discussion and debate over recent years is 
the role of the multinational company (MNC) in the industrialisation process 
(Fleming and Scott, 1993). At one end of the spectrum the multinational company is 
welcomed as an essential input to the rapid industrialisation o f the "South". The 
multinational companies are conduits for the transfer of much-needed technology and 
skills from "North" to "South" without which economic development would be 
impossible (Kissinger, 1975; Robock, Simmonds and Zwick, 1977). These 
corporations contribute towards economic and political stability and are well placed 
to represent the interests of the developing countries to high-level policy makers in 
the corridors o f power in the "Northern" capitals. The competing view regards the 
multinational companies in developing countries as essentially a vehicle for the 
(capitalist) exploitation of the poor "South" by the rich "North". Critics such as Frank 
(1969, 1972), Dos Santos (1970), Muller (1975) and Amin (1980) also point out that 
multinational companies transfer the overwhelming bulk of profits back to the parent 
country leaving the host developing country bearing all the costs but enjoying few 
benefits.
A particular problem is the practice o f transfer pricing. Because the MNC does not 
buy products from its foreign subsidiary on the open market, a transfer price must be 
set by management which will influence the profitability o f the subsidiary's operation. 
If a low transfer price is fixed, close to the cost o f production in the subsidiary, then 
the subsidiary will record minimal profits and the tax revenue accruing to the host
government will be commensurately small. Instead the profit on the subsidiary's 
operations will be realised only when the final product is sold, allowing the 
multinational to realise the full extent o f its profitability/ in whatever country that 
offers the most beneficial regime.
Even where gains from multinational company activity have been identified, they 
have often failed to materialise. In practice, the presence of a multinational company 
has not always resulted in a real transfer of technology to the developing country 
(Evans, 1979). Further, the multinational company frequently may become a 
powerful political and social pressure in the host country, and be able to secure 
financial and other concessions from weak governments which are afraid to lose 
whatever revenues the multinational company does generate. According to this view, 
once established, the multinational company may become a dominant firm whose 
subsequent withdrawal will have considerable ramifications throughout the economy 
of the developing country.
Undoubtedly, multinational companies are both part benefactor and part villain. It is 
impossible to come to general conclusions on this; every case has to be looked at on 
its own merits. What is true is that some developing countries have attempted to 
implement local policies designed to maximise the gains from multinational activity. 
An example is where any multinational company that wishes to establish a presence 
in a developing country is required to form a joint venture (JV) with a local partner - 
mostly government-owned. In Nigeria, the enterprise promotion decrees o f 1972 and 
1977 form a cornerstone o f Nigerian policy towards MNCs (Lapalombara and Blank, 
1979). The 1972 decree led to one of the most comprehensive mandatory JV
3programs in Africa and throughout the third world (Biersteker, 1987). Under the 1972 
and 1977 decrees, large foreign firms were required to make forty to sixty percent of 
their equity available to Nigerians, that is, to form equity JVs. With regard to Ghana, 
since the mid-1960s the government has instituted an extensive joint participation 
programme through legislation and administration of investment codes (Afriyie, 
1988)
1.2 Definition of FDI and Joint Ventures
One way by which a firm can engage in business outside its national borders, is 
through the acquisition o f income generating assets in a foreign country. Such 
acquisition o f assets involves a foreign investment which may be portfolio investment 
(the acquisition of foreign securities by individuals or institutions without any 
management control over the foreign entity) or foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Broadly speaking, foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as investment by trans­
national corporations (TNCs) or multinational companies in foreign countries in order 
to control assets and manage production activities in those countries. Others defined 
FDI as follows: “capital invested in for the purpose of acquiring a lasting interest in 
an enterprise’s operations” (OECD, 1992). The International Monetary Fund (1993): 
“investment that involves a long-term relationship reflecting a lasting interest o f a 
resident entity in one economy (direct investor) in an entity resident in an economy 
other than that of the investor”. FDI involves management control and therefore 
control is a critical factor. What constitutes control is not straightforward as control 
can be exercised in numerous ways. International FDI statistics are bedevilled by the 
problems o f defining control (Jones, 1996:5). One common measure of control is the 
share of the equity of a company. However, there is no international consensus on the
minimum equity stake deemed necessary for control to exist. Currently, in the United 
States an investment is regarded as direct if  at least 10 percent of equity is owned. In 
the United Kingdom it is 20 percent and in Germany it is 25 percent and many 
countries have changed their definitions over time (Jones, 1996). For statistical 
purposes, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines foreign investment as direct 
(FDI) when the investor holds 10 percent or more of the equity of an enterprise. As 
this study utilises a number o f data from the IMF and other United Nations bodies it 
is appropriate to adopt the IMF definition for this study.
According to Jones (1996), FDI may take two forms, that is, wholly owned subsidiary 
and joint venture. It is important to emphasise that this study is restricted to the JV 
mode o f FDI entry. Joint ventures are the dominant form of business organisation for 
multinational companies in developing countries (Vaupel and Curhan, 1973; Austin, 
1990). The term joint venture often implies the creation o f a separate corporation 
whose stock is shared by two or more partners, each expecting a proportional share of 
dividends as compensation. A firm is considered to be an international joint venture if 
at least one parent is headquartered outside the joint venture's country of operation or 
if  the joint venture has a significant level of operation in more than one country 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1989).
There are two fundamental classes of joint ventures: a) equity joint ventures (EJVs); 
and b) non-equity joint ventures (NEJVs). EJVs axe by far the most common form of 
JVs in Ghana and Nigeria (Adeoba, 1988; Afriyie, 1988). EJVs involve two or more 
legally distinct organisations (the parents), each participates in the decision-making 
activities o f the jointly owned entity (Geringer, 1991). On the other hand, NEJVs are
agreements between partners to co-operate in some way, but do not involve the 
creation of a new corporate entity. Instead, carefully defined rules and formulas 
govern the allocation of tasks, costs, and revenues (Contractor and Lorange, 1988).
1.3 Aims and Scope of the Study
The focus o f this research is to investigate a number of dimensions of international 
joint venture (IJV) activity in two sub-Saharan African countries, those o f Ghana and 
Nigeria. The specific aims of this research are to examine:
a) strategic motivation and host country location factors influencing JV formation in 
Ghana and Nigeria;
b) the sources of finance and problems of funding of the international joint ventures 
in Ghana and Nigeria; and
b) the capital structure determinants of international joint ventures in Ghana and 
Nigeria;
d) an assessment and determinants o f performance of international joint ventures in 
Ghana and Nigeria; and
e) to provide prescriptive advice on West African JVs.
JVs can be formed between firms in the same country (domestic joint ventures); they 
can also be formed between a firm(s) in the host country on one hand, and a firm(s) 
from any developed or developing country on the other (international joint ventures). 
Finally, JVs can be formed by partners of different nationalities in a host country 
without including any partner from the host country (foreign international joint 
ventures). The scope o f this study is limited to equity joint ventures in Ghana and 
Nigeria involving the host country partner (government or private sector firm) with
firms from Western Europe, Asia/Pacific and North America in the primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors. The choice o f the scope of this study is based on the 
following:
1) Companies from Western Europe, Asia/Pacific and North America play a 
significant role in Ghana and Nigeria as sources o f foreign investment in general 
and equity joint ventures in particular. For example, firms from these regions 
accounted for over 70 percent o f the total FDI inflows to Ghana in the 1990-1997 
period.
2) The study is able cover all sectors where IJVs are known to operate and thus 
extends previous studies which often are limited to only one sub - sector such as 
agriculture or manufacturing.
1.4 Importance of the Study
Previous studies have suggested that the trend towards the increasing frequency and 
strategic importance o f JVs are likely to continue during the 1990s and beyond 
(Deloitte, Haskins and Sells International, 1989; Anderson, 1990). Yet JV research in 
developing countries has been concentrated disproportionately on countries from 
Asia, the Middle East and Latin America with sub-Saharan African countries being 
given scant attention. It is important to recognise that sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) differs 
from other developing countries on a number of dimensions such as stage of 
economic development, attractiveness as location of foreign direct investment, and 
political system. The experiences o f other regions may therefore be irrelevant to the 
situation confronting Africa. Few studies have examined strategic motives for JV 
formation, factors influencing location o f JVs, finance and performance of JVs in 
SSA. Strategic motives for JV formation in developing countries (including SSA)
have been analysed either before the implementation o f economic reforms or in the 
context o f one sub-sector, that is, agriculture. It should be noted that the motives 
influencing JV formation during the pre-adjustment reforms era which were 
characterised by FDI restrictions, may differ from the post-adjustment period of 
liberalisation.
While several studies have examined the strategic motives for joint venture 
formation, the same is not true for location-specific motives for JVs. Where this has 
been undertaken the approach has been holistic and within the broader context of 
analysing FDI (see Dunning 1980, 1988; Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Davidson 
1980; Tatoglu and Glaister 1998b; and Chen and Chen 1998). It is important to 
emphasise however that FDI is classified into two organisational types -  wholly 
owned subsidiaries and joint ventures and that generalising the location factors can 
mask the relative importance of the critical influences on each type o f FDI.
There has been little literature on the finance and performance of JVs in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, how JVs are financed in SSA is important since it has been reported 
that most businesses including joint ventures face funding problems in these countries 
{Financial Times, 1996). Also the literature suggests that JV performance are 
generally unsatisfactory (Franko, 1976; Janger, 1980; and Beamish and Delios, 
1997b).
This study attempts to fill a clear research gap and contribute to a greater 
understanding of the motives, location factors, finance and performance dimensions 
o f IJVs to which little attention has been given in SSA.
1.5 Generalisability of the Findings to West Africa
The study is concerned primarily with two West African countries, Ghana and 
Nigeria, however, it is believed that the findings of this research can be generalised to 
the West Africa sub-region1. This is because West African countries share similar 
basic characteristics, that is, common economic, social and political problems. The 
major reasons why the findings are applicable to countries o f the West Africa sub- 
region include:
♦ Ghana and Nigeria account for about 60 percent o f the estimated total population 
o f 230 million. Together they account for over two-thirds o f the industrial output 
in the West Africa sub region.
♦ West African countries share common economic problems. The major ones 
include: poor exports and balance o f payments difficulties, low level of 
technological development, dependence on primary products for exports and debt 
crises.
♦ West African countries share common political and economic objectives and 
aspirations expressed, for example, through the Organisation of African Unity, the 
Lagos Plan o f Action for the Economic Development of Africa, and the treaty 
establishing the Economic Community of West African States.
♦ West African countries share a common legacy of dominant role by the state in 
their economies
1 N igeria, Ghana, Cote d ’Ivoire, Togo, B urkina Faso, Benin, Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Gam bia, 
Senegal, G uinea, M ali, N iger, M auritania and G uinea-Bissau
♦ Sub-Saharan African countries (SSACs) o f which West Africa countries are a part 
share a common history and social structure which have had long lasting effects 
on their development experiences; and which make them unique from many 
developing countries o f Asia and Latin America (Selassie, 1995). For example, 
Killick (1992) notes that colonially-imposed national frontiers, the survival of 
traditional social structures, low population densities and the favourable land- 
labour ratio which encouraged dispersed settlements and migration made 
‘personal rule and clientelist-based politics’ more pervasive in countries of the 
region than other developing countries o f Asia and Latin America.
♦ Recent trends provide more evidence as to why SSACs can be considered similar. 
By 1992 over 35 countries in the region were undertaking political and economic 
reforms (see UNCTAD, 1994; Selassie, 1995) giving credence to the argument 
that they have similar political and economic problems to consider.
1.6 Organisation of the thesis
The aims of the study are addressed through separate, but related analyses as follows: 
Chapter 2 considers the literature relating to the theory o f foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the JV mode in particular. This is then narrowed down to focus on strategic 
motives, finance and performance o f joint venture in developing countries in general 
and then more specifically sub-Sahara Africa. This review o f the literature underpins 
chapters 4 to 7.
The methodology of the study is set out in chapter 3. The study broadly comprises o f 
two parts: first is the analysis of the secondary data drawn from official sources. 
Second, is an analysis o f primary data obtained by means of a questionnaire
administered to senior managers of JVs in Ghana and Nigeria. This chapter also deals 
with the sample, data collection procedures, and the overview of analysis.
Chapter 4 focuses on the patterns, distribution of FDI and the role of government in 
Ghana and Nigeria. During the last decade there have been systematic and swift 
policy shifts among the host developing countries towards FDI. Underpinning those 
shifts is the introduction of economic reforms and in particular the liberalisation of 
the FDI framework. The chapter reviews the changing government policy 
environment towards FDI in Ghana and Nigeria and provides an analysis for trends of 
FDI.
Chapter 5 considers the strategic motivation and host country location factors that 
provide incentives for MNCs to form in JVs in Ghana and Nigeria. An exploratory 
factor analysis is conducted to produce a parsimonious set of distinct strategic 
motives and host country location factors. A number o f hypotheses are tested on the 
relationship between the relative importance o f strategic motives and country location 
factors and the sample characteristics.
Chapter 6 considers the source o f funds, barriers to finance and the determinants of 
capital structure o f JVs in Ghana and Nigeria. An exploratory factor analysis is 
conducted to produce a parsimonious set of distinct barriers to finance. Flypotheses 
are tested to identify factors influencing the manner in which JVs are financed and the 
determinants o f capital structure.
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Chapter 7 identifies measures employed by the sample firms to assess JV 
performance and examines multivariate determinants o f JV performance in Ghana 
and Nigeria. Also JVs with host government partners and JVs with host country 
private sector partners are compared on a number of dimensions to ascertain relative 
importance.
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the research problem, methodology and major 
research findings. The implications of the findings of the study for managers and 
policy makers are set out. This is followed by a discussion of the empirical 
contribution, limitations of the study and identification of areas for further research.
1.7 Summary
This chapter has established the context of the study, provided a definition of a JV, 
set out the aims and importance o f the research and an outline of the chapters that 
follow. It is apparent from the foregoing that the study is about equity joint ventures 
formed in Ghana and Nigeria with foreign partner firms from developed and 
developing countries. The study focuses on the investigation of four key aspects of 
international joint venture activity, namely, strategic motives, host country location 
factors, finance and performance.
The next chapter provides theoretical approaches to foreign direct investment and 
joint venture and reviews the relevant JV literature underpinning chapters 5-7 on four 
key dimensions, strategic motives, location factors, finance and performance.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
AND JOINT VENTURES
2.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) which is defined as capital invested for the purpose 
of acquiring a lasting interest in an enterprise’s operations (OECD, 1992) has been a 
focus o f much recent scholarly interest (Bjorkman, 1989). According to Torre (1981), 
a large share o f MNC literature has been devoted to the task of finding a coherent 
explanation for foreign direct investment. This chapter aims to review the distinct 
strands o f thought identified in the literature to explain why FDI takes place. This is 
then narrowed down to joint venture (JV) activity, which is one organisational form 
of FDI and the focal point o f this study. This chapter proceeds as follows: the next 
section identifies the main theoretical perspectives of FDI, which encompasses the 
market organisation theory, product cycle theory, capitalisation rate theory, follow- 
the leader theory, diversification theory, internalisation theory, eclectic paradigm and 
the dynamic comparative advantage theory. The third section reviews JV theories at 
aggregate level, and in particular, literature involving developing country firms. The 
rationale behind JV formation will be considered. The remainder o f the chapter 
reviews the prior literature from three perspectives: i) location specific factors; ii) 
sources o f finance, capital structure and problems of funding; and iii) performance.
2.2 Theories of FDI
Almost everywhere the story o f development includes foreign direct investment, from 
the Persian G ulf s oil fields to Ghana’s gold mining fields and Malaysia’s rubber 
plantations. Early in the twentieth century, a large part o f the world’s infrastructure 
was developed through FDI, including electric power in Ghana and 
telecommunication in Spain. The world stock of FDI was estimated at $15 billion
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dollars in 1914 rising to $66 billion in 1938 and then to an estimated $4.08 trillion in 
1998 (IFC, 1997; UNCTAD, 1999). Commensurate with the growth o f FDI is the 
emergence o f literature proposing theories to explain the rapid growth and increasing 
prominence of FDI. The FDI theories reviewed in the next section assume that the 
investment is the outcome of rational organisation action (Bjorkman, 1989).
2.2.1 Market Organisation Theory
Prior to the 1960, portfolio theory was the predominant explanation for why cross- 
border investments take place. This suggests that capital moves in response to 
changes in interest rates differentials. According to Ensign (1995), a significant 
change in thinking emerged with the work o f Stephen Hymers. His dissertation in 
1960 was the first to provide an explanation for FDI based on industrial organisation 
theory. It has been pointed out that from a conceptual viewpoint, Hymer’s work, 
which was published posthumously in 1976, changed the explanation o f direct 
investment from traditional trade and finance theory to the analysis o f the firm and 
market imperfections. The thrust o f Hymer’s dissertation was that oligopolistic 
market structures provide the conditions for foreign expansion. Firms which dominate 
their domestic markets have ownership-specific advantages. These advantages are 
important in that they involve assets that are unique to the firm and can be transferred 
at a relatively low cost within the firm and cannot be easily acquired by other 
domestic or foreign companies. A firm that possesses monopoly power at home can 
use these advantages abroad by internalising the barriers to entry which exist for other 
firms. The oligopolistic approach suggested by Hymer (1976) and Kindleberger 
(1969) provided the basis on which a number of other scholars such as Vernon 
(1966); Aliber (1970); Caves (1971); Knickerbocker (1973) based their work.
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2.2.2 The Product Cycle Theory
The product cycle theory is based on observations o f US firms in the post World War 
Two period. US companies typically first generated new products for the home 
market. The products reflected the demand and relative product factor availability in 
the USA and tended to be high-income and labour-saving innovations. Next US 
companies began to export these products to other countries in particular to the 
European markets. Eventually as the product matured, domestic competitors emerged 
in these countries, the production processes became more standardised, and buyers 
became price conscious. Threatened by loss o f market, US producers moved abroad 
in order to eliminate transportation costs. In the final stage o f the product cycle, firms 
sought the lowest-cost production site, often in developing countries, from which to 
service both foreign and US markets (Vernon, 1966). In his later work, Vernon 
(1979) argues that there have been changes in certain conditions upon which the 
product cycle hypothesis builds, but “it is likely to continue to provide a guide to the 
motivations and responses o f some enterprises in all countries of the world” (Vernon, 
1979: 267).
2.2.3 Capitalisation Rate Theory
Aliber’s (1970) model of FDI focuses on the effects of multiple currencies on foreign 
investments. Aliber argues that the choice between exporting and FDI depends on the 
cost o f doing business abroad, and notably, national differences in capitalisation rates, 
both by country and by industry within countries. The major thesis is that the pattern 
o f FDI reflects the fact that source country firms capitalise the same stream of 
expected earnings at a higher rate than host-country firms (Aliber, 1970: 134). This
difference in capitalisation rates emerges because the markets (that is, investors) 
attach different capitalisation rates to income streams denominated in different 
currencies. Source-country firms are likely to be those in countries where the 
capitalisation rates are high; host country firms are those in countries where the 
capitalisation rates are low. The differences in capitalisation rates select which 
country will be the host country and which the source country. In other words, the 
key factor in the explanation of the pattern o f FDI, according to Aliber (1970) is that 
the world is divided into different currency areas and that there is a bias in the 
market’s estimate o f exchange risk. The bias in the evaluation o f exchange risk 
determines whether a country is likely to be a source country or a host country for 
FDI. Moreover, the bias attached to the securities denominated in a foreign currency 
differs from that attached to the income in that currency o f a source-country firm.
In summary national differences in the capitalisation rates are the predominant factors 
explaining the country pattern o f FDI. However, examined against empirical 
evidence, this is regarded as an insufficient explanation for direct investment 
(Hawkins, 1984; Andersson, 1989).
2.2.4 Follow-the Leader Theory
In his follow-the leader theory, Knickerbocker (1973) argued that firms in 
concentrated industries may engage in FDI to match the investment pattern of rivals. 
This theory is applicable after a leading oligopolistic competitor makes the first FDI 
in an industry. This initial FDI induces a cluster o f investments in the same market by 
other leading competitors. Firms in a given industry perceive their mutual 
interdependence and follow the behaviour of rival firms that undertake FDI 
(Knickerbocker, 1973). Using the data o f Harvard Business School, Knickerbocker
(1973) constructed an entry concentration index (ECI). The index showed that entries 
of American firms into foreign markets are bunched in time. He also found a 
significant positive correlation between ECI and US industrial concentration ratios, 
which indicated that except at very high concentration levels, a high level industrial 
concentration produced reaction by rivals in the field of FDI. Studies such as those by 
Flowers (1977); Yu and Ito (1988) have rendered support for this hypothetical 
pattern.
2.2.5 Diversification Theory
Diversification theory has also been used to explain FDI and growth of the 
multinational firm. Diversification -  a well-documented strategy for expansion o f a 
firm -  must be understood as a number o f different types o f strategies. Diversification 
relates directly to a firm’s operations. It can refer to changes in products, markets or 
functions. It can take place internally or externally and horizontally or vertically. It 
can involve related or unrelated changes. Diversification can result from internal or 
external pressures. A firm’s decision to expand globally must be viewed as short and 
long-term protection against competitors moves, declining domestic market share, or 
industry changes. When diversification theory is used to explain FDI, these 
explanations are based on finance/investment theory. Scholars in finance and 
management recognise that FDI is a unique investment decision. Finance/investment 
theories o f FDI tend to account for the fact that: firms seek new markets ahead to 
diversify their portfolio o f sales and reduce risk or variance o f their expected returns; 
foreign firms capitalise host country earnings differently; and market imperfections 
may lead to FDI (Grosse, 1981).
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2.2.6 Internalisation Theory
During the 1970s, explanations o f FDI focused primarily on the firm. The emphasis 
shifted from a focus on theoretical explanations of FDI to an understanding o f the 
MNC (Ensign, 1995). Research centred on finding an explanation for FDI by 
developing a theory o f the multinational enterprise. The major approaches that 
contributed to this change include: internalisation theory, eclectic theory/paradigm 
and diversification theory.
Internalisation theory dates back to Coase (1937) whose work was later extended (in 
a largely domestic context) by Williamson (1975, 1985). Although other scholars 
such as Hymer suggest why a firm would internalise a market, it was however the 
work o f Buckley and Casson (1976), Dunning (1977), and Rugman (1981) which 
placed internalisation theory in the very front of theoretical work on FDI. 
Internalisation theory is concerned with the fact that MNC carries out many activities 
that are interdependent and related through flows of intermediate products (mostly in 
the form of knowledge and expertise). Since markets for intermediate products are 
difficult to organise, these transactions can be handled more efficiently within the 
firm by an internal hierarchy rather than by an external market. The creation of 
internal markets brings these activities under the direct ownership and control of the 
firm. Simply put, internalisation is concerned with imperfections in the markets for 
intermediate products (Casson, 1992). Intermediate products embrace all the different 
types o f goods or services that are transferred between one activity and another within 
the production process. As applied to MNCs by McManus (1972); Buckley and 
Casson (1976); Hennart (1982), this theory proposes that firms cross borders because
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the transaction costs incurred in international intermediate product markets can be 
reduced by internalising these markets within the firms.
The other element o f the theory, location-specific advantages, is concerned with 
where products are manufactured. Enterprises will engage in foreign production 
whenever they perceive it is in the best interest to manufacture in a certain location 
(Dunning, 1988).
2.2.7 The Eclectic Theory
O f the FDI theories, the eclectic theory seems currently to have most advocates 
(Boddewyn, 1988). As theoretical work progressed, scholars questioned whether a 
single theory can explain all patterns and aspects of foreign direct investment. The 
eclectic theory/paradigm (Dunning, 1977) is an attempt to consolidate a number of 
ideas into an integrated approach. This approach to the theory o f international 
production has been called eclectic for three main reasons. First, it draws on each of 
the main lines of explanation for MNC activity which have emerged over the past 
decade. Second, it can be used to explain all types of FDI. Third, it embraces the three 
main vehicles of foreign involvement by enterprises, that is, direct investment, trade 
and contractual resource transfers, e.g. licensing, technical assistance, management 
and franchising agreements, and suggests which route of exploitation is likely to be 
preferred. The eclectic paradigm suggests that all forms o f international production by 
all countries can be explained by reference to three sets o f advantages: i) ownership; 
ii) localisation and iii) internalisation (OLI). The ownership advantages consist of the 
specific assets possessed by a company compared to those o f the other enterprises. 
These include superior technology, superior management and organisation
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techniques, cheaper access to finance, the size of a firm (as large firms possess 
important sources o f market power). Multinationals can also be said to derive 
ownership advantages from being multinational. The advantage o f common 
governance derive from the ability to co-ordinate separate value added activities 
across national boundaries. Multinationality can also enhance operational flexibility 
by offering wider opportunities for global sources of input (Bjorkman, 1988). 
Location advantages are those advantages specific to a country which dictate the 
choice o f production site. Internalisation advantages determine whether foreign 
production will be organised through markets (licensing) or hierarchies.
2.2.8 The Dynamic Comparative Advantage Theory
The dynamic comparative advantage theoiy popularly known as Japanese theory was 
suggested by Kojima (1973). The theory is based on the premise that foreign direct 
investment takes place when foreign skills or capital can be combined with host 
country factors to achieve least cost production. In other words, FDI should occur 
when a country’s comparative advantage in some product is eroded or when 
comparative disadvantage exists. FDI can move factors (technology, management 
skills, movable capital) to foreign location where total production costs would be 
lowest for any given product. Instead of replacing exports, this theory suggests that 
FDI can generate new exports. Sales can also be made in the host country, to third 
countries, or even to the home country. Although the approach provides some insight 
into the determinants of FDI, however, its explanation is partial. For example, 
Buckley (1991) indicates that it cannot be generalised beyond a particular type of 
investment (Japanese?) in a particular host country (less developed). It however, can 
be integrated into Dunning’s eclectic theory.
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2.3 Explaining Joint Ventures: Theoretical Perspectives.
A number of theoretical approaches have been used to explain the motivation and 
choice of joint ventures (Kogut, 1988). These include the following:
2.3.1 Transaction Cost Theory
The proliferation o f various forms of inter-organisational collaboration in the past two 
decades was once beyond the explanatory domains o f transaction cost theory. This is 
because Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1979) focused primarily on explaining 
the existence o f firm in response to market failures (Tsang, 2000). To address this 
deficiency, Williamson (1985, 1991) and Buckley and Casson (1988) and others 
extended the theory to JVs.
A transaction cost explanation for JVs involves the question of how a firm should 
organise boundary activities with other firms. In other words, the basic principle 
underlying the theory is that firms choose how to transact according to the criterion of 
minimising the sum of production and transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). 
Production cost may be different between firms due to the scale o f operation, learning 
or proprietary knowledge. Transaction costs refer to the expenses incurred for writing 
and enforcing contracts, for haggling over terms and contingent claims, for deviating 
from optimal kinds of investments in order to increase dependence on a party or to 
stabilise relationship and for administering a transaction (Kogut, 1988: 320).
Williamson posits that the principal feature o f high transaction costs between arms- 
length parties is small numbers bargaining in a situation o f bilateral governance.
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Small number bargaining results when switching costs are high due to asset 
specificity; namely, the degree to which assets are specialised to support trade 
between only a few parties. The upshot of this analysis is that a firm may choose, say, 
to produce a component even though its production costs are higher than what outside 
suppliers incur. Such a decision may, however, be optimal if the expected transaction 
costs o f relying on an outside supplier outweigh the production saving.
Other researchers have used the transaction cost logic to analyse joint ventures 
specifically. Hennart (1988) argues that a necessary condition for a joint venture to 
emerge is the presence o f inefficiencies in markets for intermediate inputs, which 
include raw materials, components and knowledge. These inefficiencies cause 
complications in their pricing and transfer of intermediate inputs. Sales contracts of 
these inputs are bound to be incomplete and expose the parties concerned to 
opportunistic exploitation o f specific investment mode. Joint ventures are an efficient 
means of internalising these failing intermediate markets.
For JVs to remain an efficient option, effective safeguards against the risk o f a 
partner’s opportunistic behaviour need to exist. Using the transaction cost paradigm 
to extend the internalisation theory, Beamish and Banks (1987) argue that in 
situations where a JV is established in the spirit o f mutual trust and commitment to its 
long-term success, the potential threat posed by opportunism and a small-numbers 
condition can be reduced. This argument is similar to the theory of co-operation 
proposed by Buckley and Casson (1988). Buckley and Casson (1988) discuss the 
various arrangements of a JV which may motivate the partners to practice mutual 
forbearance and thereby build up trust and reputation.
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2.3.2 Strategic Behaviour
The second explanation for the use of JVs stems from theories on how strategic 
behaviour influences the competitive positioning of the firm. Strategic behaviour is 
based on the premise that firms transact by the mode which maximises profits 
through improving a firm’s competitive position in relation to rivals. Simply put, 
strategic behaviour addresses how competitive positioning influences the asset value 
o f the firm. Given the fact that transaction cost theory posits that firms transact by 
the mode which minimises the sum of production and transaction costs, it may be 
argued that transaction cost theory and strategic behaviour models are similar. This is 
because firms which are ‘cost leaders’ are always profitable. Therefore costs 
minimisation and profitability are linked, at least, in the long term. While 
acknowledging that transaction costs and strategic behaviour theories share several 
similarities, Kogut (1988) points out that they differ fundamentally in the objectives 
attributed to firms. He argues that transaction costs address the costs specific to a 
particular economic exchange, independent o f the product market strategy, whereas 
strategic behaviour deals with how competitive positioning influences the asset value 
o f the firm.
Linking strategic positioning to joint ventures, many scholars such as Vernon (1983), 
Vickers (1985) and Harrigan (1988) have emphasised JVs as an effective mode to 
implement changes in the firm’s strategic position. For example, Vernon sees JVs as 
a form of defensive investment by which firms hedge against strategic uncertainty 
and Vickers shows JVs as an effective mechanism to deter the entry of investment.
Whilst the strategic behaviour perspective has been used as a theoretical explanation 
for JV formation, it may be criticised for not addressing why the JV is deemed as a 
preferred organisational form compared to other organisational modes.
2.3.3 Resource-based Theory
Inspired by Penrose’s seminal work, The Theory o f  the Growth o f  the Firm, a recent 
development in management research has focussed the firm’s strategy on its 
resources (namely, physical resources, human resources and organisational resources) 
rather than positioning in the external environment (Porter, 1980, 1985). This 
approach is known as the resource-based theory. Resource-based theory is concerned 
with the efficient exploitation and development of firm’s resources with the aim to 
generate Ricardian rent (Kogut, 1988). Under the resource-based theory there are 
several reasons why firms would form JVs. For convenience of exposition, Tsang 
(1998) grouped the reasons into two:
i) exploitation o f resources. Many JVs are motivated by the desire o f at least one 
partner to make better use of its competitiveness. As assumed by Penrose (1959), 
firms tend to expand whenever profitable opportunities exist. A firm may therefore 
want to exploit its competitive advantage in a different country and/or industry. This 
is because a firm may wish to make further use o f its superior technology in the 
production process o f another industry in addition to its own. Another major motive 
behind joint venturing is the creation o f Ricardian rent. The key to the existence of 
Ricardian rent is the presence of scarce resources which generate higher profits than 
other resource o f the same type (Rumelt, 1987). It is possible that a combination of 
resources generate Ricardian rent though each o f them separately does not.
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ii) development o f resources. Today’s products rely on so many different critical 
technologies that most companies can no longer maintain cutting-edge sophistication 
in all of them (Ohmae, 1989: 145). Tapping external sources of know-how becomes 
an imperative. Suppose a firm wants to obtain a specific capability possessed by 
another firm. It is usually not wise for the former to acquire the latter just for the sake 
of obtaining that capability. The very essence o f capabilities, particularly those 
associated with tacit knowledge, is that they cannot be readily acquired through 
markets (Teece, 1986; Kogut and Zander, 1992). It makes more sense to learn the 
capability directly from its owners. Organisation learning may usefully be considered 
a ‘meta-skilP that directs the resources conversion activities of the firm (Mahoney, 
1995). Resources development explanation is similar to organisation knowledge and 
learning proposed by Kogut (1988) as it views the JV as a means by which firms 
learn or seek to retain their capabilities. In Kogut’s view, firms consist of a 
knowledge base which is not easily diffused across the boundaries o f the firm. JVs 
are, then, a vehicle by which tacit knowledge is transferred.
It must be emphasised that while the above approaches have been used to explain the 
motivation and choice of JVs, this theoretical perspective may not map particularly 
well onto the strategic motivates for JV formation (Kogut, 1988; Glaister and 
Buckley, 1996). As a result, there is a danger that more profound reasons for the use 
o f JVs may be obscured by focusing only on theoretical explanations for JVs at the 
cost o f a more substantive explanation (Kogut, 1988). For this reason, this study 
adopts the approach o f explaining the strategic motives for joint venture formation 
individually in addition to the theoretical ones.
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2.4.Strategic Motives for JV Formation
Many researchers of international business, for example, Mariti and Smiley (1983), 
Harrigan (1985), Porter and Fuller (1986), Contractor and Lorange (1988), Glaister 
and Buckley (1996) have examined the reasons for joint venture formation. Glaister 
and Buckley (1996) identified, classified and explained the key motives for 
international strategic alliance formation by UK firms. They reported that the main 
strategic motives were intrinsically linked to the market and geographical expansion 
of firms. Killing (1983), in a sample of 34 joint ventures in developed countries 
divided the reasons for creating a venture into three groups, namely: government 
suasion or legislation; partners’ needs for other partners’ skills; and partners’ needs 
for the other partners’ attributes or assets.
Miller, et al (1996), identified the motives for joint ventures from two points o f view 
i.e. developed country and developing country perspectives. They reported that 
government restrictions and foreign partner’s contribution to finance the JV are the 
primary reasons for advanced country firms and developing country firms 
respectively, to invest in a JV. Studies by Friedmann and Kalamanoff (1961), 
Gullander (1976a, 1976b), Goldenberg (1989), and Kent (1991) highlight the 
rationale for JV formation as the fulfillment of the needs and objectives o f the parties 
involved, which otherwise would have been impossible to achieve with other 
business alternatives.
Several o f the same motives are identified by various authors, while some o f them 
overlap. The main motives discussed in the literature include the following:
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Cost and risk sharing
Porter and Fuller (1986) identified joint ventures as a mechanism through which 
companies could hedge risk because risk and cost of the venture are borne by both 
partners. Davidson (1982) argues that, firms having lower market knowledge tend to 
reduce strategic risk by entering these markets through JV rather than wholly owned 
modes. Broadly speaking, a cooperative venture is seen as a means o f reducing a 
partner's risk by (i) spreading the risk of a large project over more than one firm, (ii) 
enabling diversification in a product portfolio sense, (iii) enabling faster entry and 
payback, and (iv) cost subadditivity (the cost to the partnership is less than the cost of 
investment undertaken by each firm alone). In short, a JV spreads the risk o f failure 
(and the potential gains) over more than one party (Contractor and Lorange, 1988).
In the context of this study, this means that a foreign firm would cooperate with a 
local firm to reduce the level o f risk it faces in Ghana and Nigeria.
Economies of large-scale production
Economies of scale is concerned with the average cost of production in relation to the 
productive capacity o f a plant. For example, if  the productive capacity o f a plant were 
increased, economies of scale would exist if  the average cost of production fell. A 
joint venture can reduce average unit cost by pooling together each partner’s 
capability and resources in order to achieve the benefits o f large scale production. 
Furthermore, where components are made by both partners in different locations and 
with unequal costs, production could be transferred to the lower cost location thereby 
further lowering sourcing costs.
Transfer of complementary technology and patents
Joint ventures, production partnerships, and licensing agreements may be formed in 
order to pool the complementary technologies o f the partners. Several alliances in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology fields, for instance, are built on this rationale. Each 
partner contributes a missing piece. By pooling know-how and patents, a superior
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product is expected. In general, it is important to consider JVs as vehicles to bring 
together complementary skills and talents which cover different aspects o f the know­
how needed in high technology industries. Such creations o f "electric atmostpheres" 
can bring out significant innovations not likely to be achieved in any one parent 
organisation’s "monoculture" context. Moreover, faster entry into a market may be 
possible if  the testing and certification done by one partner may cede the right to a 
partially developed process to another firm which refines it further, with the fruits of 
development to be shared in a joint venture (Contractor and Lorange, 1988).
Shaping Competition
Porter and Fuller (1986) pointed out that strategic alliances can influence who a firm 
competes with and the basis o f competition. Potential (or existing) competition can be 
coopted by forming a joint venture with the competitor or by entering into a network 
o f cross-licensing agreements (Telesio, 1977). Therefore, a strategic alliance may be 
used as a defensive strategy. On the other hand, a JV may also be made in a more 
offensive vein. For example, a company could link up with a rival in order to put 
pressure on the profit and market share o f a common competitor (Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988).
Overcoming Government-mandated Investment Barriers
One of the oldest and still common rationales for joint ventures is that they enable 
foreign parent firms to overcome government-mandated investment barriers. In many 
instances, host government policy makes JV formation the most convenient way to a 
market (Contrator and Lorange, 1988). In some countries investment regulations 
require a link with a local firm. In many cases, in fact, the regulations have called on 
foreign companies to limit participation to minority status. For example, until 
recently, India and Nigeria required foreign firms to be minority partners in a joint 
venture if  they were to invest at all (Miller, et al, 1996).
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Facilitating International Expansion
For medium or small-sized companies lacking international experience, initial 
overseas expansion is often likely to be a joint venture (Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988). Contractor and Lorange (1988) argue that, in general, it is an 
expensive, difficult, and time-consuming business to build up a global organisation 
and a competitive presence. JVs offer significant time savings in this respect. Even 
though one might consider building up one's market position independently, this may 
simply take too long to be viable. Again, though acquisitions abroad might be another 
alternative for international expansion, it can often be hard to find good acquisition 
candidates at realistic price levels - many o f the "good deals" may be gone. All of 
these considerations add to the attractiveness of the joint venture approach.
Vertical Linkages
Flanigan (1985) points out that joint ventures can be used to provide competitive 
strength such as vertical linkages. According to Contractor and Lorange (1988) 
several cooperative ventures involve each partner making essentially similar 
contributons. JV agreements can also be a form of vertical quasi integration, with 
each partner contributing one or more different elements in the prodution and 
distribution chains. The inputs of the partners are, in this case, complementary, not 
similar.
2.5 Host Country Location Factors of JVs
The existing literature relating to host country location factors for JV formation is 
lacking as those available are based in the context of FDI. For this reason the location 
factors will be reviewed from the perspective o f foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
host country location motives for FDI are broadly classified into two types, namely 1) 
national policy and regulation; and 2) resources endowment.
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2.5.1 National Policy and Regulation
As a general principle, host countries that offer what TNCs are seeking and/or host 
countries whose policies are most conducive to TNC activities, stand a good chance 
o f attracting FDI. Core FDI policies are summarised into three groups: (i) rules and 
regulations governing the entry and operations of foreign investors; (ii) economic, 
political and social stability; (iii) proactive measures aimed at facilitating the business 
undertaken by the foreign investors in the host country. The importance o f core FDI 
policy as a location determinant is best illustrated by the obvious fact that FDI cannot 
take place unless it is allowed to enter a country. The potential relevance o f core 
policy is also evident when policy changes sharply in the direction o f more or less 
openness. Perhaps the most conspicuous example o f the importance o f FDI policy 
change is the experience o f Central and Eastern Europe. The stock o f FDI in that 
region was less than $200 million in 1985 and less than $3 billion in 1990; it has risen 
to $66 billion in 1997 (UNCTAD, 1998).
From the perspective o f foreign business the liberalisation of the core FDI policies is 
seen as an enabling act aimed at creating a framework that establishes, by and large, a 
level-playing field for all investors and thus makes it possible for them to take action. 
This enabling act is increasingly complemented by business facilitation measures 
which include promotion efforts, provision of incentives to foreign investors, and the 
reduction o f administrative costs o f doing business in the host country.
While host country development policies and political stability are suggested to be 
important pull factors for FDI, the empirical evidence does not unequivocally support 
this expectation (Agarwal, 1980: 761). For example, Green (1972) finds no 
significant relationship between US foreign investment and a host country’s political 
instability.
However, with respect to Africa, Wubneh (1992) found that deterioration o f the 
economic and political climate, and the lack o f stability were the two major reasons
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investors found the continent unattractive for investment. Similar studies in other 
developing countries have found economic growth and political stability as 
significant factors for FDI inflows (see Root and Ahmed, 1979; Levis, 1979).
2.5.2 Resource Endowments
Historically, the most important host country location factor has been the availability 
o f natural resources. According to Dunning (1993: 57) in the nineteenth century much 
o f the FDI by European, United States and Japanese firms was prompted by the need 
to secure an economic and reliable source of raw material. Up to the eve o f the 
Second World War, about 60 per cent o f the world stock o f FDI was in natural 
resources (UNCTAD, 1998). Although the relative importance o f natural resources as 
a locational factor has declined especially since 1970s, natural resources still explain 
much o f the inward FDI in a number o f developing countries particularly countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa (Cantwell, 1991).
Apart from natural resources, there are also other location-specific factors including:
Low cost labour. The standard hypothesis holds that lower relative labour costs will 
encourage efficiency-seeking FDI inflows. But results do no offer a clear guide. The 
extensive empirical investigations o f the relative labour costs in Canada and the 
United States indicate that labour costs differentials are not a significant determinant 
for industrial countries. For example, Owen (1982) and Gupta (1983) found labour 
cost differentials between Canada and the United States to be statistically 
insignificant. However, results for developing countries seem to indicate that relative 
wage costs are a significant determinant of FDI flows. Flamm (1984), Schneider and 
Frey (1985), Wheeler and Mody (1992), and Lucas (1993) all found a wage cost 
variable to be significant.
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Market size. The size o f the market, typically proxied by the level o f GNP, appears 
to be an important determinant o f FDI inflows (Singh and Jun, 1995). For both 
developed countries and developing countries, market size has been found to be a 
significant determinant of FDI (Schmitz and Bieri, 1968; Root and Ahmed, 1979; 
Torrisi, 1985; Schneider and Frey, 1985; and Wheeler and Mody, 1992).
Other determinants of FDI are good infrastructure, technology and the availability of 
other created assets.
2.6 Finance of JVs
2.6.1 Sources of Funds and Barriers to Finance
Traditionally, JV operations in developing countries have been financed by the 
foreign investors through equity investment and the generation o f cash flows from 
ongoing production. This method o f financing has been widely employed since the 
19lh century. Although MNCs continue to use this financing method, the frequent use 
of exchange controls in developing countries encouraged MNCs not to finance their 
operations from funds provided by the parents (Jones, 1996). Davies (1976) found 
that firms often transferred funds into a country to start operations, but future growth 
was typically financed by reinvested profits and local borrowing.
Host partners in developing countries finance JVs through the following: a) private 
capital; b) national development banks; c) direct budgetary appropriations d) 
sovereign borrowing (Radetzki and Zorn, 1979). According to Radetzki and Zorn 
(1979), in a number o f developing countries, governments have established national 
development banks which provide finance for small-scale firms. The prominent 
examples are the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry and the National
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Investment Bank in Ghana. While these banks have a great value in stimulating the 
development of small projects, it is clear their financial resources are not likely to be 
adequate to the needs o f major large-scale projects. Similarly, the prospects o f direct 
budgetary appropriations by the developing country governments in support o f large - 
scale projects offer at best a limited potential. For example, in Nigeria, during the oil 
boom from 1973 to 1982, the oil revenue enabled the state to finance a lot o f projects 
by entering into JVs with many foreign partners. The collapse o f oil revenues have 
led to mounting financial problems as the government is unable to finance its share of 
maintenance and running costs under the JV agreement (EIU country profile, 1996- 
97:.23). Traditionally, the host government as a partner financed JVs through 
borrowing from international organisations. However, the financial liberalisation over 
the past two decades has changed that. According to Glen and Pinto (1994) the new 
pattern o f foreign finance emphasises direct funding o f developing country firms 
rather than sovereign borrowing, which was the dominanat theme for so many years.
The literature indicates that joint ventures have two major sources o f funds in 
developing countries (i) internally-generated funds, ii) external sources o f funds. The 
breakdown among these sources is not well documented for developing countries. A 
study by Atkin and Glen (1992) of a set o f developing countries over a decade found 
that internally generated finance represent between 12 percent and 58 percent o f the 
total financing needs, leaving susbstantial portions to be financed by external sources. 
By comparison, internally-generated finance represented between 52 percent and 100 
percent o f the financing needs for the Group of seven (G 7) nations’ firms. Evidently, 
external financing is more important in developing countries.
According to Kim and Kim (1994) the internal-generated funds are those generated 
from parents and this encompasses capital contributions from parents; intercompany 
loans from parents and loans with parent company guarantees; and funds provided 
from retained profits. External sources of funds include: funds raised from capital 
markets from host country and countries abroad; and loans from international 
development banks such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and African 
Developmemt Bank. The loans from development banks, such as IFC, have become a 
significant source o f funds to many developing country firms recently since the loans 
no longer require guarantees from the host country government. However, IFC’s 
financial contributions are limited to less than 50 percent o f the total project cost. 
Despite the potential sources o f funds available to JVs in developing countries, they 
still face a number o f constraints in the financing choices available to them. Radetzki 
and Zorn (1979) have pointed out that in relatively few cases are these firms 
financially strong and able to generate significant amounts o f cash from their ongoing 
operations. In many cases, these firms are in very weak financial positions, unable 
even to finance the necessary investments to maintain existing levels o f production. 
As for private domestic capital, this appears to be a significant factor only in a few 
countries, notably Mexico, Brazil, Malaysia and India. Few developing countries 
have either a strong domestic capitalist class or well-organised capital markets, (for 
example, until October 1990 there was no stock exchange in Ghana) and even where 
these exist the very large initial capital outlay required for some of these projects put 
them beyond the capacity of local private capital alone to develop.
According to Glen and Pinto (1994) the use of capital markets as a source of external 
financing in developing countries has soared in the 1990s. However, developing
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country firms face a number o f constraints in the financing choices that are available 
to them. The most important o f these relate to government controls, which limit the 
potential menu of instruments. The recent financial crisis in parts of Asia, Latin 
America and Russia has exacerbated the tendancy for capital controls as these 
examples have shown that opening opening up a country to foreign capital involves 
risks, including sudden flight of capital if  investors lose confidence in the country’s 
economic policies.
2.6.2 Factors Influencing Capital Structure
A basic financial decision facing firms is the choice between debt and equity capital 
(Glen and Pinto, 1994). The capital structure which is defined as the extent to which a 
firm is financed with each of its capital sources (debt or equity) is an important 
element in determining both the profitability and riskness of the firm (Bos and 
Fetherston, 1993). The greater the gearing a firm exhibits, the higher the potential for 
failure if  cash flows fall short o f those necessary to service the debts. Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) demonstrated, however, that in an idealised world without taxes, the 
value o f a firm is independent of the debt-equity mix. In short capital structure is 
irrelevant. The Modigliani and Miller perspective has been supported by other 
researchers such as Hamada (1969) and Stiglitz (1974). However, these conclusions 
are at variance with what one sees in the real world, where capital structure matters 
and banks would be extremely reluctant to finance a project with 100 percent debt.
Myers (1984) pointed out that financial economists have not hesitated to give advice 
on capital structure, even though how firms actually chose their capital structures 
remains a puzzle as the theories developed did not seem to explain actual financing
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behaviour. This capital structure puzzle is even more complicated when it is applied 
in an international setting, particularly, in developing countries where markets do not 
always work efficiently and controls and institutional constraints abound. Developing 
country banking systems are often incapable o f providing the needed resources for 
private sector expansion and diversification. This is especially true in countries where 
governments’ intervention in the form of directed credit and subsidized lending to 
state-sector companies consumes a substantial share o f available credit, as it is in 
countries where government demand for credit crowds out the private sector or where 
the macroeconomic environment is too uncertain for banks to lend long-term. In 
India, for example, o f every rupee deposited in the banking system, forty percent 
must be held as reserves (of one form or another); directed credit accounts for another 
twenty-four percent, leaving banks only thirty-six percent of deposits to lend freely 
(Glen and Pinto 1994).
The choice between debt and equity largely depends on three factors: cost, risk, and 
control (Boudreaux 1993; Glen and Pinto 1994). In the international context, 
however, country norms, type and size of industry and host government controls 
could play a role in determining the capital structure. For example, it has been 
suggested that tax differentials between countries influence the way the firm is 
financed (Stonehill and Stitzel, 1969; Lee and Kwok, 1988). This line o f argument is 
supported by Shapiro (1984) who pointed out that in the absence of taxes, MNCs are 
indifferent between issuing debt denominated in one currency or another. With 
differential corporate income taxes, however, a firm should borrow in the country 
with the weaker currency to minimise the expected financing cost (Rhee et al, 1985).
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Another important factor is political risk. MNCs are exposed to varying degrees of 
political risks. A major political event such as a currency blockage or expropriation 
rarely occurs, but the possibility of such occurrence is very real and its impact could 
be severe on the foreign partner of a JV. It may be argued that one of the tools 
available to the foreign partner is to manage this risk by debt policy. Foreign 
investors can minimise the expected loss due to a major political event in a risky 
country by financing mostly with local debt or by borrowing from a syndicate of 
international banks (Lee and Kwok, 1988). Hence it may be argued that JVs operating 
in risky countries should be expected to have higher debt ratios. Other factors found 
to influence capital structure include foreign exchange rate and agency costs.
2.7 Performance of JVs
The literature on joint venture performance has been viewed and examined from two 
perspectives: i) measures of performance and (ii) determinants and factors influencing 
JV performance.
2.7.1 Measures of performance
One particular aspect of JV performance that has been a concern for many years is the 
appropriate yardstick with which to measure or assess the performance of JVs. 
Scholars have used a variety of financial indicators typically employed in business 
research, such as profitability, growth and cost positions (Tomlinson, 1970; Good, 
1972; Renforth, 1974; Dang, 1977; Lecraw, 1983). Others have used objective 
measures such as survival of the IJV (Franko,1971; Stopford and Wells, 1972; 
Raveed,1976; Killing, 1982; Geringer, 1991), its duration (Harringan, 1986; Kogut, 
1988), instability of (significant changes in) its ownership (Franko,1971; Gomes-
Casseres,1987), and re-negotiation of the JV contract (Bloggett, 1987). At the core of 
this debate is the difficulty in operationalising IJV performance, with the effect that 
consensus still eludes researchers as to how to define and measure the concept of 
performance (Geringer and Herbert, 1989). JVs are established for a number of 
different reasons in a variety of circumstances (Killing, 1983, Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988; Porter and Fuller, 1986). The assessment of performance is related to 
the objectives under which a JV is formed (Beamish and Delios 1997b). 
Consequently, measuring JV performance should be approached with due care, 
bearing in mind the objectives of forming the venture. This is because the use of a 
particular yardstick may or may not be indicative of the extent to which the JV has 
achieved its objectives. For example where a JV is formed for the purpose of 
technology transfer, a performance measure like survival or duration may 
inaccurately classify the JV as a poor performer (because of its dissolution), even in 
the event that the technology transfer had occurred successfully (Beamish and Delios, 
1997b).
2.7.2 Factors influencing JV Performance
Many factors have been suggested in the literature as potentially important 
determinants of JV performance (Glaister and Buckley, 1999). These include partner- 
and task-related variables, firm and industry related factors and managerial and host 
country related factors. Partner- and task-related factors found to have an impact on 
JV performance include: partner needs, trust and commitment (Killing, 1983; 
Beamish, 1988; Cavusgil and Zou, 1994; Jarillo, 1988); partner asymmertries and the 
extent to which the businesses of partner firms are related and their influence on JV 
success (Harrigan, 1988; Koh and Venkatramen, 1991; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976).
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Industry related factors considered to have significant influence on JV performance 
are technology level and stage of industry development, i.e., if the industry is in the 
embryonic, growth or mature stage (Theorelli, 1986; Gomes-Casseres, 1988). The 
managerial factors include ownership, control exercised by partners and operational 
autonomy (Schaan, 1983; Rafii, 1978; Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1984; Kogut, 1988; 
Geringer and Herbert, 1989; Blodgett, 1991). Joint ventures formed with host country 
governments were found to be more profitable than those formed with private sector 
enterprises (Reveed and Renforth; 1983, Beamish, 1984). The environment under 
which JVs operate was also found to influence performance. This may encompass the 
host country political system, economic development, legal system, national culture, 
and government policy towards foreign investment (Hamel, 1991, Inkpen, 1995).
2.7.3 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has examined the main theoretical perspectives of FDI and equity joint 
venture formation. The review provides the theoretical underpinnings for the 
empirical analyses in chapter 4 to chapter 7. The extant theories identified in the 
literature to explain why foreign direct investment (FDI) takes place were examined. 
Hymer (1960) was the first to systematically analyse issues relating to the advantages 
of large multinationals, market imperfections, and control. Vernon (1966) built on the 
technological advantage theories, analysing the strategic market implications of the 
product life cycle. Buckley and Casson (1976) extended Coase’s (1937) explanation 
of why MNCs internalise intermediate markets. Dunning (1973, 1981) was the first to 
provide a more comprehensive analysis based on ownership, location, and the 
advantages of internalisation. Literature relating to JVs was also reviewed from three
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perspectives: strategic motives and location factors influencing JV formation, finance 
of JVs and JV performance.
Despite the significant contribution of the literature reviewed above, it is necessary to 
point out some of its limitations. Tomlinson (1970) was the first to note the relative 
lack of literature on international JVs in developing countries compared with 
economically developed countries. Two decades after Tomlinson’s observation, the 
same concerns were expressed by Bennel (1990) and Selassie (1995). With respect to 
Africa Bennel (p.156) notes.“...at a time when ...important policy shifts are 
occurring, it is surprising to find that so little substantive research is being undertaken 
on foreign direct investment in Africa, both in absolute terms and in relation to what 
was being done during the 1970s”. Sharing this view, Selassie pointed out that the 
limited literature on JVs in developing countries is based on the experiences of the 
relatively more developed countries of Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. It 
should be stressed that few studies have examined the countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Moreover, it is important to note that SSACs differ from other developing 
regions on a number of dimensions such as political system, human development, 
culture and stage of economic development. Therefore findings from other regions 
reported in the prior literature may be less applicable to SSA.
The next chapter sets out the research methods for the study.
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Introduction
The focus of this study is based on three research questions: First, what are the 
strategic motives and location factors that influence a foreign investor’s decision to 
enter into international joint ventures in Ghana and Nigeria? Second, what are the 
sources and barriers to finance and the determinants of capital structure of the joint 
ventures in Ghana and Nigeria? Third, what measures are employed to assess the JV 
performance and factors influencing JV success in Ghana and Nigeria? It is pertinent 
to note that in order to address successfully these research questions and achieve the 
aims of this study, as outlined in chapter 1, it is necessary to collect and analyse data 
on the areas central to this research. This chapter sets out the research methods for the 
study.
3.2 Choice of Methodology
Two basic philosophies of research exist, phenomenology and positivism (Easterby- 
Smith et al, 1991). Phenomenology takes the position that reality is socially 
constructed and that the aim of research should be “to appreciate the different 
constructions and meanings that people place on their experience...to understand why 
people have different experience” (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991:24). A 
phenomenological approach is inductive in that the researcher builds theories and 
propositions only following a detailed understanding of experience (Creswell, 1994). 
In contrast, positivism views reality as external and objective, with the role of 
research cast as making reliable and valid observations of this reality in order to test 
fundamental laws hypothesised from existing theory (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). It 
will become clear to the reader that a positivist philosophy underlies this piece of 
research.
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Closely allied to the two philosophical paradigms is the choice between qualitative 
and quantitative research methodologies (Creswell, 1994). Van Maanen (1980: 9) 
defines qualitative methods as an array of interpretive techniques which seek to 
describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the 
frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world. 
The primary techniques associated with qualitative methods are interviews, 
observation and diary methods. Burgess (1982) argues that qualitative methodology 
provides the researcher with an opportunity to probe a small number of samples in 
depth to uncover new clues, open up new dimension of a problem and secure vivid, 
accurate and inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience. However, 
qualitative design is inherently complex and time consuming as design rules and 
procedures are not fixed (Creswell, 1994).
On the other hand, quantitative studies are characterised by the use of deductive form 
of logic wherein theories and hypotheses are tested in a cause-and-effect order. 
Concepts, variables and hypotheses are chosen before the study begins and remain 
fixed throughout the study (Creswell, 1994: 7). The most fundamental way of 
gathering quantitative data is that of questionnaire survey using carefully worked out 
rules and procedures. Aspects of joint venture formation have been investigated 
previously using both methodologies. For example, Selassie (1995) adopted a 
qualitative method in the phenomenological tradition, while other researchers such as 
Glaister and Buckley, 1996; 1998; Awadzi, 1987 and Tatoglu and Glaister, 1998a; 
1998b have employed quantitative survey methods in the positivist tradition. The 
emphasis on quantitative methodology within the international joint venture literature 
is unsurprising given the characteristics of the methodology. Large samples surveys 
allow the researcher to establish the relationship between a number of independent 
variables and an outcome (typically firm performance) and to generalise the findings 
to the population from which the sample was drawn (Creswell, 1994).
Morgan and Smircich (1980) observed that the appropriateness of the research 
approach to be adopted depends on the aims and the nature of the social phenomena
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to be explored. This study involves cross sectional research to be completed over a 
specific period of time. The research has an overall objective to investigate strategic 
motives, factors influencing JV location, finance and performance with the view to 
provide prescriptive advice on West African JVs. Moreover, the basic subject of this 
research involves measurable and quantifiable factors such as how JVs are financed 
in Ghana and Nigeria and therefore provides an ideal situation for the choice of 
quantitative methodology. These general considerations led to the choice of a 
quantitative approach for this study.
In order to achieve the aims of the study, two types of data were collected: i) 
secondary data and ii) primary data.
3.3 Secondary Data Collection
Since the research problem is concerned with JVs in West Africa, of which little is 
known in terms of prior literature, it was deemed necessary to collect and examine as 
many data as possible regarding the subject of study. Secondary data were collected 
and used to identify the patterns and distribution of FDI activity, of which the JV is 
an organisational type, in Ghana. Official annual aggregate data and project level 
information were derived from the records of United Nations Conference for Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) and the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), 
and used to delineate the trends over time, ownership type of FDI, geographical 
location of projects and distribution by sector. It is pertinent to note that the database 
of GIPC consists of all FDI in Ghana since 1986, and as of the fourth quarter of 1998 
totalling about 1399 projects of which equity joint ventures constitute 80.5 percent.
In the case of Nigeria, due to the unavailability of project level data, the analysis of 
trends in FDI are limited to aggregate data derived from the records of the UNCTAD. 
The GIPC database coupled with that of UNCTAD underpins the analysis contained 
in chapter 4.
43
3.4 Primary data Collection
Primary data collection constituted the main purpose of the field study. The following 
sections discuss the sample choice, the survey strategy and procedures for collecting 
the primary data.
3.4.1 Sample Choice
The sample consists of joint ventures formed in Ghana and Nigeria by multinational 
companies from Asia, Europe, Africa and America. There are several alternatives 
available in the selection of a sample for a study of JVs. However, given the 
limitation of financial resources and time available for this study, there were two 
basic options available:
i) take small samples in six or more countries or ii) concentrate on larger samples 
from fewer countries. A decision was made for the latter option. The criteria for 
selecting the host countries are:
a) There should be at least a minimum number of foreign investments in JVs to 
facilitate data collection.
b) The countries should be of 'average' status on the basis of characteristics such as 
GDP, importance of foreign investments to the economy;
c) There should be a relatively stable political and peaceful environment.
Viewed against these broad criteria, the final focus of attention was placed on Ghana 
and Nigeria. As Ghana and Nigeria are among the relatively few West African 
countries where JVs are known to operate, and as the researcher has a good 
knowledge of these countries they are primarily the targets for this study. Ghana and 
Nigeria provide a relatively hospitable climate to foreign investors. This is evidenced 
in the recent enactment of investment laws designed to encourage foreign investment 
by offering incentives to foreign investors and reducing investment restrictions. The 
major recipients of FDI flows to Africa can be placed in three broad groups. The first
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consists of the early recipients, whose net FDI flows have tended to plateau or even 
decline. The second group consists of countries that recorded large increases in FDI 
flows during the 1990s with a large proportion directed to the oil and mining sectors. 
The third group consists of countries where FDI flows have been low and declining 
during much of the 1980s and early 1990s but have begun to turn round in the last 
year or two. According to Bhattacharya et al (1997) Ghana and Nigeria are among the 
three West African countries (the third being Guinea) that fall into the second group 
and therefore strengthen the basis for their selection in terms of FDI characteristics.
It should also be pointed out that Ghana and Nigeria differ in terms of the country 
size and population, however, the difference appears to have no significant impact on 
the combination of samples from Ghana and Nigeria.
Table 3.1 shows the result of the independent sample t-test procedure to test the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the JV samples from Ghana and 
Nigeria along a number of key variables: host partner type, origin of foreign partner 
and JV sector of activity. The t-statistic with associated probabilities provide no 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the Ghana and Nigeria samples are similar. 
This provides a further justification for the choice of Ghana and Nigeria.
Table 3.1
Comparison of Joint Venture Samples: Ghana versus Nigeria
Ghana Nigeria t-value Prob
Mean SD Mean SD
Host partner Type 1.58 0.50 1.50 0.52 0.50 0.62
Origin of Partner 2.00 0.59 2.06 0.68 0.32 0.75
Sector of Activity 2.05 0.80 2.13 0.62 0.38 0.71
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3.4.2 Sample Design and Characteristics
The research population of interest is the international joint ventures in Ghana and 
Nigeria. A listing of such JVs was obtained from secondary sources (The Ghana 
Investment and Promotion Centre, 1996; Franklin, 1996, Redasel’s companies of 
Nigeria, 1996). It is expected that the resulting sampling frame of 450 JVs represents 
a reasonable approximation of the overall population of JVs in Ghana and Nigeria, 
and that any selection bias is minimal.
Samples are classified into two generic types: probability samples and non­
probability or purposive samples. A probability sample is where all members of the 
population have an equal chance of being selected. Where this condition is not met, 
and the methods involve a significant degree of personal judgement, the sample is 
classified as a non-probability sample. A sample should be a microcosm of the 
population, that is, representative of it in order to enable correct conclusions to be 
drawn (Targett, 1990). In order to achieve the above, the sample design adopted for 
this survey used both non-probability and probability sampling methods. First, three 
restrictions were employed in selecting the final sample frame: 1) the sample was 
restricted to JVs with a minimum capital of US $200,000 because companies of that 
size are likely to be obliged by the Companies Act to keep proper records and these 
facilitate data collection. 2) JVs with only one foreign parent and a foreign equity 
holding of more than 10%, because such parents are likely to participate in the JV’s 
decision making. 3) JVs should have been established before 1993 to enable a 
realistic assessment of JV performance. Thereafter, a random sampling technique was 
adopted to select the final sample frame of 160 JVs. The sample frame covered the 
following industry categories of the JVs: agriculture, manufacturing, building and 
construction, mining and services. They were further grouped into three sectoral 
distributions as follows:
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Primary: agriculture and mining (extractive)
Secondary: manufacturing and building and construction 
Tertiary: services
3.4.3 The Choice of Survey Strategy
Survey commonly refers to the collection of standardised information from a specific 
population, or some sample from one, usually but not necessarily by means of 
questionnaire or interview (Robson, 1997). According to Kervin (1992), business 
researchers use three types of survey, which vary in terms of how data are gathered: 
a) questionnaire (including mail survey); b) personal interview; and c) telephone 
interview. Of these, personal interviews and mail interviews are the most commonly 
used. Both methods have advantages one over the other. Personal interviews are 
generally characterised with more reliability of information, high response rates and 
more flexibility as their strengths. Their weaknesses include being relatively 
expensive, potentially susceptible to interviewer's bias and taking a longer time. Mail 
questionnaires can cover a wide geographical area, can provide standardised 
responses, generally cost less and provide an anonymous setting for threatening and 
embarrassing topics. However the response rate could be low. Mail questionnaires 
require limited length and complexity of questions, and there is little control over 
who actually completes the questionnaire (de Chernatony, 1990; Barabba, 1990, 
Kervin, 1992).
As regards to validity and reliability, the literature indicates that it is generally 
difficult to choose one from the other on these bases, and therefore, choosing one of 
the methods would depend on the specific purpose of the survey (Gatlung, 1969; Fink 
and Kosecoff, 1985). A self-administered questionnaire was considered the most 
appropriate data collection instrument for this study. This questionnaire was delivered
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and collected personally for data collection in Ghana. The questionnaire was mailed 
for data collection purposes in the case of Nigeria.
3.4.4 Questionnaire Design.
A copy of the study’s questionnaire is provided in Appendix 1. The design of the 
questionnaire was heavily influenced by the recommendations of Dillman (1978) and 
Oppenheim (1992) who both present comprehensive reviews of the literature on 
questionnaire design. The questions generated were based on the aims of this study 
and from the literature review. The questions were also checked against 
questionnaires administered in similar studies (for example, Tatoglu and Glaister, 
1998a, 1998b; Selassie, 1995). The questionnaire layout was shaped with the 
objective of maximising both response rate and response quality. Consistent with 
Dillman’s (1978) advice, the layout consisted of a series of sections each relating to a 
particular study variable.
The questions incorporated in the instrument are two types: questions of a factual 
nature and attitudinal questions designed to measure the attitudes, perception and 
opinions of the respondents. An issue in trying to capture the attitudes of the 
respondents is the level of scale measurement to apply. There are four levels of 
measurement: nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio. Nuttal (1986) points out that while 
it is rare to meet interval and ratio scales, nominal and ordinal scales are very 
common in the social sciences. Treating attitudinal scales used in social sciences as 
truly interval scaled is controversial (Weisberg and Brown, 1977; Holmes, 1984; and 
Robson, 1985). The question often asked is “what would be the gravity of the risk of 
faulty conclusion in applying interval statistics on ordinal variables?” Researchers 
such as Gaito (1980), Townsend and Ashby (1984) argue that ordinal-level data 
should not be analysed using parametric statistics supposedly limited to interval-level 
or ratio-level measures. On the other hand, Weisberg and Brown (1977:195) disagree 
and suggest that applying interval statistics on ordinal variables would not lead to
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faulty conclusions. In practice, many researchers apply interval statistics on ordinal- 
level measures (see Dooley, 1995; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; Tatoglu and Glaister, 
1988). Furthermore, it is suggested that researcher’s analysis should be based on 
assumptions of the particular statistic, the nature of the construct being measured and 
the distribution of the observations (Binder, 1984; Borgatta and Bohrnstedt, 1980; 
Davison and Sharma, 1988; Maxwell and Delaney, 1985; and Michell, 1986). Based 
on these assumptions, it was deemed appropriate to apply parametric statistical test to 
the ordinal data in this study.
Among the scaling techniques used in surveys, the semantic differential scale and the 
Likert scale are the most widely used technique (Weisberg and Brown, 1977; Tull and 
Hawkins, 1984). Tull and Hawkins (1984) further note that various scaling techniques 
provide "equivalent results" and suggest that generally the use of multiple scale is 
advisable. Holmes (1974) points out that 5 - point scales are generally most effective 
and easier to comprehend from the respondent's point of view. Taking into 
consideration such factors as the type of information needed and the characteristics of 
the respondents, using a Likert like 5 - point scale was considered the most 
appropriate for this study. However, other scales were also used depending on their 
relevance to the specific information being sought.
3.4.5 Pre-testing the Questionnaire
A pilot study was employed as an initial means of highlighting any problem 
associated with the research instrument. Robson (1997) and Yin (1994) suggest that a 
pilot survey enhances the conceptualisation and re-conceptualisation of the key aims 
of the study and ensures errors and omissions are detected. This view is consistent 
with that of Oppenheim (1992). As JV formation in SSA has received little attention, 
a pilot survey helped to define the variables and concepts more sharply for the survey.
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A pre -test of the questionnaire was conducted in two stages. The first stage involved 
inviting comments on the questionnaire from two UK academics who had previously 
conducted research in Sub-Saharan African Countries. Following the revisions made 
in the light of various suggestions made by the two academics, the questionnaires 
were next despatched by mail to twenty JV executives in Ghana and Nigeria. The 
purpose of this pre-test was to evaluate the clarity and understanding of the items. 
Therefore, the JV executives were asked to complete the questionnaires, and give 
their opinions and suggestions with regard to the content, form, clarity and length of 
the questionnaire.
In all 12 respondents from Ghana and Nigeria returned the questionnaire. Their 
written comments indicated the appropriateness of the questions with the exception of 
its length, over which they expressed some concern, but thought necessary after 
further discussions. It must be pointed out that questionnaire length has been the 
subject of debate over many years. Diamantopoulos and Schlegemich (1996) claim 
that a five-page questionnaire on a subject, which the respondent found interesting, 
stood a better chance of completion than a two-page questionnaire on a boring topic. 
Given the interest this area of research generates and the promptness by which the test 
respondents returned the questionnaires (in most cases by an express carrier) it was 
deemed appropriate to proceed without any modifications.
3.4.6 Mail-Out Procedures
In order to improve the response rate, the mail out procedure was modelled closely on 
that advocated by Dillman (1978), in his comprehensive treatment of the topic. The 
following guidelines as suggested by Dillman (1978); Jobber and O’Reilly (1996) and 
Churchill (1987) as shown in Table 3.2 were followed:
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Table 3.2
Procedures for Mail Survey Implementation
Influential Survey Issues Motivated potential respondent by Used in this study
Survey sponsorship Study approved by an organisation valued by the 
respondent (University of Leeds) Yes
Cover letter Personalised, individually-typed, signed by the 
researcher and Prof. Glaister with job titles Yes
The questionnaire Requested information of interest to the respondent, 
easy availability o f  information requested. Used 
simple, short and easy to comprehend questions
Yes
Anonymity/
Confidentiality
Assurance o f respondent’s anonymity/ 
Confidentiality.
Code number/firm’s name on the questionnaire
Yes
No
Contacts Pre-notification of respondent by letter, fax or 
telephone. Reminder by telephone, e-mail or letter 
with duplicate questionnaire
Yes
Postage Providing stamped self-addressed envelopes 
Providing self-addressed envelope (No stamp) In part
Monetary incentive Enclosed monetary incentives No
Non-monetary
incentives
Promised monetary incentives
Promised a summary o f  the study results without
requesting surrender o f anonymity
No
Yes
Deadline Stated deadline in general Yes
Adapted from: Cragg (1991), and Damantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (1996)
The procedures used in the study are summarised below:
Contacts (pre-notification) In order to enhance the response rate, a pre-notification 
letter by e-mail or by telephone was made in advance to the Chief executives/General 
Managers of JVs in Ghana and Nigeria prior to the despatch of the questionnaires. 
This letter explained the purpose of the study and assured confidentiality.
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The Covering letter: A personalised cover letter which was on the Leeds University 
Business School headed paper and not more than one page with the following 
contents was sent to the respondents:
i) the purpose and importance of the study;
ii) the importance attached to the opinion of the respondent;
iii) promise of confidentiality and anonymity;
iv) suggested deadline date for returning the questionnaire; and
v) an expression of thanks to the respondent for the time given.
A sample copy of the cover letter and the reminder are reproduced in Appendices 2 
and 3.
Survey Sponsorship: The likelihood of participating in a mail survey is higher when 
there is some kind of approval from an organisation valued by the potential 
respondents. Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (1996) suggest that company 
executives are in particular more positively disposed towards surveys emanating from 
academics. Compared to proprietary surveys initiated by/on behalf of business firms, 
university sponsorship is likely to achieve a higher response rate due to the non-profit 
nature of the sponsoring organisation. This situation is reflected in the covering letter 
that was counter-signed by the academic supervising this area of research.
Anonymity/Confidentiality: Assurances were made to the respondents that 
confidentiality would be maintained and neither the respondent nor his or her 
organisation would be identified during the analysis and report stages of the study. A 
promise of anonymity and strict confidentiality was stated at the beginning of the 
questionnaires. This was further stressed in the covering letter to indicate the 
importance the researcher attached to the issue of anonymity and confidentiality of 
the respondents. The purpose of such a guarantee was to encourage 
participation/provide motivation and accurate responses.
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Postage: The mail-outs for the questionnaires to Nigerian JVs were processed 
through the University of Leeds postal service and were posted airmail. A self- 
addressed return envelope was enclosed. Although the inclusion of a stamped return 
envelope is recognised as important in terms of encouraging response, the cost 
involved in administering an international mail survey using a prepaid stamped 
envelope rendered this practice less feasible. Examination of the returned envelopes 
with the completed questionnaire was made to verify the impact for not using a 
stamped envelope. The results indicate that all the completed questionnaires were 
automatically processed through a franking machine and that it was usually the 
responsibility of the respondent firm to bear the cost of the postage. This indicates 
that the overall non-response for not using a prepaid stamp appears to be at best 
tenuous. In the case of Ghana, the questionnaires were delivered and collected in 
person thus avoiding the need to enclose a prepaid stamp. However, in a few cases 
where the senior managers who were expected to complete the questionnaires were 
on holiday, self-addressed envelopes with prepaid stamps were included.
Non-monetary incentives: Only one type of non-monetary reward, an offer of a 
summary of the study’s findings (with anonymity maintained) was given to positively 
influence the response rate.
3.4.7 Response Rate
Two techniques were employed to collect data from respondents in Ghana and 
Nigeria. In the case of Nigeria, questionnaires were posted while in the case of Ghana 
questionnaires were delivered to potential respondents in person. In July 1998, 160 
questionnaires with covering letters were either posted or delivered personally. After 
one reminder, a total of 57 usable questionnaires were returned, representing a
response rate of 35.6 per cent. The breakdown of the response rate, together with the 
reasons for not responding are shown in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3 Schedule of Reasons for Non-participation
Number of JVs Percent
Joint Ventures contacted
JVs replies but unable or unwilling to participate 
Reasons for non participation:
Not joint ventures
Due to numerous similar requests/lack o f time 
Company policy not to answer questionnaires 
Uncompleted /  Confidentiality concerns 
Total Usable replies 
No reply
160 100
53 33.1
8 5.0
15 9.3
20 12.5
10 6.3
57 35.6
50 31.2
It is apparent from Table 3.3 that 57 JVs replied with a completed questionnaire. 
Another 53 JVs replied but were unable to participate, the most common reasons 
given being company policy towards questionnaire completion (20). The reason for 
about 50 JVs not replying at all may be due to the vagaries of the postal system in 
Nigeria. One JV executive returned the questionnaire with the comment “I am late 
because I just received your questionnaire and this is one of the problems facing 
Nigerian businesses. Letters do not reach their destinations and if they do arrive are 
very late”. This view was supported by many respondents who pointed out that postal 
systems in many African countries are poor and unreliable. Despite this problem, it 
was decided that a further test should be conducted to ascertain whether non-response
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bias was prevalent in the study. Using Armstrong and Overton’s procedure (1977), a 
non-response bias was tested for by implementing a t-test comparing early and late 
responses along a number of key descriptive variables.
Table 3.4 shows the result of the independent sample t-test procedure to test the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between early and late respondents along the 
variables: host partner type, origin of foreign partner and JV sector of activity. The t- 
statistics with the associated probabilities gave no grounds for rejecting the null 
hypothesis. In summary, the tests indicated no evidence of non-response bias along 
the chosen dimensions.
Table 3.4
Comparison of Early Respondent and Late Respondent
Early Respondents Late Respondent t-value Prob
Mean SD Mean SD
H ost p artn er Type 1.56 0.50 1.54 0.51 0.152 0.88
O rig in  o f  Partner 1.97 0.59 2.08 0.65 0.68 0.49
S ecto r o f  A ctiv ity 2 .97 1.38 3.25 1.54 0.709 0.47
Sample Characteristics and Response
An attempt was also made to match the sample frame characteristics with the 
respondent characteristics to show whether the respondents reflect the characteristic 
of the sample frame. Table 3.5 shows that the response rates were approximately the 
same across the three groups leading to response groupings that reflected the sample
frame division. The highest number of responses came from the secondary sector, 
which not surprisingly, constitutes the biggest proportion of the sample.
Table 3.5
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Sample Characteristics: Sample Frame versus Response rate
Sector of JV Activity No. in Sample 
Frame
Percentage No. of Responses 
received
Response rate 
percentage
Primary 30 37.5 10 33.3
Secondary 80 33.3 30 37.5
Tertiary 50 38.5 17 34.0
Total 160 35.6 57 35.6
An important element in conducting survey research is the identification of key 
informants who are knowledgeable about the business activities of particular interest 
to the researcher and are motivated to respond to the questionnaire. As the questions 
were of a strategic nature, it was determined that respondents should be upper-level 
managers. An examination of the job titles of the respondents revealed: Chief 
Executive (64% of respondents), Finance Director (16%), Executive Director/Board 
Secretary (8%), Personnel Director (12%). It is likely that these respondents will be 
involved in strategic decision-making of their respective firms.
3.5 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument
The concepts of validity and reliability have been universally accepted as critical to 
the evaluation of research (Schwab, 1980). Validity refers to the degree to which 
instruments truly measure the constructs to which they are intended to measure. 
According to Peter (1979), valid measure is the sine qua non of science. A necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for validity of measures is that they are reliable.
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Reliability can be defined broadly as the degree to which measures are free from error 
and therefore yield consistent results.
Churchill (1991) points out that validity of a measuring instrument can be assessed by 
looking for evidence of its content, construct and pragmatic validity. Content validity 
is a subjective measure of how appropriate the items seem to a set of reviewers who 
have some knowledge of the subject matter (Litwin, 1995). The assessment of content 
validity typically involves an organised review of the survey’s content to ensure that 
it includes everything it should and does not include anything it should not. The 
content validity of the instrument used in the present study was established in the 
following way: An extensive literature review was undertaken to develop the items in 
the questionnaire and further checked against similar studies. Next, the questionnaire 
instruments were piloted in two stages utilising two academics and JVs in Ghana and 
Nigeria to give the final shape to the data collection instrument.
Reliability is commonly assessed in three forms: test-retest, alternative form, and 
internal consistency. This study utilised the internal consistency method which is an 
indicator of how well the different items measure the same issue. This is important 
because a group of items that purports to measure one variable should indeed be 
clearly focused on that variable. Internal consistency is measured by calculating a 
statistic known as Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. Coefficient alpha measures internal 
consistency reliability among a group of items combined to form a single scale. It is a 
statistic that reflects the homogeneity of the scale. Nunnally (1978) suggests that 
adequate reliability can be obtained with as few as three items, and can be improved, 
though with diminishing returns, with the addition of more items. Alpha levels of 
0.70 or more are generally accepted as representing good reliability, however, 
Nunnally and Robinson (1991) suggest the alpha value of 0.60 as a threshold. The 
Cronbach alpha results for the constructs are reported in each of the relevant chapters 
and in the appendices 4-7.
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3.6 Data Analysis
The study consists of several separate but related analyses as well as a discussion of 
the results and their implications. Several analytical techniques are used. Detailed 
descriptions of each analytical component are contained in the appropriate chapters. 
Using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for Windows (Version 9), 
both secondary and primary data analyses were conducted and are reported in 
Chapters 4 to 7. Figure 1 shows the diagramatic representation of the phases of the 
analytical components.
Prior to the main analysis, an exploratory data analysis was conducted using visual 
and descriptive displays such as histogram, scatter plots, mean, median, skewness and 
kurtosis to reveal information about the data being examined. This procedure is 
consistent with the views of Flartwig and Dearing (1979) who argue that a researcher 
should learn as much as possible about a variable or a set of variables before using the 
data to test theories of social science relationships. The data were also examined with 
respect to normality, linearity, homogeneity of variance, outliers and missing values.
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Figure 3.1
Overview of Analytical Components
3.7 Summary
This chapter has discussed the research design, study sample, procedures of data 
collection and analysis. The secondary data collection method involved mainly the 
examination of the GIPC database and that of UNCTAD.
Primary data collection, which constitutes the main purpose of the field study was 
through a self-administered questionnaire of JV executives in Ghana and Nigeria. A 
listing of such JVs was obtained from secondary sources (The Ghana Investment and 
Promotion Centre, 1996; Franklin, 1996; Redasel’s companies of Nigeria, 1996). The 
data gathered by the questionnaire represents the perceptions of the JV managers. As
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the questions were of a strategic nature, it was decided that respondents should be 
upper-level managers.
Huber and Power (1985) caution that care should be taken in data collection, in terms 
of designing the questionnaire and ensuring appropriate managers respond to the 
questionnaire. Several of Huber and Power’s recommendations were followed, in 
particular, all the respondents were pre-notified. In administering the mail survey an 
attempt was made to utilise the guidelines suggested by Diamantopoulos and 
Schlegelmilch (1996) in order to improve the response rate. A usable response rate of
35.6 percent was obtained which is deemed reasonably good, particularly given the 
poor and unreliable nature of the postal systems in many sub-Saharan African 
countries.
A good construct measurement is a key methodological concern in research, 
particularly in mail questionnaire surveys. This is because in mail questionnaire based 
studies there is a separation between the researcher and respondents and this places a 
great onus on the designer of the questionnaire to ensure good construct measures. In 
this study, an effort was made to meet generally accepted psychometric criteria, such 
as reliability and validity. Specifically, a triangulation of both literature review and 
pre-test with experts were used to ensure validity of the test instrument. This is 
significant in that the concept of triangulation is based on the assumption that any 
bias inherent in a particular method is neutralised when used in conjunction with 
other methods (Jick, 1979).
The analysis of the secondary data is presented in chapter 4. The analysis of the 
primary data is presented in chapters 5 to 7.
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CHAPTER 4
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN GHANA AND NIGERIA: 
PATTERNS OF ACTIVITY, DISTRIBUTION AND THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT POLICY.
4.1 Introduction
Developing countries are engaged in a programme of growth aimed at breaking 
out of the shell of poverty and underpriviledge and raising average living 
standards. The achievement of growth obviously necessitates a very substantial 
programme of investment. Fernandes (1979) maintains that one of the evidences 
of the poverty of developing countries is an acute shortage of capital. 
Developing countries seek to raise investment funds through taxation and 
borrowing domestically and abroad. These sources have their limitations, 
however, as domestic incomes on which to base these taxes are low, and the 
developing countries have mounting debt problems. Official development 
assistance (ODA) which is another important source of finance to developing 
countries has also fallen. According to the IMF (1998) the gross bilateral ODA 
disbursements to sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) fell from $13.9 billion in 1990 to 
$10.7 billion in 1996. In such circumstances, a long recognised option available 
to developing countries is to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) (Fernandes, 
1979). It is argued that FDI serves as a means to augment domestic savings 
without resorting to debt. Simply put, it enables a country to finance a faster rate 
of investment than is possible from domestic savings, thereby raising its growth 
potential. Researchers such as Colman and Nixson (1985) and Bennel (1990) 
support this line of argument. They point out that FDI provides a unique 
combination of long - term finance, much needed technologies and associated
management and technical know-how, which are unavailable or in short supply 
in developing countries and are particularly useful for their economic 
development. It is therefore no coincidence that after the world debt crisis in the 
early 1980s, FDI assumed a greater importance for many developing countries 
(see UNCTAD, 1992). This is partly because the increasing adoption of market 
oriented and liberal economic reforms in developing countries and indeed the 
forces of globalisation have served to change the hostile reservations which 
formerly characterised attitudes towards FDI (Lall, 1998). Now there is a 
growing realisation among policy makers in developing countries that FDI offers 
a significant potential for growth and presents an unparalleled opportunity for 
developing countries to raise their living standards.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part deals with FDI in Ghana and 
the second part is mainly concerned with FDI in Nigeria.
4.2 FDI in Ghana
The purpose of this part is to describe and analyse the trends of FDI, and to 
review the changing government policy environment towards FDI in Ghana, 
which has moved from a once centralised economy into a free market economy 
(Appiah-Adu, 1998). This part of the chapter is organised as follows: 
Determinants of FDI with specific reference to location-specific advantages is 
presented in the next section. The following section discusses the national policy 
environment as a determinant of FDI in Ghana. The third section focuses on the 
data source for the chapter. The fourth section examines trends over time, 
ownership type of foreign direct investment, capital structure of FDI projects,
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geographical location of projects, distribution by sector, and national and 
regional origins of foreign investors. The fifth section provides a discussion of 
the FDI trends in Ghana and the implications of government policy. Conclusions 
are in the final section.
4.3 Location Specific Advantages and FDI Capital Inflows
FDI constitutes the largest source of aggregate private capital flows to 
developing countries and is estimated to account for 45 percent of all private 
finance for developing countries (Foley, 1995). Underpinning the rising FDI 
inflows lie three broad variables which influence the decision of MNCs to invest 
in a foreign country (Dunning, 1981; 1993; 1995). First is the presence of 
ownership-specific advantages as incorporated in a firm’s resources and 
capabilities. Second, the presence of locational advantages, which includes 
tangible and intangible resources such as physical and social infrastructure, and 
government policies that create a congenial business environment. Third, the 
existence of an organisational form by which the MNC combines its ownership 
advantages with country location advantages to maintain and improve its 
competitive position. These factors together determine FDI in the host country. 
Whilst all three factors are important determinants of FDI it is only location- 
specific advantages which can be influenced directly by the host government 
actions as the other two factors are firm-specific. As competition to attract FDI 
among developing countries has heightened in recent years (see UNCTAD, 
1993), it is imperative that those factors which could be used to influence 
inbound FDI by the host government are exploited to the fullest advantage in 
order to increase FDI capital inflow into a specific country.
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Ghana, like many African countries, has an abundance of natural resources, 
which include mineral wealth, a good supply of arable land suitable for crops 
and livestock production, forest resources, marine and fresh water fish stocks, 
and a good potential for hydroelectricity generation. With an internal market of 
around 18.3 million people and the potential of an extended market as trade 
barriers in West Africa are systematically being dismantled through integration 
of individual states into the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS see Appendix 8), the natural assets collectively constitute an 
important attraction for inward FDI. Yet, during the 1980s, Ghana attracted a 
relatively negligible amount of FDI (Afriyie, 1998). This points to the fact that, 
although natural resources play an important role in FDI inflow, if Ghana is to 
attract FDI on the scale needed it must offer foreign investors new sources of 
competitive advantage rather than a reliance on natural resources alone. It is 
against this background that the created and intangible location-specific 
resources, such as physical infrastructure and government policies, are regarded 
as important as natural resources.
FDI flows into the developing countries as a whole have increased considerably. 
The proportion of global FDI as a whole have increased from 18 percent in 1992 
to 33 percent in 1996 (Arnold and Quelch, 1998). In contrast sub-Saharan 
Africa’s share in the developing country total declined from 6.4 percent in 1985- 
1990 to 3.5 percent in 1994 then to 2.7 percent in 1996 (UNCTC, 1995; 
UNCTC, 1997). It is estimated to fall further to 1.9 percent in 1997 (UNCTAD, 
1998). This is significant in that it suggests that sub-Saharan Africa has not
benefited much from the surge in FDI flows to developing countries. Yet, Ghana 
has recorded an average increase in inflow of 920% compared to an average 
increase of 60% for the 1987-1996 period for Africa (UNCTAD, 1998). This 
requires a closer examination of the changes and impact of government policies 
towards FDI. There is a considerable measure of support for the view that 
national policies impact the inflow of FDI into a country (see Brewer, 1993; 
UNCTAD, 1998). The key question is: how important are national policy 
reforms in attracting FDI finance into the Ghanaian economy?
The following section reviews some of the main features of the national policy 
reforms, as intangible location-specific determinants of FDI in Ghana.
4.4 National Policy Environment as a Determinant of FDI
During the last decade many sub-Saharan Africa countries (SSACs) embarked 
upon economic reforms to reverse economic decline, and to generate sustainable 
growth and development under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). SSACs that adopted the reforms programme include Ghana, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zaire. The reforms 
programme has the following key components:
i) Liberalisation of FDI regulatory framework
ii) Economic stabilisation including reduction in fiscal deficits
ii) Privatisation, rationalisation and restructuring of state owned enterprises 
(SOEs)
iv) Upgrading of physical infrastructure.
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These reforms proved to be very unpopular in many SSACs resulting in political 
instability, partial implementation and in some cases the programmes were 
completely abandoned due to inadequate institutional capacity with which to 
implement the reforms. Nigeria, for example, abandoned the reforms programme 
in 1993 and is yet to resume it (Economist, 1999). Overall the degree of 
government commitment and the level of implementation have varied 
considerably among governments of the SSACs. Ghana is among the few 
SSACs that has substantially implemented the programme and is one of the most 
successful in sub-Saharan Africa (Chhibber and Leechor, 1993: Appiah-Adu, 
1998).
4.4.1 Liberalisation of FDI Regulatory Framework
The investment legislation in Ghana has undergone a systematic change since 
the late 1950s. Over the past five decades the investment codes have been 
changed seven times with the latest being 1994 (see Appendix 9). The economic 
reforms programme initiated in 1983 accelerated the pace of FDI liberalisation 
culminating in the 1994 investment code which virtually removed all the 
restrictions on foreign ownership, capital and dividend transfer by foreign 
investors. It is important to note that the 1994 investment code represents a 
significant departure from the previous ones which made restrictions the comer 
stone of the investment regulations. The liberal FDI policies of the Ghanaian 
government has further enhanced FDI capital inflow by offering a number of 
investment incentives to investors, as well as introducing a one-stop shop to 
reduce administrative costs and inefficiencies. Ghana is also a member of the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank, which
provides international insurance coverage for investors in developing countries 
to reduce non-commercial risks. It must be emphasised that these investment 
rules and regulations are an important FDI determinant because obviously FDI 
cannot occur unless it is allowed to enter a country and no investor decides to 
invest in a country without regard to the country’s regulatory environment. The 
liberalisation of rules and regulations may partly explain why FDI is rising in 
Ghana. However, while open FDI policies are basically intended to induce FDI 
the inducement may not be taken. FDI remains low in most of the countries of 
Africa although the regulatory framework is quite open (UNCTAD, 1998).
4.4.2 Macroeconomic Stability
With respect to economic stability, there has been a remarkable turnaround in 
the Ghanaian economy from negative growth to an average growth of 3 percent 
per annum in the last decade. Inflation which averaged about 56 percent per 
annum before the economic reforms programme in 1983 has also fallen to an 
annual average of 26 percent over the last decade (Botchwey, 1995). The 
precipitous decline in the real GDP rate has also been arrested and reversed. In 
the 1991 - 1996 period, GDP grew from 2427.5 billion cedis to 10384.5 billion 
cedis representing a rise of 327.8 percent over the five year period (IMF, 1998). 
According to the Bank of Ghana (1995) the growth in money supply has been 
controlled, resulting in relative price stability in the economy.
There is no doubt that the allocation of foreign exchange by governments 
through non-market processes has in the past been one of the policies most 
damaging to growth in Africa. But in recent years, exchange rate regimes have
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changed dramatically in a number of African countries. Market forces in Ghana 
now determine the exchange rate. This real exchange rate policy has not only 
enhanced the purchasing power of foreign capital when it enters the country but 
also provides insurance against sudden real devaluation in the future and has a 
positive influence on FDI location decisions. It may also be noted that a decade 
of stabilising policies has yielded broad budget balance, strong export growth 
and a reasonable external position. This economic growth performance and 
general prospects in Ghana are expected to attract larger investment inflows to 
serve the market.
4.4.3 Privatisation
Over the last decade there has been a tremendous shift of opinion about the role 
of state and private enterprises in promoting economic growth (Bouton and 
Sumlinski, 1996). A strong consensus has emerged that the achievement of more 
dynamic economic growth requires a greater role for the private sector. 
Underlying this consensus is the belief that resources will be used more 
efficiently and effectively if they are transferred to the private sector. According 
to Bouton and Sumlinski (1996) a key element of this market orthodoxy has 
been the privatisation of state - owned enterprises (SOEs).
Privatisation which is defined as a special case of acquisition of a firm from the 
state is becoming an increasingly important avenue for foreign investment 
finance in Africa (UNCTAD, 1998). Privatisation in Ghana welcomes foreign 
investors and the committee in charge of the privatisation programme often look 
for foreign investors to buy shares in such enterprises. Whilst privatisation has
become a global phenomenon, the distribution and intensity of privatisation 
activities continues to be geographically uneven. Up to 1997, Ghana has 
concluded more than 100 privatisation transactions and is regarded as one of the 
most active countries in privatisation in Africa. In SSA, $299 million of a total 
of $623 million in privatisation sales in 1996 were raised through sales to 
foreign investors. Ghana topped the list with $186 million representing about 75 
percent of the total proceeds realised from foreign investors through 
privatisation sales in Africa (UNCTAD, 1998). It is true to say that in Ghana 
FDI flows are largely driven by privatisation and constitute a massive source of 
capital inflow to Ghana. Privatisation programmes are therefore an important 
means for attracting additional domestic and foreign investment flows and 
beyond those related directly to the sale of SOEs. The reason is that privatisation 
may also act as an indication of the host government commitment to private 
sector investment (Lall, 1998).
4.4.4 Infrastructure Development
Another aspect of the environment is the institutions which foreign investors 
come into contact with when they intend to invest in a country. These 
institutions which may be government as well as quasi-government include 
institutions which grant access to infrastructure facilities such as energy, 
telecommunication, certification of entitlement to fiscal or other incentives. 
Since the launch of the economic reforms in Ghana in 1983, these institutions 
have been restructured to respond more positively to the needs of prospective 
investors (GIPC, 1997). In addition, it has been the government investment 
strategy to rehabilitate the physical infrastructure such as roads and ports on a
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large scale. In spite of significant improvements in the physical infrastructure, 
Ghana still faces a backlog of infrastructure rehabilitation that resulted from 
many years of neglect (Chhiber and Leechor, 1993). The availability of these 
infrastructure facilities and the efficient functioning of these institutions partly 
determine the relative attractiveness of Ghana as an investment location.
4.5 Sources of Data
Given the important policy shifts towards FDI that have occurred, it is somewhat 
surprising that so little substantive research has been undertaken on FDI in 
Africa. Bennell (1990) maintains that this is due to the paucity of good quality 
data that collectively provide a clear detailed overview and understanding of the 
extent of FDI in Africa. Ghana is no exception to the problem of lack of good 
quality data availability. Up to the late 1960s the industrial statistics section of 
the Ghana Central Bureau of Statistics collected data on the ownership structure 
and productive operations of the manufacturing enterprises in Ghana employing 
more than thirty people. Thereafter the standard of data collection and analysis 
deteriorated rapidly to such an extent that no statistics were published after 1972 
until 1975 (Bennell, 1990). It is important to note that most of the data up to 
1986 relate solely to the manufacturing sector and are therefore unsuitable for 
the analysis of general trends of FDI and JVs in particular. The Ghana 
Investment Centre collected data on ownership structure of Ghanaian enterprises 
between 1986 and September, 1994 but still there were problems with the 
quality of data collection techniques used in this period. With the re­
establishment of the Ghana Investment Centre as Ghana Investment Promotion 
Centre in September, 1994 with the role to co-ordinate and monitor all
investment activities in Ghana, the problem of data quality has, to a large extent 
been overcome.
The data presented below is derived from the records of Ghana Investment 
Promotion Centre and the United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). What makes the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 
data particularly valuable and reliable is that the legislation requires all new 
investors intending to establish an enterprise in Ghana to register with the centre 
before they begin to operate. However, it should be noted that the data used 
represents the approved FDI projects only, and that about 90 percent of these 
approved projects materialised. Also, some of the data is incomplete and 
therefore the information that is presented, in some cases, is limited to a 
relatively few number of years. Nevertheless, it should also be pointed out that 
these data sets provide one of the most comprehensive bodies of information 
available for systematic study on FDI activity in an African country. The nature 
of investment legislation that forms the backdrop of the FDI trends reported 
below is outlined in Appendix 8.
4.6 Trends of FDI in Ghana
The number of foreign direct investment projects over the 1986 - 1998 period is 
shown in Table 4.1. The number of new projects rose steadily over the period. It 
may be noted that out of the 1399 FDI projects registered in the period, the 
1992-1998 seven year period accounts for about 77.6 percent, compared to 22.4 
percent over the six year period of 1986-1991.
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Table 4.1.
Volume of Approved FDI Projects in Ghana: All Sectors 1986-1998
YEAR NUMBER OF PROJECTS PERCENTAGE
1986- 1989 163 11.7
1990 65 4.6
1991 86 6.1
1992 133 9.5
1993- 1994 191 13.7
1995 150 10.7
1996 187 13.4
1997 237 16.9
1998 187 13.4
Total 1399 100.0
Source: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 1997
Table 4.2 shows the share of inward FDI to gross fixed capital formation. The 
share of FDI to gross fixed capital formation in Ghana rose steadily between 
1980-1992 but below the African average. It then rose dramatically to 14 percent 
in 1993, reaching the highest level in the decade at over 30 percent in 1994 
before falling to 15.6 percent in 1996. It should be noted that Ghana's share has 
been more than double that of the average share of Africa in the 1993-1996 
period.
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Table 4.2
Share of Inward FDI to Gross Capital Formation, 1980-1996
(i) Share of Inward FDI (%)
Year Ghana Africa
1980 1.1 3.6
1985 1.9 2.7
1986-1991 1.6 3.4
1992 2.5 4.2
1993 14.0 6.1 (
1994 30.2 7.6
1995 13.8 7.4
1996 15.6 8.7
(ii) Share of FDI Stock (%) 
Year Ghana Africa
1980 1.5 3.7
1985 4.3 6.9
1990 5.3 10.0
1996 15.3 16.6
Source: UNCTAD (1998)
The value of FDI inflow to Ghana over the 1985-1995 period is shown in Table 
3. The value of FDI rose steadily from an annual average of $8 million in the 
1985-1990 period to $240 million in 1995. This represents a thirty-fold increase 
and is unprecedented in FDI history in Ghana. Also, Table 4.3 shows that the 
FDI stock has risen significantly, nearly three times the 1990 level.
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Table 4.3
Value of Inward FDI and Selected Stock in Ghana, 1985-1995 (US$ Million)
YEAR FDI INFLOW FDI STOCK
1985-90 8 375
1991 20 -
1992 23 -
1993 125 -
1994 233 776
1995 240 1021
Source: UNCTAD 1997
* Annual Average.
The capital structure of FDI is shown in Table 4.4. Out of the overall FDI 
capitalisation of $997.01million over the 1994-1998 period, about two-thirds are 
in the form of debts/loans indicating that the foreign investors prefer to finance 
projects in Ghana using debts rather than equity. Perhaps the reason for the 
preference for debt to equity may be due to foreign investors’ perceptions of the 
risk relative to the benefits of using fixed debt financing.
Table 4.4
Capital Structure of Approved FDI Projects, September 1994-1998 
(US $ Million)
Year Equity Percent Debt Percent Total
1994* 4.90 51.5 4.62 49.50 9.52
1995 49.07 32.71 101.2 67.29 150.27
1996 96.40 50.00 96.39 50.00 192.79
1997 142.25 30.00 337.36 70.00 479.61
1998 51.68 31.00 113.14 69.00 164.82
Total 334.30 34.5 652.71 65.5 997.01
Source: Author’s Calculation based on Ghana Investment Promotion Centre
Unpublished data 1998
1994* September - December
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Approved FDI projects by ownership type shown is Table 4.5. Out of the 1212 
projects approved for the period 1986 -1997, a total of 1007 projects (83 
percent) were JVs and 205 projects (17 percent) were WOS.
Ghana has instituted an extensive joint participation programme through 
legislation and administration of investment codes since the mid-1960s (see 
Appendix 8). The primary aim of this investment program has been to increase 
local control of key economic sectors while utilising foreign expertise to do so 
(Afriyie, 1988). At the macro level, the relative importance of Ghana's joint 
participation in ownership of enterprises is reflected in Table 5. From the mid 
1980s to the early 1990s around 97 percent of the FDI projects were in the form 
of EJVs. This percentage has steadily declined from 1992 with the most recent 
figures indicating that EJVs comprise around two-thirds of approved projects 
with WOS comprising about one third of FDI projects. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that EJVs constitute a significant proportion of investment ownership in Ghana.
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Table 4.5
Approved FDI Projects in Ghana by Ownership Type 1986 - 1997.
WHOLLY-OWNED EQUITY JOINT VENTURE TOTAL
YEAR NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER
COLUMN
PERCENT
1986 1989 5 3.1 158 96.9 163 13.4
1990 2 3.1 63 96.9 65 5.4
1991 0 0 86 100.0 86 7.0
1992 4 3.0 129 97.0 133 11.0
1993-1994 23 12.0 168 88.0 191 15.8
1995 38 25.3 112 74.7 150 12.5
1996 51 27.3 136 72.7 187 15.5
1997 82 34.6 155 65.4 237 19.5
Total 205 16.9 1007 83.1 1212 100
Source: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, 1997
The geographical location of new investment projects in Ghana between 1994 
and 1998 (the period for which data is available) is shown in Table 4.6. The vast 
majority of the projects (over three - quarters) are, not surprisingly, located in 
the Greater Accra region, which has the bulk of Ghanaian infrastructure. The 
Ashanti region is the next most popular location with about 9 percent of the 
projects. The least developed regions in terms of infrastructure recorded very 
low investment inflow levels and in the case of Upper West region none at all.
Table 4.6
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Geographical Location of FDI Projects (September 1994 -  1998)
REGION NO. OF PROJECTS PERCENTAGE
Greater Accra 606 77.69
Ashanti 67 8.59
Western 40 5.13
Central 24 3.08
Eastern 22 2.82
Volta 10 1.28
Northern 7 0.90
Brong Ahafo 3 0.38
Upper East 1 0.13
Upper West 0 0.00
Total 780 100.0
Sources: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, 1998.
The sectoral distribution of FDI projects for the 1994-98 period (the period for 
which data is available) is shown in Table 4.7. The tertiary sector plays a 
dominant role with service industry recording over two-thirds of the FDI 
projects. This is followed by the secondary sector with about one-fifth of the 
projects. The number of the projects in the service sector has increased 
significantly. Traditionally the service sector in Ghana was perceived as being 
relatively unattractive to foreign investors. This is because Ghana like many 
African countries is rich in natural resources such as gold deposits, industrial 
diamonds, bauxite, manganese and lumber and therefore attractive to resource- 
seeking investors. The primary sector which is predominantly agricultural 
industry and employs about 70 percent of the Ghanaian population and the 
mainstay of the economy registered relatively few projects.
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Table 4.7
FDI Inflows into Ghana by Sector and Industry, September 1994 -1998 (US$ million)
Sector/Industry Value Percentage
Primary 100.70 10.10
Agriculture 100.70 10.10
Secondary 204.10 20.47
Manufacturing 204.10 20.47
Tertiary 692.30 70.45
Building & Construction 63.50 6.37
Commerce 45.60 4.57
Tourism 12.10 1.21
Other Services 571.10 57.30
Total 997.01 100.00
Source: Author’s Calculations based on Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 1998
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The nationality of investors in Ghana by number of projects is shown in Table 
4.8. The UK leads the league of foreign investors in Ghana with over 12 percent 
of the projects, followed by Germany and India each with about 8 percent. The 
'Other' investors representing about 42 countries contribute about one - third of 
the projects. It is noteworthy that countries such as India, China, South Korea 
and Israel, which in the past had very few investments in Ghana, are now 
showing a greater willingness to invest.
Table 4.8
Approved FDI Projects by Nationality: All Sectors, 1990-1997
COUNTRY NUMBER PERCENT
United Kingdom 128 12.2
Germany 86 8.2
India 85 8.1
U. S. A. 79 7.6
China 75 7.2
Lebanon 72 6.9
Switzerland 43 4.1
Netherlands 35 3.3
Italy 30 2.9
South Korea 28 2.7
France 27 2.6
Canada 18 1.7
Israel 12 1.2
Other 327 31.3
Total 1045 100
Source: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 1997
The regional source of approved projects in Ghana is shown in Table 4.9. Well 
over one-third of the approved projects come from Western European investors, 
followed by the Asian/Pacific region with about one- quarter of the projects. 
Another significant group of investors is from the Middle East contributing 
about 10 percent, with Lebanon and Israel being the primary source countries.
North America also contributed 10 percent of the projects. Multilateral projects, 
that is, investment projects from more than one national origin comprised about 
10 percent of projects. Table 4.9 also shows that well over two - thirds of the 
projects came from the Triad.
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Table 4.9
Approved FDI Projects by Regional Origin: All Sectors 1990 - 1997.
Region 1990 1991 1992 1993-
1994
1995-
1997
Total percent
Africa 1 4 8 7 31 51 4.9
Asia/Pacific 14 12 35 44 138 243 23.3
Mid-East 9 5 14 26 47 101 9.7
N / America 6 14 10 15 53 98 9.4
W/Europe 24 36 52 74 230 416 39.8
E/Europe 1 3 3 5 5 17 1.6
L / America 1 3 1 0 8 13 1.2
Multilateral 9 8 10 20 59 106 10.1
Total 65 85 133 191 571 1045 100
TRIAD
STATUS
Triad 44 62 97 133 421 757 72
Non-Triad 21 23 36 58 150 288 28
Total 65 85 133 191 571 1045 100
Source: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 1997
Table 10 shows the region of origin and entry mode of FDI projects. It is clear 
from Table 10 that for each region the preferred mode of entry was through an 
equity joint venture with at least two - thirds of the projects from each region 
being represented by this organisational form.
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Table 4.10
Approved FDI Projects by Ownership Type and Regional Origin: All 
Sectors, 1990 - 1997
Wholly Owned Equity Joint Venture Total
Region NO. % (Row) NO. %
(Row)
NO. %
(Col)
Africa 17 33.3 34 66.7 51 4.9
Asia/Pacific 58 23.9 185 76.1 243 23.4
Middle East 11 11.0 90 89.0 101 9.6
N/America 13 13.3 85 86.7 98 9.3
W/Europe 75 18.0 341 82.0 416 40.0
E/Europe 4 23.5 13 76.5 17 1.6
L/America 4 31.0 9 69.0 13 1.2
Multilateral 18 17.0 88 83.0 106 10.0
Total 200 19.1 845 80.9 1045 100.0
TRIAD
STATUS
Triad 146 19.2 611 80.7 757 72.0
Non-Triad 54 18.7 228 81.3 288 28.0
Total 200 19.1 845 80.9 1045 100.0
Source: Ghana nvestmenl Promotion Centre 1997
4.7 Discussion and Implications
This chapter is the first to provide a systematic account of recent trends of FDI 
in Ghana over a relatively long period of time. Official statistics indicate that 
there is an increasing trend of inward FDI to Ghana from the late 1980s into the 
1990s. The relative success of Ghana in attracting FDI is partly explained by 
differences in the level of economic reform policies being pursued by the 
Ghanaian government and those pursued by other sub-Saharan African 
countries. Brewer (1993) has pointed out that whether policies of an individual 
country will attract FDI or not are dependent on the relative features of another 
country’s policies. In other words, changes in the growth rate of inbound FDI for 
any one country depends on the relative magnitude of that country’s policy 
changes compared with other countries. Therefore Ghana by pursuing the
reforms programme for almost a decade and a half has placed itself in a 
relatively advantageous position in relation to other SSACs with respect to the 
attraction of FDI capital inflows.
A further explanation of the rising trend in FDI appears to be in a change in the 
political circumstances of the country. Ghana abandoned military dictatorship 
and returned to democratic governance through multi - party elections thereby 
reducing the perceived political risk and increasing the confidence of 
prospective foreign investors.
It is also clear that privatisation is a major source of FDI in Ghana. There were 
about 181 SOEs in which the central government had 100 percent or majority 
shares in Ghana prior to the privatisation programme. As at 1997 over 100 SOEs 
have been privatised (UNCTAD, 1998). It is apparent from the foregoing that 
privatisation in Ghana will, in the near future, exhaust itself, and as such this 
sector will lose its influence as a major attraction and source of FDI capital 
inflow. In public policy terms Ghana should consolidate its economic reforms by 
removing the remaining obstacles in order to create a more congenial 
environment to sustain the FDI capital inflows. Specifically, Ghana needs to 
implement far-reaching improvements in corporate governance to avoid 
capricious interference with private activity and should develop and maintain a 
transparent legal system capable of gaining the confidence of foreign investors. 
Another sector of the economy that deserves greater attention is the provision of 
physical infrastructure such as electricity, water quality roads and transport 
network. The incidence of power cuts in Ghana, for example, highlights the need 
to shift budgetary priorities towards infrastructure development. At the same
81
8 2
time the Ghanaian government should encourage private sector investment in 
infrastructure development.
There has clearly been an overwhelming preference by foreign companies to 
engage in equity joint ventures rather than invest through wholly owned 
subsidiaries. This is despite the fact that Ghana has almost eliminated ownership 
restrictions that were prevalent in the 1970s and early 1980s. Perhaps the 
investment legislation in Ghana partly provides explanation for the preference of 
EJVs. The analysis of changes in the investment legislation in Ghana (see 
Appendix 8) reveals progressive moves in favour of EJVs. For example, the 
Ghana Investment Policy Decree 1976 required all foreign firms to form EJVs 
with Ghanaians. Subsequent investment codes in 1981, 1985 and 1994 have 
made it easier to form an EJV as against a WOS by requiring or placing lower 
equity capital requirements on the prospective EJV investors.
Another important explanation for the preference of EJVs on the part of foreign 
investors is that EJVs offer many advantages such as political accommodation, 
country knowledge, technology transfer, risk and cost sharing (see Beamish 
1985, Glaister and Buckley 1996, Afriyie 1998). It is important to single out risk 
and cost sharing advantages because Africa, including Ghana, is perceived to be 
a risky place to do business (Bhattacharya et al,1997). It would appear that EJVs 
are seen by foreign investors in Ghana as a highly effective mode of FDI entry to 
reduce the perceived risk by sharing the cost and risk with the local partner. It is 
further suggested Ghana and other SSACs should collaborate to set up 
investment centres abroad (as SSACs may lack the resources to do so alone) to
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offset the negative perception of potential investors of whom many may lack 
direct exposure to Africa.
The data also raises an important issue on how FDI is financed in Ghana. It is 
apparent from the data that debt capital constitutes over 65 per cent of the capital 
structure of FDI capital inflows. Identifying the determinants of international 
capital structure has proved controversial (Sekely and Collins, 1988). Stonehill 
and Stitzel (1969) found no significant impact of industry and country effect on 
capital structure whereas Aggarwal (1981) and Errunza (1979) found both 
industry and country effects to be significant. It is widely accepted that the 
firm’s managerial perceptions of the risks relative to the benefits of using fixed- 
cost debt financing affect capital structure. Specifically, tax and legal systems 
influence capital structure (Sekely and Collins, 1988). Given the above and the 
perception of Africa, including Ghana to be a risky place to do business this is 
bound to influence the capital structure of FDI in Ghana in favour of debt as 
against equity. It also appears that debt capital offers foreign investors greater 
flexibility in repatriating funds to service debt or pay creditors. The implication 
for Ghana of having more debt as against equity is that as more and more debt 
capital is used to finance FDI projects, the firm’s ability to meet fixed interest 
payments out of current earnings diminishes. It should be noted that all earnings 
are subject to natural fluctuations due to changes in the market place but debt 
interest payment must be made regardless of the level of current earnings. If 
earnings fall too much, even temporarily, an over-leveraged firm can be forced 
into insolvency in spite of its long-term viability.
The data raises an important issue regarding the sectoral composition of FDI in 
Ghana. The primary sector accounts for 60 percent of total FDI in SSA 
(UNCTAD, 1998). In Ghana, however, FDI is concentrated in the tertiary and 
secondary sectors with little FDI in the primary sector. The implication of this is 
that Ghana appears to be moving away from its over dependence on the primary 
sector, which for so many years has been the dominant sector and a reason for 
the slower pace of industrialisation in much of Africa, as pointed out by 
Cantwell (1991).
The geographical distribution of foreign investments clearly shows that the bulk 
of registered projects are located in Accra, which is the most developed region in 
Ghana, with under one-quarter of FDI projects spread over the remaining nine 
regions. This is despite locational incentives in the form of tax rebates ranging 
between 25 - 50 percent for investments located outside Accra. This evidence 
lends support to other research findings that fiscal incentive packages alone do 
not have a positive effects on FDI inflows (Shah and Toye 1978; Lim 1983; 
Balasubramanyam 1984).
In terms of source country investors, FDI in Ghana has largely originated from 
the UK and other Western European countries, which has historically long been 
the case. However, it is interesting to note that non-traditional sources of FDI 
such as from India, China and Israel now feature in the league of foreign 
investors.
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As Ghana continues with its liberalisation of FDI regimes and policy moves 
more towards a market-based economic system, the economy will become 
steadily more integrated with other national economies as cross-border 
investment and financial capital increase. It would be counter-productive for the 
Ghanaian government to try to use capital controls to protect firms in Ghana 
from global forces since that would amount to shielding the economy from 
powerful sources of growth. However, the recent financial crisis in parts of Asia, 
Latin America and Russia have shown that opening up a country to foreign 
capital involves risks, including a sudden flight of capital if investors lose 
confidence in the country’s economic policies. To forestall such an eventuality, 
the Ghanaian government should continue to implement sound macro-economic 
policies, which are a basis for a robust banking and financial system. Also the 
government should strengthen the institutions that supervise the banking 
industry, update the banking regulations and make sure that the banks especially 
the indigenous ones are well capitalised. More generally, the establishment of 
globally applicable set of rules to manage international capital flows will benefit 
all countries as globalisation means all countries are part of the global society 
and economic mismanagement elsewhere affect others.
4.8 Conclusion
It may be argued that the mixed record of FDI inflow of some of the nations of 
sub-Saharan Africa, has been varied not because of the lack or unavailability of 
natural resources. At least it has been because of political instability, and the 
resultant lack of coherent economic policies the governments choose to pursue.
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Ghana’s record of consistent economic policies followed for over a decade and a 
half provides a clear example for other SSACs to follow.
A tentative conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of FDI performance in 
Ghana is that if SSACs fully commit themselves to implement economic 
reforms, FDI in SSACs would be a positive sum game. As the attractiveness of 
SSACs partly depend on a number and extent of economic reform measures 
taken, all SSACs would benefit from increased FDI inflows by implementing 
reforms.
4.9 Policy Reforms and FDI in Nigeria
4.10 Background to the Nigerian Economy
Nigeria, like Ghana is situated in West Africa and has an estimated population of
113.8 million. With an annual growth rate of 2.8 percent, the population is 
projected to reach 150.2 million by the year 2010. The crude petroleum sub­
sector is the major contributor to the GDP and accounts for about 96.3 percent of 
the country’s total exports. Nigeria has abundant mineral resources, fertile land 
and a relatively well educated labour force. However these resources have 
brought scant rewards for most of the population. On the political front, 
Nigeria’s post-independence history has been marred by frequent political 
upheaval, with brief periods of civilian democratic rule repeatedly reversed by 
military interventions. It was only in 1999 that Nigeria was returned to 
democratic governance after more than a decade of military dictatorship.
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The purpose of this part of the chapter is to describe and analyse the trends of 
FDI, and review the FDI policy reforms in Nigeria from 1960-1997. This part of 
the chapter is structured as follows: the next section deals with policy reforms. 
The third section analyses the trends of FDI and the final section provides a 
summary.
4.11 Government Policy Reforms
Nigeria has long been an important destination for FDI. However, government 
policies towards FDI have fluctuated over time, leading to changes in the level 
and type of FDI inflows. Foreign investment policy in Nigeria has undergone 
wide swings from liberal to restrictive in three phases since 1960. These were 
largely driven by availability of capital, which was initially closely linked to oil 
revenues. Table 4.11 provides a summary of policy reforms and FDI in Nigeria.
4.11.1 1960-1971: Open Door Policy
In the early post independence period 1960-1971, there was hardly any 
regulation governing foreign investment in Nigeria. The first National 
Development Plan encouraged the establishment and growth of industries by 
foreign multinationals. This was the pioneering period for industry and 100 
percent foreign ownership was allowed in virtually all sectors of the economy. 
Foreign companies employing and training Nigerians were given tax holidays. 
This ‘open door’ policy was given further support by the import-substitution 
strategy of the post-independence period. As a result of these liberal policies, 
industries were set up in both public and private sectors of the Nigerian 
economy.
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4.11.2 1971-1982: Restrictions
Strong nationalist sentiments in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to foreign 
investment restrictions, culminating in the Nigeria’s First Enterprise Promotion 
Decree 1972, which led to one of the most comprehensive mandatory joint 
venture programmes in Africa and throughout the Third World (Biersteker,
1987). It was reported that the widespread foreign control of the Nigerian 
economy was not the only source of the indigenous business community’s 
dissatisfaction. Many were particularly concerned with their inability to 
purchase shares of the foreign-owned and foreign-managed enterprises, even 
when they had sufficient capital to buy into them (Biersteker, 1987: 58). For 
example, before the indigenisation decree West Africa Portland Cement gave a 
portion of its stock to United Africa Company (UAC), another foreign 
subsidiary, and then had it sold to other foreign companies. Indigenous 
businessmen resented the fact that they were often barred from actual capital 
participation (Ogunbanjo, 1969). The 1972 decree reserved many sectors 
exclusively for Nigerians while foreign companies were made to relinquish 40- 
60 percent of the equity shares to Nigerians in the intermediate-technology 
industries. Maximum foreign investment ownership in these industries was fixed 
at 60 percent.
Five years after the promulgation of the Enterprise Promotion Decree 1972, a 
new and a more stringent one was made. The 1977 version limits foreign 
investment participation largely to those enterprises in which Nigerians have not 
shown demonstrable competence (Biersteker, 1987). Unlike the first decree in
1972, the 1977 decree affected all foreign owned enterprises. The maximum 
foreign ownership limit for certain sectors was set at 40 percent with the 
exception of high technology and capital intensive industries which were 
required to be in the form of a JV with a maximum foreign ownership limit of 60 
percent. These restrictions were in addition to sectors reserved for exclusively 
for Nigerians.
Table 4.11
Changes in Policy and Procedure towards FDI in Nigeria
Year Administrative
Procedure
Sectoral
Access
Incentives Ownership
Restrictions
1960-1971 Companies
Code
Access to all 
sectors
General 
incentives for 
foreign firms 
employing 
Nigerians
No Ownership 
Restrictions
1972 First Enterprise
Promotion
Decree
Negative list Maximum of 60 
percent ownership 
in some sectors
1977 2nd Enterprise
Promotion
Decree
Longer 
negative list
Maximum of 40 
percent ownership 
in some sectors
1989 3rd Enterprise
Promotion
Decree
Negative list of 
closed sectors 
shortened
General
incentives
100 percent FDI 
in some sectors, 
limited 
diverstiture
1995 Investment
Promotion
Commission
Decree
Access to 
virtually all 
sectors
Free Zone.
General
incentives
More 100 percent 
FDI in most 
sectors. More 
diverstitures
Source: Compiled by the Author based on Nigerian Investment Decrees 1972, 
1977, 1989, 1995.
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4.11.3 1983-1997: Economic Reforms Programme
Realisation by the government of the importance of FDI in bringing in capital, 
technology, managerial capability, access to export markets and improvement of 
the living standard for the citizens. Nigeria introduced an economic reform 
programme designed to liberalise the economy and attract foreign investment. 
The main elements of the program can be highlighted as follows: 
i) floating currencies, ii) eliminating subsidies and controls on trade, iii) 
promoting foreign investments, iv) privatisation and commercialisation 
of state-owned enterprises, and v) financial sector reforms.
Floating currencies
For years, many (SSACs) have been reluctant to allow their currencies’ values to 
be determined by market forces. Floating their currencies, they argued, would be 
inflationary since a steady depreciation could result in higher prices for imported 
goods (Gillespie and Alden, 1989). As a result, their currencies were pegged to 
those of their major trading partners such as the U.S. dollar and the UK pound 
sterling. Artificial pegging of currencies shored up by numerous exchange rate 
policies which would restrict and curb local demand for foreign exchange 
resulted in overvalued currencies. Agreeing to float their currencies, therefore, 
was a radical move (Okoroafo and Kotabe, 1993).
Nigeria’s plan was implemented in two stages. In the first stage (1986-1988), a 
two-tier currency regime was created. In the first stage the Naira (Nigerian 
currency) exchange rate was managed flexibly against the U.S. dollar and
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applied to the servicing of external debt obligations, official payments, and 
transfers to multilateral institutions (which were contracted prior to the 
introduction of the new exchange system). The second tier currency regime took 
place at market-determined rates. Exchange rates usually were set at weekly 
auctions in which the Nigerian central bank and authorised foreign exchange 
dealers participated. The second tier system has been in operation since 1986 
(IMF, 1987). According to the World Bank (1996) assessment the exchange rate 
reform has been one of the most important achievements of Nigeria’ 
programme.
Eliminating Controls on Trade
Prior to the 1980s, tariffs and non-tariff restrictions were part of the ‘import 
substitution’ economic policies of SSACs. High tariff rates were placed on 
imports deemed non-essential to economic development to conserve foreign 
exchange. Quotas and local content regulations were often used to limit imports 
altogether. Many of these restrictions on trade particularly imports have been 
dismantled. For instance, Nigeria eliminated licensing requirements for all 
imports, except for basic food items, vegetable, fresh fruits, and eggs. With 
regards to export trade, policy reforms have sought to support growth and 
diversification of exports, particularly manufactured goods. To encourage more 
exports, steps were taken to abolish most export bans, and introduce a duty 
drawback scheme.
Promoting Investment and Incentives
Efforts to promote foreign investments, in Nigeria, have been twofold: i) 
eliminating investment restrictions and ii) offering new investment incentives. In
1989, Nigeria announced a radical change in laws affecting foreign investments 
reversing the indigenisation decrees of 1972 and 1977. Foreign investors are 
now allowed to be sole investors in all enterprises with the exception of banking, 
insurance, petroleum prospecting and mining where a joint venture is required. It 
is important to point out that the 1989 decree has since been superseded by the 
new Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Decree 1995 (IPCD) which is 
the most liberal of all the investment decrees. The IPCD grants non-Nigerians 
broad rights to make investments in Nigeria, whether in the form of foreign 
direct investment or portfolio investments. Non-Nigerians may invest and 
participate in the operation of any enterprise in Nigeria except petroleum 
enterprises, which are required to be in the form of joint venture with the 
government. In the area of investment incentives, Nigeria now offers a number 
of tax benefits to investors. For instance, tax rates have been lowered and 
controls on repatriation of profits removed
Public Enterprise Reform
In an effort to rationalise and commercialise public enterprises the government 
of Nigeria issued a decree in 1988 mandating the testing of 145 state-owned 
enterprises for full or partial privatisation and commercialisation. Some 111 
enterprises were targeted for privatisation by the end of 1991. By March 1992, 
few SOEs were fully or partially privatised (The World Bank, 1996). It must be 
pointed out therefore that the overall budgetary impact of the public enterprise 
reform program has been minimal due to the slow pace of privatisation of SOEs.
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4.12 Sources of Data
It should be reiterated that a number of difficulties arise in attempting to 
examine trends in FDI in SSA. Foremost are inadequate national statistics or 
complete absence of data, accentuated by under-reporting. As pointed out 
earlier, due to the unavailability of project level information in Nigeria, the 
analysis of the trends in FDI is limited to the aggregate data derived from the 
records of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)
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4.13 Trends of FDI
Table 4.12 shows the value of FDI inflow to Nigeria over the 1985-1997 period. 
The value of FDI rose steadily from an annual average of US$690 million in 
1985-1990 to $1959 million in 1994. This represents more than a twofold 
increase in FDI. The value of inflow then dropped substantially to $1079 million 
before rising again in 1996.
Table 4.12
Annual Inward FDI and Selected Stock in Nigeria, 1980-1997 (US$
Million)
Year FDI Inflow FDI Stock
1985-1990 690 8072
1991 712 -
1992 897 -
1993 1345 -
1994 1959 -
1995 1079 14065
1996 1593 16578
1997 1539 17198
Source: UNCTAD (1996, 1999)
94
The share o f inward FDI to gross fixed capital formation is shown in Table 4.13. 
The share of FDI to gross fixed capital formation in Nigeria was higher each 
year than African average over the 1986-1997 period, with the exception of 1997 
where the African average exceeded that of Nigeria. It is apparent that FDI 
inflows to Nigeria have a relatively greater impact on that country’s economy 
than do FDI inflows in other countries in Africa.
Table 4.13
Share of FDI to Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1980-1997
(i) Share of Inward FDI (%) ____________
Year Nigeria Africa
1986-1991 23.2 3.9
1992 26.3 5.2
1993 36.5 5.5
1994 50.5 8.3
1995 20.6 5.9
1996 21.3 7.8
1997 7.2 8.3
(ii) Share of FDI Stock (%)
Year Nigeria Africa
1980 2.6 3.6
1985 5.5 6.9
1990 24.9 12.1
1995 34.7 17.7
1996 39.9 16.6
1997 12.0 14.7
Source: UNCTAD, 1996, 1998
4.14 Summary and Discussion
The analysis of policy reforms indicated that Nigeria has taken bold steps to 
improve laws governing the entry of FDI by removing restrictions on foreign
ownership which were the cornerstone of the 1972 and 1977 investment decrees. 
Other key policy areas such as trade liberalisation, exchange rate management, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and financial policy reforms have been tackled. 
It is important to remark, however, that macroeconomic indicators are not 
impressive and generally reflect the inconsistent ‘stop-and-go progress’ in the 
reforms program. Nevertheless, it is at least an indication that Nigeria has 
overcome the initial public opposition to economic reform and has bolstered 
private sector confidence, which was a major impediment to investment in 
Nigeria.
Another important point is the robust growth of FDI in Nigeria despite the fact 
that the reform program has been relatively unsatisfactory compared to that of 
Ghana. According to UNCTAD (1999) Nigeria is among the African countries 
which are classified as high performers in terms of absolute size of FDI inflows. 
The reason for the FDI growth may be due to the fact that Nigeria is linked to 
specific locational advantages based on natural resources, that is, oil and gas, 
where policies against long-term foreign ownership were less of a deterrent.
To move away from the over-reliance on oil as the main attraction of FDI, a 
strategy is needed to create an environment in which foreign investors will feel 
secure and comfortable in investing. This strategy should have the following 
core elements: good governance, liberalising the economy and integrating it with 
the rest of the world, and macro-economic stabilisation. Some of these elements 
have been addressed but more needs to be done. For example, deregulation and 
privatisation have been started but more is needed to improve the quality of
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essential services, lower the costs of doing business in Nigeria, and freeing the 
energy and entrepreneurial drive of the private sector. The corruption that 
plagues Nigerian society also needs to be addressed seriously. In particular, there 
should be a renewed emphasis on transparency and accountability in all aspects 
of economic life, both public and private.
The following chapter examines JV formation in Ghana and Nigeria based on 
primary data sources.
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CHAPTER 5
JOINT VENTURE FORMATION IN GHANA AND NIGERIA: STRATEGIC 
MOTIVES AND LOCATION FACTORS
5.1 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a growing emphasis on the use of joint ventures 
(JVs) as a dominant form of business organisation pursued both by firms from 
advanced industrial nations and firms from developing countries (Beamish and 
Delios, 1997a). Many of the joint ventures formed in the past 20 years have become 
more ’’strategic” in nature. Porter and Fuller (1986) and Glaister and Buckley (1996) 
highlight JVs as a strategic option in response to changing market conditions. 
Harrigan (1988) suggests that JVs are now often used to obtain or enhance 
competitive strengths such as technological capabilities, management or marketing 
skills. In developing countries, traditionally, JVs have been used as a means of 
tackling the problems of lack of capital and reducing foreign domination in sectors 
considered strategic by the host developing countries (Afriyie, 1988). Many 
developing countries continue to use JVs as a vehicle to gain local control over key 
economic sectors whilst utilising foreign capital to do so. The analysis of the changes 
in the investment legislation in Ghana reveals progressive moves in favour of JV 
formation. For example, the Ghana investment legislation of 1973, 1976, 1981, 1985 
and 1994 have consistently made it easier to form a JV as against a wholly owned 
subsidiary (WOS) by requiring or placing lower equity capital requirements on 
prospective JV investors.
On the other side of the coin, Killing (1983, 1988) points out that JVs are inherently 
risky and unstable. The propensity of joint venture instability is collaborated by 
Lorange and Roos (1992) and Dussauge and Garrette (1995). A study in Nigeria, for
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example, reported that out of some fifty agricultural JVs set up in the mid-1980s, only 
about 10 were said to viable by 1990 (British Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, 
1992). For Miller et al (1996), JVs are a second-best for both partners and they point 
out that few firms would choose JVs if there were a practical alternative because JVs 
are tough to manage. Pitfalls associated with JVs include problems associated with 
sharing proprietary know-how. Many firms fear a “Trojan Horse” situation in which a 
partner might gain access to important technology and then exit the venture, setting 
itself up as competitor. Other problems include improper fit between the joint venture 
parents or wrong choice of partner; strategic and cultural mismatch; and lack of co­
operation from one partner.
Despite the difficulties associated with joint ventures, they remain popular and have 
witnessed an unprecedented growth in both developed and developing countries 
(Deloitte, Haskins and Sells International, 1989; Anderson, 1990; Selassie, 1995). 
Hill (1981) reports that about half of the USA and UK firms in developing countries 
are run as JVs. Though figures are scarce with regard to sub-Saharan African 
countries (SSACs), those available provide important clues. For example, the analysis 
of FDI trends in Ghana in chapter 4 points to an overwhelming preference by foreign 
firms to engage in JVs rather than invest through wholly owned subsidiaries. Official 
data indicates that out of thel399 projects approved for the period 1986-1998, a total 
of 1126 (80.5 percent) were JVs and 273 projects (19.5 percent) were wholly owned 
subsidiaries (see chapter 4).
The main objective of this chapter is to present new data and new empirical insights 
into strategic motivation and location specific factors influencing JV formation in
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Ghana and Nigeria. The chapter builds on the few studies of international joint 
ventures in sub-Saharan Africa with particular reference to Ghana and Nigeria. It 
considers the relative importance of the strategic motives and the host country 
location for JV formation by foreign MNCs in the context of the following 
characteristics: type of host partner, ownership level, sector of operation and origin of 
foreign investor. The chapter provides a parsimonious set of host country location 
factors and strategic motives for the sample studied by means of factor analysis and 
tests hypotheses on the relative importance of motives and location factors.
The remainder of the chapter is organised in the following way: The next section sets 
out the research hypotheses. This is followed by the research results. The fourth 
section presents a discussion and policy implications. The final section contains the 
conclusion.
5.2 Hypotheses
The following sub-section derives the exploratory hypotheses of the study.
5.2.1 Organisational type of host partner
A partner to a JV may either be a private commercial organisation or a public sector 
organisation related to the government of the host country. It is expected that the 
motives for forming the JV are likely to differ according to the type of partner. A 
foreign partner, for example, may be able to enter certain sectors considered as vital 
to the interest of the host country, such as petroleum, telecommunication and gold 
mining, only through a JV with the host government and not a private organisation, 
because these sectors are reserved for the state. Government organisations may exist 
to provide essential services whereas private sector organisations exist for 
commercial purposes. In a similar vein, Selassie (1995) suggests that the
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organisational type of host partner is an important determinant in a decision to locate 
in a particular country by a foreign firm. Selassie (1995) reported that the majority of 
foreign firms in most African countries see state owned firms as the only viable 
partners as they are endowed with ample resources, such as finance, manpower, 
organisational and various government supports. As local firms differ in their 
capabilities to attract foreign investors as partners, it is expected that locational 
factors will vary with organisational type. This reasoning leads to the following 
hypotheses:
H la: The relative importance o f motives for JV formation will vary with the 
organisational type o f the host country partner.
H lb: The relative importance o f location factors will vary with the organisational 
type o f the host country partner
5.2.2 Ownership level
Control has been defined as the authority over operational and strategic decisions 
(Kim and Hwang, 1991). Closely allied with control is the level of ownership of each 
partner. The split of ownership between the partners of a JV has been used as a basis 
of the level of partner’s resource commitment and an indicator of decision-making 
control which consequently influences the performance of a joint venture (Blodgett, 
1991; Bleeke and Ernst, 1991). The success of a JV may be judged by the 
achievement or non-achievement of the motives for the JV established by the partners 
at the time of formation. Since the possession of a majority shareholding generally 
confers on the partner a major part of the decision-making control, it may be argued 
that ownership level is expected to influence the motives for setting up the JV.
With regard to locating a business abroad, Tatoglu and Glaister (1998a) pointed out 
that it involves a huge resource commitment in the form of substantial infusions of 
capital and managerial resources. MNEs must carefully consider where to locate
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among the several alternatives available and this is particularly true where the foreign 
partner is planning to have a majority share of foreign company. The size of the 
foreign investment may be expected to influence the location of the JV. The 
reasoning leads to the second hypothesis of the study:
H2a: The relative importance o f motives will vary with the level o f  ownership o f the 
jo in t venture.
H2b: The relative importance o f host country location factors will vary with the level 
o f  ownership o f the joint venture.
5.2.3 Origin of foreign partner
National characteristics impact on the MNCs ownership entry strategies (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988; Hennart and Larimo, 1998). Erramilli (1996) argues that MNCs based in 
culturally distant and high uncertainty avoidance countries are more likely to prefer 
wholly owned subsidiaries because of the high level of uncertainty involved in 
dealing with a foreign host partner from an equal or subordinate position. Similarly, 
the lower the power distance and the uncertainty avoidance associated with the 
national culture of a MNC and the more likely the foreign firm will prefer to enter 
into a JV with the host partner of a particular nationality. For example, the UK’s long 
colonial links with Ghana is likely to narrow the cultural distance between them. It is 
therefore expected that a firm from the UK will prefer to choose a Ghanaian partner 
in preference to partners from other nationalities who are more culturally distanced.
It is not only national and personal characteristics of the required partner that 
influence the choice of a local partner but also the task to be accomplished by the 
venture (Geringer, 1988, 1991). For example, if a local firm of a particular nationality 
is able to provide natural resources and access to distribution, which it is hoped will
enable the venture to accomplish its task or achieve its motives. Then it is expected 
that the foreign firm will prefer such a firm as a partner to partners of another 
nationality. This reasoning leads to the following hypotheses:
H3a: The relative importance o f strategic motives will vary with the origin o f  the 
foreign partner
H3b: The relative importance o f  location factors will vary with the origin o f  the 
foreign partner.
5.2.4 Sector of operation
Glaister and Buckley (1996) examined the relative importance of strategic motives 
for JV formation according to the industry of the venture in the UK. To date no study 
has attempted to examine the relative importance of strategic motives and locational 
factors in relation to JV sector of operation for a developing country. It is likely that 
the reasons for foreign firms entering into JVs will vary with the industry they wish to 
enter. For example, the spatial distribution of resource endowments is a strategic 
motivation as well as a critical location factor for MNEs engaged in the exploitation 
of natural resources (Jones,1996). Cantwell (1991) noted that as Africa is rich in 
natural resources, more than half of FDI, not surprisingly, has traditionally been 
oriented towards resource-based activities, and to a much greater degree than FDI in 
order developing regions. Clearly, the relative importance of different location- 
specific determinants depends on at least the following aspects of investment: (i) the 
motive of investment (e.g resource seeking or market seeking); (ii) the sector of 
investment (e.g services or manufacturing). The above leads to the following 
hypotheses:
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H4a: The relative importance o f strategic motives will vary with the type o f  JV  
business sector activities.
H4b: The relative importance o f host country location factors will vary with the type 
o f JV business sector activities
5.3 Statistical Analysis
The hypotheses were tested by considering differences in means of the importance of 
the strategic motives and location factors. As the sample size exceeds 30 it was 
reasonable to assume that the sample is from a normal distribution, and a parametric 
tests were used, that is two sample t-test or ANOVA as appropriate. The non- 
parametric equivalent of the above tests (Mann-Whitney U and the Kruskal-Wallis 
Test) were also conducted to remove any doubt that may stem from the nature of the 
data. The non-parametric tests (not reported here) confirmed the findings of the 
parametric tests.
5.4 Results and Discussion
5.4.1 Strategic Motives
Table 5.1 shows the rank order of the strategic motives for JV formation in Ghana 
and Nigeria based on the mean measure of the importance of 10 strategic motives. 
The median measure is exceeded by five strategic motives: ‘to overcome 
government-mandated barriers’ (3.70), ‘risk and cost sharing’ (3.47), ‘to facilitate 
international expansion’ (3.37) ‘to have access to low cost inputs’ (2.90), to obtain 
economies of scale’ (2.79).
It is hardly surprising that ‘to overcome government mandated barriers’ is the highest 
ranked motive. This is because developing countries use a wide range of specific 
policies and institutions to regulate investments. These include ownership limits for 
foreign investors, investment screening and monitoring processes that tend to deter 
foreign investors from investing in many developing countries. Ghana and Nigeria are 
no exceptions and even with extensive liberalisation of investment policies, obstacles 
still remain. Under such circumstances JVs provide a means for faster entry. ‘Risk 
and cost sharing’ which is ranked second highest supports the earlier research 
findings by Bhattacharya et al, (1997) which reported that Africa, including Ghana 
and Nigeria, is perceived to be a risky place to do business. To reduce this perceived 
risk foreign investors enter into a JV with a local partner. It is also not surprising that 
forming a joint venture in order to gain access to finance, management know-how, 
and partner’s technology are ranked relatively low, as it would be expected that the 
foreign partner would be bringing these resources to the joint venture. It is also 
apparent from Table 5.1 that to enable product diversification is a relatively 
unimportant motive for JV formation indicating that the foreign partners are not 
venturing into new business areas through JV formation in Ghana and Nigeria. 
Similarly, the formation of JVs in Ghana appears not to be motivated by the desire to 
block or reduce competition.
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Table 5.1
Relative Importance of Strategic Motives for IJV Formation in Ghana and 
Nigeria.
Rank Motivation Mean SD
1 To overcome government-mandated barrier 3.70 1.28
2 Risk and cost sharing 3.47 1.14
3 To facilitate international expansion 3.37 1.33
4 To have access to low cost labour 2.90 1.13
5 To obtain economies of large scale 2.79 1.22
6 To gain access to finance 2.21 1.19
7 To gain access to management know-how 1.88 0.96
8 To enable product diversification 1.72 0.98
9 To gain access to partners technology 1.67 1.04
10 To co-opt existing competitor to reduce competition
N=57
1.58 0.98
Notes:
1. The mean is the average on a scale of 1 ( =‘not at all important’ ) to 5 ( = ’very 
important
2. SD = Standard Deviation
3. Scores are significantly different on the Friedman two way ANOVA test (p<0.001)
5.4.2 Location Factors
Table 5.2 shows the rank order of location factors for JV formation based on the 
mean measure of importance of 15 location motives. The median measure is 
exceeded by all the 15 location factors. The seven factors with the highest degree of 
importance are: ‘government policy towards foreign investors’ (4.02), repatriability 
of profit and capital (3.90); political stability (3.70); availability of incentives (3.67); 
market size (3.60); macro-economic stability (3.58); and level of infrastructure 
development (3.42). It is apparent from Table 2 that the highest ranked host country 
factors are concerned with national policy and regulation and this underscores the 
importance investors attach to these factors in Africa, where there has been an 
incidence of inconsistent policies towards foreign investment by successive 
governments. For example, Chhibber and Leechor (1993) pointed out that investment 
regulation and control, lack of transparency in the enforcement of laws and regulation
remains a major impediment to investment FDI inflows in Africa. Political stability 
and macroeconomic stability are regarded as very important factors to foreign 
partners. Several researchers, including Bhattacharya et al (1997) have pointed out 
that potential investors choose locations with stable political and macroeconomic 
environments. In sub-Saharan Africa many countries suffer from civil strife, large 
structural fiscal deficits, erratic monetary policies and weaknesses in the financial 
system. Although, Ghana and Nigeria have made progress in reducing political and 
macroeconomic instabilities obstacles still remain. Hence, it is not surprising that 
foreign partners regard them as very important factors.
It might be expected that ‘access to natural resources’ would be ranked relatively 
higher given the abundance of these resources and their importance to many investors 
in Africa (see Cantwell, 1991). However, the relatively low rank is perhaps not 
surprising as FDI in Ghana is now concentrated in the tertiary and secondary sectors 
as discussed in the previous chapter.
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Table 5.2
Relative Importance of Location Factors for IJV Formation in Ghana and 
Nigeria
Rank Location Factor Mean SD
1 Government policy towards foreign investors 4.02 0.86
2 Repatriability of profit and capital 3.90 0.94
3 Political stability 3.70 1.50
4 Availability of incentives 3.67 1.01
5 Market size 3.60 1.24
6 Macro-economic stability 3.58 1.13
7 Level of infrastructure development 3.42 1.00
=8 Protection offered against nationalisation 3.28 1.13
=8 Ease of employing foreign labour 3.28 0.96
=10 Availability of low cost inputs 3.23 1.07
=10 Information availability on investment opportunities 3.23 1.05
12 Purchasing power of customers 3.18 0.98
13 Availability of capable partners 3.04 1.24
14 To gain access to natural resources 3.00 1.10
15 Level of industry competition
N=57
2.77 1.48
Notes:
1. The mean is the average on a scale o f  1 ( = ‘not at all important’ ) to 5 ( = ’very important
2. SD = Standard Deviation
3. Scores are significantly different on the Friedman two way ANOVA test (p<0.001)
5.4.3 Factor Analysis and Strategic Motives
The correlation matrix of 10 strategic motives revealed a number of low to moderate 
intercorrelations. Due to potential conceptual and statistical overlap, an attempt was 
made to identify a parsimonious set of variables to determine the underlying 
dimensions governing the full set of strategic motives. Exploratory factor analysis 
using varimax rotation was used to extract the underlying factors. The factor analysis 
produced four underlying factors with a total of 72.5 percent of the observed variance 
as shown in Table 5.3. The four factors identified are as follows: market 
development; market power, partner synergies, and production efficiency.
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Table 5.3
Factor Analysis of Strategic Motives
Factors Factor
load
Eigen­
value
% Variance 
Explained
Cum.
Percent
Cronbach
Alpha
Factor 1: Market Development
Facilitates international expansion 
Overcome government-mandated barriers
0.56
0.64
3.31 33.1 33.1 0.70
Factor 2: Market Power
To reduce competition 
To enable product diversification
0.57
0.63
1.73 17.4 50.5 0.67
Factor 3: Partner synergies
Risk and cost sharing 
To gain access to finance 
To gain access to partner’s technology 
Access to management know-how
0.67
0.53
0.65
0.65
1.16 11.7 62.2 0.78
Factor 4: Production efficiency
To obtain economies of large scale prod. 
To have access to low cost labour
0.75
0.73
1.03 10.3 72.5 0.65
Notes:
Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation 
K-M-0 Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.555 
Barlett Test of Sphericity = 207.871; p< 0.000
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5.4.4 Host Country Selection
The correlation matrix of 15 host country location factors revealed a number of low to 
moderate intercorrelations. Due to potential conceptual and statistical overlap, an 
attempt was made to identify a parsimonious set of variables to determine the 
underlying dimensions governing the full set of strategic motives. Exploratory factor 
analysis using varimax rotation was used to extract the underlying factors.
The factor analysis produced five underlying factors that make good conceptual sense 
and explained a total of 68.7 percent of the observed variance, as shown in Table 5.4 
The five factors are identified as: market potential, country risk; government policy 
and regulation; comparative cost and location advantages; and business facilitation.
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Table 5.4
Factor Analysis of Host Country Location Influences
Factor Factor
Load
Eigen­
value
% Variance 
Explained
Cum.
Percent
Cronbach
Alpha
Factor 1:
Market potential
Market size
Purchasing power o f  customers
0.67
0.59
3.19 21.3 21.3 0.69
Factor 2:
Country risk 
Political stability 
Economic Stability
0.74
0.70
2.18 14.5 35.8 0.67
Factor 3:
Government policy & regulation
Repatriability o f  profit and capital 
Protection offered against nationalisation 
Government policy towards investors 
Ease o f  employing foreign labour
0.59
0.57
0.65
0.52
2.03 13.5 49.3 0.72
Factor 4:
Comparative cost & location advantages
Access to natural resources 
Availability o f  low cost inputs 
Availability o f  capable partners 
Level o f  industry competition
0.63
0.64
0.80
0.64
1.60 10.6 59.9 0.79
Factor 5:
Business facilitation
Availability o f  incentives 
Information availability on investment 
Level o f  infrastructure development
0.63
0.72
0.59
1.31 8.7 68.7 0.75
Notes:
Principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation 
K -M -0 Measure o f  Sampling Adequacy = 0.584 
Barlett Test o f  Sphericity =  269.062; p< 0.000
To further investigate the underlying nature and pattern of the strategic motives and 
host country location factors for this sample of JVs, the analyses were developed by 
considering the strategic motives and host country location items in terms of the 
characteristics of the sample. For each of the relevant characteristics of the sample 
under consideration, Tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 show the means 
and standard deviation of the factors and their components and the appropriate test 
statistic for comparing differences in means scores.
5.4.5 Strategic Motives and Type of Host Partner
Table 5.5 shows that there is lack of support for hypothesis la  in that the relative 
importance of the strategic motives hardly varies between the type of host partner 
(private or government). None of the factors have mean scores that are statistically 
different. With regard to individual motives, the relative importance of only one item 
-  ‘to overcome government-mandated barrier’ (p<0.05) is found to vary between the 
type of partner, with the mean score being significantly different between the two 
partner types.
The finding related to ‘overcome government mandated barrier’ may be explained by 
the fact that, in Ghana and Nigeria, some strategic sectors can be entered by a foreign 
partner only through a JV with the host government. In the case of access to finance, 
the finding is surprising in that domestic financing of investment projects is 
considered to be a major problem in many African countries particularly for private 
investors (International Monetary Fund, 1996). Where the JV project requires a large 
capital investment it is likely that the government is more able to supply the needed 
capital than the private sector firms. Perhaps with the establishment of capital markets
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and on-going economic liberalisation in the 1990s, this phenomenon appears to have 
changed and private sector can equally access capital.
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Table 5.5
Strategic Motives for IJV Formation in Ghana and Nigeria: Partnership Type
Motivation Group Mean SD T-value
Factor 1: Entry strategies Private 3.40 0.78
Government 3.65 0.66 1.28
Facilitates international expansion Private 3.48 1.22
Government 3.29 1.44 0.52
Overcome government-mandated barrier Private 3.32 1.38
Government 4.00 1.15 -2.01**
Factor 2: Market power Private 1.74 0.71
Government 1.58 0.92 0.71
To reduce competition Private 1.76 0.93
Government 1.42 1.03 1.29
To enable product diversification Private 1.72 0.84 -0.08
Government 1.74 1.10
Factor 3: partner synergies Private 2.32 0.86
Government 2.30 0.82 0.60
Risk and cost sharing Private 3.56 1.12
Government 3.26 1.15 0.99
To gain access to finance Private 2.00 1.26
Government 2.39 1.15 -1.20
To gain access to partner’s technology Private 1.72 1.10
Government 1.65 1.02 0.26
Access to management know-how Private 1.92 0.86
Government 1.87 1.06 0.18
Factor 4: Production efficiency Private 2.90 0.98
Government 2.77 1.05 0.46
To obtain economies large scale prod. Private 2.92 1.12
Government 2.68 1.38 0.48
To have access to low cost labour Private 2.88 1.13
Government 2.90 1.16 -0.08
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean for the factor scores; the mean for the 
individual motives is the average on a scale of 1 (=not at all important) to 5 (very 
important); p<0.1*; p<0.05**; p<0.01***
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5.4.6 Location factors and type of host partner
Table 5.6 shows that there is no support for hypothesis lb. None of the factors have 
mean scores which are significantly different. As regards to the individual location 
components the relative importance of two - ‘government policies towards foreign 
investors’ and ‘ease of employing a foreign labour’ differ significantly between the 
partnership types. In the case of government policy towards foreign investors, the 
mean score is higher for government indicating a favourable policy where the partner 
is government agency. This is not surprising in that government policy normally 
favour government agencies particularly in the area of lending. The mean score is 
higher for the private sector organisation with regard to ‘ease of employing foreign 
labour’. This may stem from the fact that private sector organisation are less regulated 
in terms of employing foreign labour compared with government sector organisation 
where normally a quota system operates.
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Table 5.6
Host Country Location Factors for IJV Formation in Ghana and Nigeria: Organisation Type
Host Country Location Factor Group Mean SD T-value
Market potential Private 3.28 0.94
Government 3.54 0.88 -1.10
Market size Private 3.48 1.19
Government 3.77 1.20 0.91
Purchasing power o f  customers Private 3.08 1.04
Government 3.32 0.87 -0.95
Country risk Private 3.80 0.75
Government 3.57 1.17 0.87
Political stability Private 3.88 0.88
Government 3.58 1.34 1.01
M acro-economic stability Private 3.72 0.79
Government 3.55 1.29 0.61
Government policy & regulation Private 3.65 0.55
Government 3.60 0.60 0.73
Repatriability o f  profit and capital Private 4.08 0.81
Government 4.00 0.89 0.35
Protection offered against nationalisation Private 3.32 1.28
Government 3.26 1.03 0.20
Government policy towards foreign investors Private 3.60 1.12
Government 4.13 0.72 -2.05**
Ease o f  employing foreign labour Private 3.60 0.91
Government 3.00 0.93 2.42**
Comparative cost & location advantages Private 3.08 0.79
Government 2.92 0.84 0.49
A ccess to natural resources Private 2.68 1.44
Government 2.77 1.50 -0.24
Availability o f  low cost inputs Private 3.28 1.10
Government 3.16 1.07 0.41
Availability o f  capable partners Private 3.24 1.30
Government 2.84 1.19 1.21
Level o f  industry competition Private 3.12 1.01
Government 2.94 1.18 0.62
Business Facilitation Private 3.53 0.63
Government 3.39 0.70 0.82
Availability o f  incentives Private 3.56 1.23
Government 3.74 0.82 0.64
Information availability on investments Private 3.44 1.00
Government 3.06 1.09 1.33
Level o f  infrastructure development Private 3.60 0.76
Government 3.3.36 1.08 0.96
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean for the factor scores: the mean for the individual motives 
is the average on a scale o f  1 (=not at all important) to 5 (=very important);p<0.1* p<0.05** 
p<0.01***
5.4.7 Strategic Motives and Ownership Level
Strategic motives for JV formation by the level of partner’s ownership is shown in 
Table 5.7 There is a weak support for hypothesis 2a, with the mean of the factor
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scores being significantly different for one of the four factors, ie, partner synergies, 
(p<0.1). Three of the four items constituting the partner synergies factor, ie, risk and 
cost sharing (p<0.1), access to partner’s technology (p<0.1), and access to 
management know-how (p<0.05), have means significantly different between 
ownership level. In each case the mean score is highest for equal ownership (50-50), 
indicating a three U shaped relationship between the importance of the motivating 
factors and the level of foreign partner ownership.
Table 5.7
Strategic Motivation of IJV Formation in Ghana and Nigeria: Ownership Level
Motivation Group Mean SD F-ratio
Factor 1: Entry strategies More than 50% 3.48 0.88
Co-ownership (50-50) 3.69 0.59
Less than 50% 3.54 0.58 0.25
To facilitate international expansion More than 50% 3.22 1.51
Co-ownership (50-50) 3.75 0.71
Less than 50% 3.39 1.33 0.47
To overcome government-mandated More than 50% 3.57 1.38
Barriers Co-ownership (50-50) 3.25 1.04
Less than 50% 3.62 1.39 0.23
Factor 2: Market power More than 50% 1.59 0.91
Co-ownership (50-50) 1.56 0.68
Less than 50% 1.73 0.80 0.25
To co-opt existing competitor in order to More than 50% 1.83 1.44
Reduce competition Co-ownership (50-50) 2.25 1.49
Less than 50% 1.77 1.03 0.45
To enable product diversification More than 50% 1.87 1.22
Co-ownership (50-50) 1.25 0.46
Less than 50% 1.92 1.16 1.16
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Table 5.7 (continued)
Host Country Location Factors Group Mean SD T-value
Factor 3: partner synergies More than 50% 2.01 0.82
Co-ownership (50-50) 2.69 0.73
Less than 50% 2.41 0.82 2.64*
Risk and cost sharing More than 50% 3.04 1.43
Co-ownership (50-50) 4.00 0.76
Less than 50% 3.42 1.03 2.04*
To gain access to finance More than 50% 1.91 1.08
Co-ownership (50-50) 2.63 1.19
Less than 50% 2.35 1.26 1.39
To gain access to partner’s technology More than 50% 1.87 1.39
Co-ownership (50-50) 3.00 1.69
Less than 50% 1.92 1.06 2.50*
Access to management know-how More than 50% 1.74 1.05
Co-ownership (50-50) 2.88 0.99
Less than 50% 2.15 1.05 3.62**
Factor 4: Production efficiency More than 50% 2.59 1.08
Co-o wnership(5 0-5 0) 2.88 0.35
Less than 50% 3.00 1.07 1.03
To obtain economies of large scale More than 50% 2.49 1.24
Production Co-ownership (50-50) 3.13 0.64
Less than 50% 2.81 1.30 0.98
To have access to low cost labour More than 50% 2.65 1.30
Co-ownership (50-50) 2.63 0.74
Less than 50% 3.15 1.08 1.40
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean for the factor scores: the mean for the 
individual motives is the average on a scale of 1 (=not at all important) to 5 (=very 
important);p<0.1* p<0.05** p<0.01***
5.4.8 Host Country Factors and Level of Ownership
Table 5.8 shows that there is no support for H2b in that the relative importance of 
location factors hardly varies between the ownership levels. None of the five location 
factors have men scores which is significantly different. As regards to individual 
location only two items, that is, purchasing power of customers (p<0.05) and 
government policy towards foreign investors (p<0.05) have means significantly 
different between the ownership levels.
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Table 5.8 Host Country Location Factors of IJV Formation in Ghana and 
Nigeria: Ownership Level
Host Country Location Factor Group Mean SD F-value
Market potential More than 50% 3.54 0.94
Co-ownership 2.81 1.19
Less than 50% 3.42 0.86 1.83
Market size More than 50% 3.83 1.19
Co-ownership 3.38 1.51
Less than 50% 3.46 1.21 0.67
Purchasing power of customers More than 50% 3.26 1.01
Co-ownership 2.25 1.04
Less than 50% 3.39 0.80 4.78**
Country risk More than 50% 3.52 1.23
Co-ownership 3.25 0.66
Less than 50% 3.87 0.88 1.39
Political stability More than 50% 3.56 1.44
Co-ownership 3.25 0.71
Less than 50% 3.96 0.93 1.47
Macro-economic stability More than 50% 3.48 1.28
Co-ownership 3.25 0.88
Less than 50% 3.77 1.07 0.79
Government policy & regulation More than 50% 3.58 0.63
Co-ownership 3.63 0.64
Less than 50% 3.65 0.89 0.11
Repatriability of profit and capital More than 50% 3.87 0.81
Co-ownership 4.00 0.00
Less than 50% 4.15 1.01 0.67
Protection offered against More than 50% 3.17 1.07
Nationalisation Co-ownership 3.50 1.20
Less than 50% 3.31 1.19 0.25
Government policy towards foreign More than 50% 4.26 0.69
Investors Co-ownership 3.50 1.41
Less than 50% 3.69 0.88 3.31**
Ease of employing foreign labour More than 50% 3.00 0.95
Co-ownership 3.50 1.20
Less than 50% 3.46 0.86 1.70
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Table 5.8 (continued)
Host Country Location Factors 
ratio
Comparative cost & location advantages
Access to natural resources
Availability of low cost inputs
Availability of capable partners
Level of industry competition
Business Facilitation
Availability of incentives
Information availability on investments
Level of infrastructure development
Group Mean SD F-
More than 50% 3.07 0.76
Co-ownership 3.31 0.62
Less than 50% 2.86 0.90 1.11
More than 50% 2.78 1.45
Co-ownership 3.25 1.75
Less than 50% 2.62 1.44 0.56
More than 50% 3.39 0.99
Co-ownership 3.25 1.04
Less than 50% 3.08 1.16 0.52
More than 50% 3.04 1.19
Co-ownership 3.50 1.20
Less than 50% 2.88 1.30 0.75
More than 50% 3.09 1.13
Co-ownership 3.25 0.89
Less than 50% 2.84 1.16 0.52
More than 50% 3.54 0.66
Co-ownership 3.29 0.76
Less than 50% 3.40 0.67 0.48
More than 50% 3.74 0.86
Co-ownership 3.50 1.41
Less than 50% 3.65 1.02 0.16
More than 50% 3.52 0.90
Co-ownership 3.00 1.31
Less than 50% 3.04 1.08 1.53
More than 50% 3.35 0.98
Co-ownership 3.38 0.92
Less than 50% 3.50 1.07 0.15
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean for the factor scores: the mean for the 
individual location factors is the average on the scale of 1 (= not at all important) to 5 
(= very important); p<0.1*; p<0.05**; P<0.01***
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5.4.9 Strategic Motives and Nationality
The strategic motivation for JV formation by regional category of nationality of the 
foreign partner is shown in Table 5.9. There is no support for hypothesis 3a in that 
none of the four factors has mean scores significantly different. Only one of the four 
individual motives constituting the partner synergies factor, that is, risk and cost 
sharing, (p<0.05), has means significantly higher for JVs formed by the North 
American and the Asia/Pacific multinationals compared with JVs formed by the 
European based MNCs. Another individual motive which is statistically different is 
‘to co-opt an existing competitor in order to reduce competition’ (p<0.1). American 
MNCs again have higher mean scores compared to MNCs from Western Europe and 
Asia/Pacific.
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Table 5.9
Strategic Motives for IJV in Ghana and Nigeria: Origin of Foreign Partner
Motivation Group Mean SD F-ratio
Factor 1: Entry strategies North America 3.30 0.67
Western Europe 3.54 0.76
Asia/Pacific 3.73 0.56 0.94
To facilitate international expansion North America 3.10 1.10
Western Europe 3.22 1.48
Asia/Pacific 4.09 0.70 2.12
Overcome government-mandated barrier North America 3.50 0.97
Western Europe 3.86 1.44
Asia/Pacific 3.36 0.92 0.78
Factor 2: Market power North America 1.95 0.68
Western Europe 1.60 0.92
Asia/Pacific 1.55 0.57 0.82
To reduce competition North America 2.20 1.03
Western Europe 1.50 1.03
Asia/Pacific 1.27 0.47 2.83*
To enable product diversification North America 1.70 0.95
Western Europe 1.69 1.04
Asia/Pacific 1.82 0.87 0.07
Factor 3: partner synergies North America 2.40 0.83
Western Europe 2.22 0.91
Asia/Pacific 2.48 0.45 0.45
Risk and cost sharing North America 4.00 0.82
Western Europe 3.17 1.21
Asia/Pacific 4.00 0.78 3.95**
To gain access to finance North America 2.20 1.23
Western Europe 2.11 1.28
Asia/Pacific 2.55 0.82 0.55
To gain access to partner’s technology North America 1.80 1.23
Western Europe 1.72 1.09
Asia/Pacific 1.36 0.67 0.59
A ccess to management know-how North America 1.60 0.84
Western Europe 1.92 1.00
Asia/Pacific 2.00 1.00 0.52
Factor 4: Production efficiency North America 2.75 0.85
Western Europe 2.76 1.04
Asia/Pacific 3.18 1.05 0.77
To obtain econom ies o f  large scale North America 2.70 1.06
Production Western Europe 2.78 1.27
Asia/Pacific 2.91 1.30 0.79
To have access to low cost labour North America 2.80 1.14
Western Europe 2.75 1.16
Asia/Pacific 3.46 0.93 1.73
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean for the factor scores: the mean for the individual m otives 
is the average on the scale o f  1 (= not at all important) to 5 
(=  very important); p<0.1*; p<0.05**; P<0.01***
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5.4.10 Host Country Selection and Nationality
Table 5.10 shows the relationship between host country location factors and the 
origin of the foreign partner. Table 5.10 shows a moderate support for hypothesis 3b. 
Of the five factors, one i.e., market potential (p<0.05) has mean factor scores that is 
significantly different. The results relating to market potential indicate that JV 
partners from Western Europe have higher mean scores compared to North American 
and Asia/Pacific groups. The two individual host country items comprising the 
market potential factor, ie, market size (p<0.1), and purchasing power of customer 
(p<0.05), have means significantly higher for JV partners from Western Europe 
compared with those from North America and Asia/Pacific. One host country item of 
the business facilitation factor, that is, availability of incentives (p<0.05), has a mean 
significantly higher for JV partners from North America compared with those from 
Europe and Asia/Pacific.
The findings that the market potential factor and two of this factor’s constituent items, 
(market size and purchasing power of customers), are more important to Western 
European multinationals than North America and Asia/Pacific partners. This may be 
due to the fact that the latter groups are more often engaged in exploiting natural 
resources which are exported abroad for further production and is consistent with the 
report that states that two-thirds of the North America’s FDI is in the primary sector 
(UNCTAD, 1995). In contrast, the Western European firms tend to produce for local 
consumption and as such rely on the local market.
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Another host country factor which is significantly different is government policy 
towards foreign investors (p<0.1).The western European firms have higher mean 
scores than MNEs from North America and Asia/Pacific. The findings indicate that 
the government policy towards foreign investors is considered more important by 
Western European firms compared to partners from America and Asia/Pacific. This 
finding is not surprising because the Western European firms have a long association 
with Ghana and Nigeria whose past experiences, particularly, from the mid-1960s to 
early 1980s were characterised with hostile government policies towards foreign 
investment. This is in contrast to North American and Asia/Pacific MNCs, who until 
recently had relatively negligible investments in Ghana and Nigeria and did not 
experience the sweeping nationalisation of the European MNCs that took place in the 
1970s, and may explain the differences in attitudes towards host country policies.
T able 5.10
Host Country Location Factors of IJV Formation in Ghana and Nigeria: Ownership Type
Host Country Location Factor Group Mean SD F-value
Market potential North America 2.70 1.23
Western Europe 3.53 0.77
Asia/Pacific 3.55 1.06 3.40**
Market size North America 3.00 1.63
Western Europe 3.75 1.08
Asia/Pacific 3.64 1.29 1.47
Purchasing power o f  customers North America 2.40 1.08
Western Europe 3.31 0.86
Asia/Pacific 3.46 1.04 4.32**
Country risk North America 3.55 0.98
Western Europe 3.81 0.94
Asia/Pacific 3.18 1.25 1.66
Political stability North America 3.80 1.23
Western Europe 3.86 1.02
Asia/Pacific 3.09 1.38 2.01
M acro-economic stability North America 3.30 1.06
Western Europe 3.75 1.03
Asia/Pacific 3.27 1.49 1.12
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T able 5.10 (continued)
Host country Location Factor Group Mean SD F-value
Government policy & regulation North America 3.80 0.50
Western Europe 3.63 0.55
Asia/Pacific 3.41 0.65 1.29
Repatriability o f  profit and capital North America 4.20 0.63
Western Europe 4.11 0.71
Asia/Pacific 3.55 1.29 2.21
Protection offered against nationalisation North America 3.60 0.97
Western Europe 3.14 1.25
Asia/Pacific 3.46 0.82 0.81
Government policy towards foreign North America 3.90 0.74
Investors Western Europe 4.06 0.86
Asia/Pacific 3.36 1.21 2.40*
Ease o f  employing foreign labour North America 3.50 0.85
Western Europe 3.22 0.99
Asia/Pacific 2.73 1.01 0.32
Comparative cost & location advantages North America 2.85 1.03
Western Europe 3.11 0.65
Asia/Pacific 2.82 1.07 0.78
Access to natural resources North America 1.94
Western Europe 1.36
Asia/Pacific 1.51 0.24
Availability o f  low cost inputs North America 2.70 1.25
Western Europe 3.39 1.02
Asia/Pacific 3.18 0.98 1.67
Availability o f  capable partners North America 3.50 1.43
Western Europe 3.22 1.10
Asia/Pacific 2.31 1.45 1.42
Level o f  industry competition North America 3.20 1.14
Western Europe 3.06 1.09
Asia/Pacific 2.64 1.12 0.80
Business Facilitation North America 3.67 0.74
Western Europe 3.39 0.65
Asia/Pacific 3.39 0.71 0.70
Availability o f  incentives North America 4.40 0.70
Western Europe 3.44 1.08
Asia/Pacific 3.73 0.65 3.93**
Information availability on investments North America 3.40 0.70
Western Europe 3.33 1.04
Asia/Pacific 2.73 1.27 1.59
Level o f  infrastructure development North America 3.20 1.03
Western Europe 3.39 0.96
Asia/Pacific 3.73 1.10 0.77
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean for the factor scores: the mean for the individual location 
factors is the average on the scale o f  1 (= not at all important) to 5 
(=  very important); p<0.1*; p<0.05**; P O .O l***
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5.4.11 Strategic Motives and Sector of JV
Table 5.11 shows that there is reasonable support for hypothesis 4a, in that for two of 
the four factors -  partner synergies (p<0.05) and production efficiency (p<0.05) -  
there is a significant difference in the means of the factor scores, with the mean of 
both factors being significantly higher for JVs in the primary sector compared with 
those in the secondary and tertiary sectors. All the four motives constituting partner 
synergies, i.e, to gain access to finance (0.1); risk and cost sharing (p<0.05), to gain 
access to partner’s technology (p<0.01), and access to management know-how 
(p<0.05), have means significantly higher for JVs in the primary sector. One of the 
two motives comprising the production efficiency factor, i.e, economies of large scale 
production (p<0.05), has a mean significantly higher for JVs in the primary sector 
compared to the secondary and the tertiary sectors
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Table 5.11
Strategic Motivation for IJV in Ghana and Nigeria: Sector of Activity
Motivation Group Mean SD F-ratio
F actor 1: Entry strategies Primary 3.39 0.40
Secondary 3.66 0.72
Tertiary 3.47 0.88 0.73
To facilitates international expansion Primary 3.42 1.22
Secondary 3.52 1.42
Tertiary 3.11 1.32 0.50
To overcome government-mandated Primary 3.36 1.15
Barriers Secondary 3.80 1.35
Tertiary 3.83 1.29 0.67
F actor 2: M arket pow er Primary 1.43 0.58
Secondary 1.88 0.98
Tertiary 1.50 0.69 1.83
To co-opt existing competitors in order Primary 1.64 1.08
to reduce competition Secondary 1.76 1.17
Tertiary 1.28 0.46 1.32
To enable product diversification Primary 1.21 0.43
Secondary 2.00 1.04
Tertiary 1.72 1.07 1.32
F actor 3: partner synergies Primary 2.89 0.76
Secondary 2.20 0.82
Tertiary 2.00 0.65 L/1 o * *
Risk and cost sharing Primary 4.21 0.58
Secondary 3.12 1.24
Tertiary 3.38 1.09 4.82**
To gain access to finance Primary 2.29 0.73
Secondary 2.52 1.42
Tertiary 1.72 1.02 2.52*
To gain access to partner’s technology Primary 2.50 1.29
Secondary 1.48 0.92
Tertiary 1.28 0.57 7 59***
To gain access to management Primary 2.57 1.02
Know-how Secondary 1.68 0.80
Tertiary 1.61 0.92 5.62**
F actor 4: Production efficiency Primary 3.18 0.54
Secondary 3.08 1.07
Tertiary 2.25 1.00 5.26**
To obtain economies of large scale. Primary 3.36 0.93
Production Secondary 3.04 1.21
Tertiary 2.00 1.09 7.06**
To have access to low cost labour Primary 3.00 0.96
Secondary 3.12 1.24
Tertiary 2.50 1.04 1.70
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean for the factor scores: the mean for the individual 
motives is the average on a scale of 1 (=not at all important) to 5 (=very important);p<0.1 * 
p < 0 .0 5 * *  p < 0 .0 1 * * *
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5.4.12 Host Country Selection and Sector o f JV
Table 5.12 shows that there is fairly reasonable support for hypothesis 4b, in that two 
of the five factors, ie, market potential (p<0.01), and comparative cost and location 
advantages (p<0.05) have mean scores significant different. The two host country 
items comprising the market potential factor, ie, market size (p<0.05), purchasing 
power of customers (p<0.05) revealed a significant difference in the mean of the three 
sectors, with the mean scores being highest for the secondary sector. In the case of 
comparative cost and location advantages factor -two of the four items, ie, level of 
industry competition (0.05) and ‘access to natural resources’ (p<0.01) have mean 
scores significantly different. The mean score is higher for the primary sector than the 
manufacturing and the tertiary sectors with regard to access to natural resources. This 
is not particularly surprising because natural resources are utilised more in the 
primary sector. With regard to business facilitation factor, the availability of 
incentives item has a mean score significantly different for secondary sector 
compared to primary and tertiary sectors.
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Table 5.12
Host Country Location Factors of IJV Formation in Ghana and Nigeria: Sector 
of Activity
Host Country Location Factors Group Mean SD F-ratio
Primary 2.68 1.03
Secondary 3.88 0.85
Tertiary 3.25 0.62
Primary 2.70 1.16
Market potential
Market size
Purchasing power of customers
Country risk
Political stability 
Macro-economic stability
Government policy & regulation
Repatriability of profit and capital
Protection offered against nationalisation
Government policy towards foreign 
Investors
Ease of employing foreign labour
Secondary 3.90 1.21
Tertiary 3.59 1.12 3.89**
Primary 2.40 1.17
Secondary 3.50 0.97
Tertiary 3.06 0.56 5.66**
Primary 3.36 1.01
Secondary 3.84 1.13
Tertiary 3.58 0.85 1.05
Primary 3.50 0.97
Secondary 3.87 1.17
Tertiary 3.53 1.23 0.65
Primary 3.30 1.34
Secondary 3.63 1.27
Tertiary 3.65 0.70 0.36
Primary 3.79 0.45
Secondary 3.57 0.59
Tertiary 3.56 0.62 0.80
Primary 4.30 0.68
Secondary 3.83 0.91
Tertiary 4.18 0.81 1.56
Primary 3.60 0.84
Secondary 3.33 1.06
Tertiary 3.00 1.37 0.95
Primary 4.30 0.68
Secondary 3.73 1.04
Tertiary 3.94 0.83 1.42
Primary 3.40 0.52
Secondary 3.23 1.17
Tertiary 3.29 0.77 0.11
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Table 5.11 (continued)
Host Country Location Factor 
ratio
Group Mean SD F-
Comparative cost & location advantages Primary 3.21 0.78
Secondary 3.18 0.93
Tertiary 2.61 0.50 3.44**
Access to natural resources Primary 4.60 0.52
Secondary 2.73 1.39
Tertiary 1.76 0.90 12.65**
Availability of low cost inputs Primary 2.90 1.45
Secondary 3.47 1.07
Tertiary 3.00 0.70 1.64
Availability of capable partners Primary 3.29 1.20
Secondary 3.00 1.38
Tertiary 2.89 1.09 0.41
Level of industry competition Primary 2.40 1.17
Secondary 3.30 1.08
Tertiary 2.82 0.95 3.01**
Business Facilitation Primary 3.45 0.61
Secondary 3.32 0.74
Tertiary 3.59 0.62 0.87
Availability of incentives Primary 4.30 0.68
Secondary 3.73 1.05
Tertiary 3.94 0.82 3.89**
Information availability on investments Primary 3.50 0.52
Secondary 3.00 1.29
Tertiary 3.47 0.72 1.52
Level of infrastructure development Primary 3.10 1.29
Secondary 3.43 1.01
Tertiary 3.59 0.79 0.75
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean for the factor scores: the mean for the 
individual location factors is the average on the scale of 1 (= not at all important) to 5 
(= very important); p<0.1*; p<0.05**; P<0.01***
5.4.13 Country of Ownership by Industry
Table 5.13 shows IJV formation by country of ownership and industry. Most of the 
IJVs are formed in manufacturing sector with the UK accounting for a fifth of the 
IJVs in the manufacturing sector. Agriculture, building and construction industries are
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dominated by partners from Western Europe, while Canada and the USA have a 
strong presence in the mining industry. Half of the IJVs in the service industry have 
partners from the UK. With regard to earlier finding, it may be noted that industry- 
specific differences are probably washed out by country of ownership. This may be 
regarded as possible interpretation of the weakness of the country findings and the 
relative strength of the industry findings.
Table 5.13
IJV Formation in Ghana: Country of Ownership by Industry
Country Agriculture Manufacturing Building
&Construction
Mining Service
No % No % No % No % No %
UK 1 20.0 5 20.0 1 20.0 1 12.5 7 50.0
Germany - - 3 12.0 1 20.0 - - - -
France 1 20.0 1 4.0 1 20.0 1 12.5 1 7.1
Holland 1 20.0 3 12.0 1 20.0 - - 1 7.1
Switzerland - - 4 16.0 1 20.0 - - -
USA - - 2 8.0 - - 2 25.0 1 7.1
Canada - - - - - - 4 50.0 -
Australia - - 3 12.0 - - - - 1 7.1
Malaysia 1 20.0 2 8.0 - - - - 1 7.1
South Korea - - 2 8.0 - - - - 2 14.3
Total 5 100.0 25 100.0 5 100.0 8 100.0 14 100.0
5.5 Discussion and Policy Implications
This paper identifies the main strategic motives and host country location factors that 
motivate multinational firms to form joint ventures in Ghana and Nigeria. The 
findings indicate that national policy and regulation constitute very important aspects 
of what motivates the formation of joint ventures in Ghana. This is evidenced by the 
high mean scores of government-mandated barriers and cost and risk sharing in the 
case of strategic motives. With regard to location factors, government policy towards
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foreign investors is ranked highest, followed by repatriability of profits and capital, 
political stability, availability of incentives, market size, macro-economic stability 
and level of infrastructure development. It is apparent from these findings that 
national policy and regulation are very crucial in the decision to form a joint venture 
in Ghana and Nigeria. This is not surprising in that past policies in many developing 
countries, including Ghana, have been hostile towards foreign investors 
(Bennell, 1990). Sudden change in policies and rules were common place in sub 
Saharan Africa. It appears every change of government, particularly, military ones, 
brings about a change in rules and policies. This fact has been documented in 
numerous studies. For example, IMF (1996) reported that what worries foreign 
investors most is a sudden change in the ‘rules of the game’. Therefore the ranking 
reported in this study reflects the deep uncertainty among foreign investors when it 
comes to choosing a developing country as a JV location. This is so even with the 
sweeping liberalisation of investment policies and regulations permeating throughout 
sub-Saharan Africa. The implication of this is that although much has been done in 
recent years to improve investment policies and regulations investors remain cautious 
and are still observing how these changes work in practice. Policy makers should 
therefore assure investors that the changes taking place are not only permanent but 
should expedite efforts to remove the remaining obstacles. More information should 
be disseminated on the investment rules and policy changes to investors. It is also 
suggested that, in some cases, governments should involve both local and foreign 
investors in investment policy formulation affecting the business community.
The study also finds that ‘to enable product diversification’ and ‘to co-opt existing 
competitor in order to reduce competition’ appear to be relatively unimportant
motives for JV formation in Ghana. This appears to support the finding reported by 
Appiah-Adu (1998) that before the introduction of economic reforms in Ghana, 
marketing decisions were made in an environment where competition was virtually 
non-existent. This is inconsistent with the views in the literature that highlight JVs as 
competitive weapons (Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Porter and Fuller, 1986). It 
therefore appears that after years of reforms and liberalisation, competition in Ghana 
remains largely undeveloped. The implication of the lack of competition is that it 
leads to poor quality of goods and services, curtails consumer choice, masks firms’ 
inefficiencies and fosters low living standards. It is suggested that policy makers in 
Ghana should accelerate the liberalisation process and take pragmatic measures aimed 
at encouraging competition instead of propping up monopolies under the untenable 
argument that they provide essential services at reasonable prices.
5.5 Conclusion
Systematic survey evidence by many researchers (e.g. Killing, 1983; Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988; Miller, et al 1996) show that overcoming government-mandated 
barriers and cost and risk sharing are the oldest and common strategic motives in a 
foreign partner’s decision to invest through a JV. This study concludes that these two 
factors are the most important and remain the strongest motivating factors in 
persuading companies to utilise a JV structure in their market development strategies 
in Ghana.
Traditionally, JVs were frequently motivated by the availability of natural resources 
sought by the foreign investors. It may be argued natural resources as a location 
factor continues to exert influence in MNC location decisions but only for some 
labour or resource investments in developing countries (UNCTAD, 1998; Dunning,
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1998). MNCs are increasingly seeking locations where the governments have 
relatively good policies towards foreign investment, sound physical and human 
infrastructure, together with a stable political and macroeconomic environment as 
pointed out in the previous chapter. It is therefore concluded that with the 
environment changing, particularly, the forces of globalisation and increased 
competition for investment, these factors would tend to play a more decisive role in 
location decisions than they once did.
While the variation in importance of several of the strategic motives and location 
factors appear to be readily justifiable the reason for the variation in importance is not 
always apparent. Further investigation of the relative importance of strategic motives 
and location factors appear warranted. The survey was conducted with the upper level 
managers of the JVs. Most, but not all, of these managers have good knowledge of 
the formation and development of the joint venture. Consequently, responses might 
not have reflected accurately the opinions of both partners of the JV. To offset this 
obvious source of bias, a number of interviews were conducted in the UK and Ghana 
with parents of four JVs. Not surprisingly, on some issues opinions were quite 
different, but in general responses with managers and partners were similar. 
Nevertheless, in future research obtaining data from representatives of the JV partners 
on how strategic motives and location factors vary across the sample characteristics is 
suggested.
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The next chapter examines how international joint ventures are financed in Ghana and 
Nigeria by investigating a range of finance issues including sources of capital, 
barriers to finance and the determinants of capital structure.
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CHAPTER 6
FINANCING INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES IN GHANA AND 
NIGERIA: SOURCES OF FUNDS, BARRIERS AND DETERMINANTS OF
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
6.1 Introduction
One of the most striking changes over the past two decades has been the increasing 
adoption and vigorous pursuit of economic reforms in developing countries under the 
auspices of the International Monetary Fund. These reforms have gone far beyond 
trade policy {Economist, 1993). Many governments from developing countries have 
privatised state-owned enterprises, liberalised exchange controls, deregulated 
industry, commerce and domestic finance. Developing countries that once 
discouraged foreign investments now go to financial centres of the rich countries to 
advertise opportunities for foreign investments (Bennel, 1990). The reason behind 
these comprehensive moves away from heavy state intervention towards more liberal 
economic policies is to attract foreign capital which is crucial to the economic 
development of many developing countries (Lecraw, 1992). It is therefore 
unsurprising that capital inflows into developing countries has soared over the past 
decade (International Finance Corporation, 1997). FDI now averages about 1.7 
percent of all developing countries’ GNP and accounts for one third of global FDI 
(IFC, 1997). It is important to note that the biggest single component of the capital 
inflow into developing countries is foreign direct investment. For example, FDI 
inflow into developing countries has risen from $29 billion in 1989 to $166 billion in 
1998 (IFC, 1997; UNCTAD, 1999).
Joint ventures have been used as popular vehicles through which foreign direct 
investments are channelled into many developing countries (Austin, 1990). Yet 
relatively few studies have systematically examined how JVs are financed and the 
barriers to the financing of IJVs, particularly in developing countries where acute 
shortage of capital has been identified as one of the evidences of their poverty (see 
Fernandes, 1979). Where this has been studied the factors influencing the extent to 
which a JV is financed by debt or equity capital has ignored international factors (see 
Burgman, 1996). Given the relative importance of capital inflows, or increasing 
reliance by many developing country ventures on multinational operations, financed 
in part by foreign sources of funds, it is no longer tenable to ignore the possible 
impact of international factors. It is necessary to focus on a set of international 
environmental variables which must be incorporated into the determination of the 
appropriate financial structure. This is because multinational companies may wish to 
finance their partly owned ventures abroad with as many foreign loans as possible, 
and this complicates the choice of the appropriate financial structure (Lee and Kwok,
1988).
The purpose of this chapter is to bridge this gap by presenting new data and new 
empirical insights into how joint ventures are financed and examine the barriers to 
joint venture finance in West Africa. The remainder of this chapter proceeds as 
follows: The next section reviews the literature relating to source of funds, capital 
structure and barriers to IJV finance, and sets out the hypotheses of the study. The 
third section presents the results and discussion. A summary and conclusions are in 
the final section.
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6.2 Hypotheses
6.2.1 Finance Sources and Partner Choice
Domestic financing of investment projects is considered to be a major problem in 
many African countries and a serious impediment against new private investment 
(Bachmann, 1996). According to Bachman, difficulties in mobilising long - term 
funds in the host country is one of the most serious problems facing investors. This is 
supported by the International Finance Corporation (1989), which reported that 
improving the financial environment was one of the major incomplete agenda items 
for developing countries in the 1990s.
"In many African countries, there is a serious shortage of long - term finance" (IFC, 
1989 pp. 18). This is true particularly for local entrepreneurs, but even foreign 
investors prefer to finance part of a new project through local borrowing so as to 
contain the foreign exchange risk. Foreign investors are therefore inclined to invest in 
a country where a well functioning banking sector will allow them to do so at a 
reasonable cost and on acceptable conditions (Bachmann 1996). This is not the case 
in most African countries including Ghana and Nigeria. The fact that most African 
countries simply lack capital markets where funds might be raised exacerbates the 
problem (IFC, 1989), although a number of African countries including Ghana have 
made strides in recent years in establishing equity markets. Despite these 
achievements, capital market development is taking place far too slowly. In Ghana 
and Nigeria, stock markets remain small, involve few shareholders, and have limited 
activity (Africa and Middle East, 1997). It is therefore hypothesised that:
HI: The largest source o f capital to IJVs in West Africa will be contributions from the 
foreign partner.
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6.2.2 Initial Capital and Host Partner Type
Some industries are capital intensive and require huge capital investment and longer 
payback period terms. Traditionally, IJVs in sectors such as mining, oil (extractive) 
and power construction, which require large initial capital investments, have normally 
used a host government as a partner rather than a local private investor. This is 
because the former will be more likely to have the level of funds needed for such 
huge investment than the latter (Radetzki and Zorn, 1979; Selassie, 1995). In contrast, 
it may also be argued that with the steps taken over the past decade to encourage 
private enterprise and to liberalise the financial sector in Ghana and Nigeria, even if 
partially, it may be expected that the host government will not be preferred to a 
private local partner in capital intensive IJVs. There is therefore a degree of 
ambiguity over the amount of capital required to establish the IJV and the preferred 
partner type. In line with this discussion it is hypothesised that:
H2: The choice o f  organisation type o f host partner (government or private) will not 
be independent o f  the size o f  capital outlay required to form an IJV.
6.2.3 Regulatory Barriers and Investment Finance.
Developing countries use a wide range of specific policies and institutions to regulate 
investment inflows (Pfefferman, 1988). These restrictions include: a) the sectors in 
which investments are accepted; b) the proportion of ownership open to a foreign 
partner. Regulation usually involves an investment screening and monitoring process 
of differing complexity and duration. This process itself becomes a barrier to 
investment in many countries (Encarnation and Wells, 1985).
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According to Imoisili (1978), since 1972 regulation in Nigeria has sought to 
encourage the increased participation of Nigerians in the ownership and management 
of business enterprises (see Nigeria enterprises promotion decrees 1972 and 1977). 
Faced with severe limitations on the availability of foreign capital through 
commercial lending, a number of developing countries began to liberalise foreign 
investment policies (Pfefferman, 1988). According to Pfefferman (1988), the changes 
have been only superficial, often involving tinkering with an investment code, while a 
large number of other restrictions remain in place. Ghana for example, adopted a 
more liberal code in 1985, while continuing to impose marginal tax rates of over 
eighty per cent on earnings repatriated to foreign investors. In the case of Nigeria, 
despite the liberalisation of investment policies, ownership restrictions remain in 
many sectors particularly the oil sector (EIU, 1994). In Thailand, the level of foreign 
participation depends on the government’s view of industry strategic importance, 
with banking being considered more important than most other sectors (Glen and 
Pinto, 1994). This leads to the final hypothesis:
H3: The barriers to finance and the sector o f  joint venture operation will not be 
independent.
6.2.4 Capital Structure and Firm Size
Firm size has been found to be a factor in determining capital structure (Scott and 
Martin, 1976; Gupta, 1969; Ferri and Jones, 1979). Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) 
pointed out that small firms would find it too expensive to float bond issues because 
of heavy underwriting costs. On the other hand, it may be argued that large JVs could 
support huge bond flotation and consequently more debt in their capital structure
because of the vast nature of their resources. However, Remmers et al (1974) and 
Boquest and Moore (1984) did not find firm size to be a contributory factor. In sum, 
the empirical efforts of multiple investigators have found size effects to be present in 
varying degrees. However, the presence of inconsistent findings suggests further 
study in this area is necessary. It is therefore hypothesised that:
H4: The capital structure and the size o f  a joint venture will not be independent
6.2.5 Capital Structure and Industry
The personalities of owners and managers have a strong impact on firm behavoiur. 
Struggles over control of the firm are not infrequent for obvious reasons. With control 
comes access to the firm's earnings, not to mention various nonpecuniary benefits. As 
a result, maintaining control can preoccupy management (owners if they are different) 
whenever capital structure decisions are being made and the choice between debt and 
equity can at times tilt in favour of debt on the basis of control, even when cost 
considerations would favour equity. This is particularly true in SSA where the 
governments make every effort to control sectors considered strategic. In these 
sectors, the government may be in favour of more equity as against debt as more 
debts may increase the chances of takeover should JVs fail to meet their obligations. 
Past empirical efforts have included industry classification as determining factors in 
capital structure (Bos and Fetherson, 1993; Scott and Martin, 1976). Schmidt (1976) 
argues that industry classification is a relevant factor. However, the works of 
Remmers et al (1974) and Belkaoui (1975) suggest that the other studies are flawed in 
that they found industry classification was not an important consideration. It is 
therefore hypothesised that:
H5: Capital structure will vary with the type o f  industry o f  the joint venture.
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6.3 Statistical Analysis
The analysis of the hypotheses was conducted by using three different sets of 
statistical tests. A paired t-test was conducted to test the differences associated with 
HI. Contingency table analysis was used to test hypothesis 2. The rest of the 
hypotheses, that is, H3, H4 and H5 were tested by considering differences in means 
of the relative effects of barriers and factors influencing the capital structure of JV 
finance. T-test was therefore implemented.
6.4 Results and discussion
6.4.1 Sources of JV Finance
Table 6.1 shows that there are three main sources of funds used by the firms in the 
sample. These are equity contributions from the parents, debt capital from 
development banks and other commercial institutions, and retained profits from on 
going operations. It is apparent from Table 6.1 that over a half of the IJV total capital 
is represented by equity contributions from JV parents. This is followed by debt 
capital, which represents over a third of the total capital and the rest is generated from 
retained profit. This finding tends to lend support to the conclusions drawn by Davies 
(1976) that firms in developing countries are financed predominantly by partners’ 
equity contributions and future growth by profit reinvestment and borrowing.
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Table 6.1
Sources of Capital to Finance Joint Ventures
Sources o f  Capital
Number 
of JVs Percent
Proportion of 
Capital ($ Million)
Percent
Equity contribution 197.1 53 .4
Foreign Partner 51 100.0 102.8 27.9
Host Partner 51 100.0 94.3 25.5
Debt Capital # 120.7 32.7
Foreign Country Loans 17 33.3 82.7 22.4
Host Country Loans 14 27.5 38.0 10.3
Other 57.3 15.5
Retained Profits 19 37.3 57.3 15.5
Total Capital 51 100.0 375.1 100.0
6.4.2 Initial Capital and Host Partner Type
The results of the paired sample t-test conducted to compare the equity contributions 
by foreign partners and host country partners are shown in Table 6.2. Although the 
mean score for the foreign partners is marginally higher than the mean score of the 
host country partner indicating that equity finance from foreign partners is important 
in financing developing country firms, the results do not support HI, i.e. equity 
contributions from foreign partners do not significantly differ from the equity 
contributions from the host country partners
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Table 6.2
Equity Capital Contribution: Foreign Partner versus Host Partner
Partners Paired
Foreign Partner Host Partner Difference
Equity Capital Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD T-value
Equity Contribution 28.04 19.46 27.97 22.03 6.92 25.8 0.19
6.4.3 Regulatory Barriers and Investment Finance.
A two-way contingency table analysis was conducted to evaluate whether the size of 
the IJV initial capital is associated with the organisation type of the host partner. As 
Table 6.3 shows, the host government partner tends to form more IJVs (75%) than the 
private sector partner (25%) when the initial capital requirement is large. By contrast, 
the private sector partner (54.1%) tends to form more IJVs than host government 
partner (45.9%) when the initial capital is small/medium. The results of the Chi- 
square analysis (Pearson Chi square = 4.45; p<0.05) indicating a significant 
relationship between the size of initial capital required to form an IJV and the choice 
of organisation type of host partner. This evidence tends to support H2. This finding 
is consistent with the earlier research findings of Radetski and Zorn (1979), Selassie 
(1995) that host government tends to be the dominant partner type in IJV projects 
which require larger size of capital. However, it is inconsistent with the conclusions 
drawn by Lopez-Mejia (1999) that the economic liberalisation in the 1990s appears to 
have systematically shifted the usual experience where governments of developing 
countries were the ones able to attract more funds for capital investment.
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Table 6.3
Result of Chi-square Test: Size of the Initial Capital and the Host PartnerType
Size o f  Capital Host Governm ent Partner Private sector partner
Small/M edium 17 20.0 37
(45.9%) (54.1% ) (100% )
Large 15 5 20
(75% ) (25% ) (100% )
Total 32 25 57
(56.1% ) (43.9%) 100%)
Notes: Sm all/M edium  denotes IJV with total capital less than/equal to $10 m illion
Large denotes IJV with total capital of more than $10 million 
Figure in parentheses: percentage of row counts 
Pearson’s Chi-square = 4.45; d.f. = 1; p<.05 
Continuity correlation = 3.35; d.f. = 1; p<.05
6.4.4 Barriers to JV Finance
The rank order of the barriers to JV finance based on the mean measure of the relative 
effects shown in Table 6.4. Scores are all significantly different on the one-way t test 
(p<0.001). The median measure is exceeded by four barriers to finance: ‘exchange 
rate (3.61), ‘poor infrastructure’ (3.44), ‘political instability’ (3.28), ‘transfer risk’ 
(3.12). The other four barriers: ‘installed foreign ownership limit’ ‘higher taxes on 
dividend repatriation’ ‘ban on profit repatriation’ ‘host country screening procedure’ 
all have mean scores below the median measure. This finding is not surprising in that 
it shows the areas where the reforms and FDI liberalisation have concentrated on over 
the past decade. The liberalisation programme has, to a large extent, emphasised 
removing restrictions on foreign ownership and providing incentives to foreign 
investors. While restrictions on private sector participation have been removed in 
most sectors in Ghana and Nigeria, adequate attention has not been given to the
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provision of basic infrastructure and political stability. Exchange rates have been an 
area where reforms have taken place in Ghana and Nigeria, however, the reforms 
have been inconsistent. For example, Ghana and Nigeria liberalised their foreign 
exchange controls by letting the local currency float and limiting the role of the 
central bank to open market operations. However, facing dwindling reserves recently, 
Ghana and Nigeria increased the role of the central bank and reintroduced foreign 
exchange regulations (Economist, 2000). It should be emphasised however that the 
data was collected between July and November, 1998 and that the reintroduction of 
exchange controls did not affect the survey.
Table 6.4
Barriers to JV Investment Finance
Rank Barrier to finance Mean SD
1 Exchange risk 3.61 1.11
2 Poor infrastructure 3.44 1.14
3 Political instability 3.28 1.18
4 Transfer risk 3.12 1.27
5 Installed foreign ownership limit 2.42 1.40
6 Higher tax on dividend repatriation 2.40 1.21
7 Ban on profit repatriation 2.31 1.54
8 Host country screening procedure 1.86 1.86
N=57
The mean is the average on a scale of (‘not at all a problem’) to 5 (‘a serious 
problem’)
SD = Standard Deviation
Scores are significantly different on the Friedman two way ANOVA test (p<.001
6.4.5 Factor Analysis of Barriers to JV Finance
The correlation matrix of the eight barriers to finance revealed a number of low to 
moderate inter-correlations. Due to potential conceptual overlap, an attempt was
made to identify a parsimonious set of variables to determine the primary underlying 
factors. Using a varimax rotation procedure, the solution as shown in Table 6.5 
yielded two interpretable factors, which make good conceptual sense. The two factors 
are interpreted as “investment risks and infrastructure” and the “host government 
control”. Together the two factors accounted for a total of 60.12 percent of the 
variance. Cronbach alphas for the underlying factors are 0.70 and 0.69 respectively. 
As these values are substantially over 0.60, this suggests a satisfactory level of 
construct reliability (Nunnally, 1978; Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).
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Table 6.5
Factor Analysis of Barriers to Finance
Factors Factor loads Eigenvalue % variance 
explained
Cumulative
percent
Cronbach
Alpha
Factor 1:
Investment risk and infrastructure
3.49 43.56 43.56 0.70
Exchange risk 0.74
Transfer risk 0.86
Political instability 0.66
Poor infrastructure 0.39
Factor 2:
Host Country Controls
1.32 16.56 60.12 0.69
Installed ownership limit 0.87
Ban on profit repatriation 0.80
Higher tax on dividend repatriation 0.86
Host country screening procedure 0.46
Notes:
Principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation 
K-M-0 Measure of sampling Adequacy = 0.636 
Barlett Test of sphericity = 184.399; p < 0.000
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6.4.6 Barriers to Finance and Sector of JV
To further investigate the underlying nature of the barriers for this sample of JVs, the 
analysis was developed by considering the barrier items in respect of two 
characteristics of the sample. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show the means and standard 
deviations of the factors and their components and the t-test statistic for comparing 
differences in mean scores, across the sectors of operation.
Table 6.6 shows that there is no support for hypothesis 3. None of the factors have 
mean scores that are significantly different. As regards to the individual barriers, 
exchange risk (p<0.1); transfer risk (p<0.001) and higher tax on dividend repatriation 
(p<0.05) have significantly different means between sectors of operation. In the case 
of exchange risk, transfer risk and higher taxes on dividend repatriation the mean 
scores for the primary sector are higher compared with those of the manufacturing 
sector.
The finding that exchange risk and transfer risk vary with the sector of operation 
tends to support the conclusions drawn by Shapiro (1975) that the sector of economy 
in which a firm operates and the sources of the firm’s inputs are major determinants 
of a firm’s exchange risk. JVs in the primary sector in Ghana and Nigeria involved 
mostly in exploitation of natural resources such as oil and gold mining, which require 
the importation of large inputs (machinery, technical know-how) from abroad. The 
primary sector JVs, are likely, therefore, to experience relatively higher exchange risk 
and transfer risk than JVs in the manufacturing sector.
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Table 6.6. Barriers to Joint Venture Finance: Sector of Operation
Barriers to Finance Group Mean SD T-value
Investment risk & Infrastructure Prim ary 3.61 0.84 1.65
M anuf/Tertiary 3.23 0.85
Exchange risk Prim ary 3.95 0.89 1.86*
M anuf/Tertiary 3.43 1.19
Transfer risk Primary 3.70 1.08 2.66***
M anuf/Tertiary 2.81 1.27
Political instability Primary 3.25 1.16 -0.14
M anuf/Tertiary 3.29 1.20
Poor infrastructure Primary 3.53 1.12 0.42
M anuf/Tertiary 3.39 1.15
Host country Controls Primary 2.38 0.89 0.81
M anuf/Tertiary 2.18 0.84
Installed ownership limit Primary 2.05 1.05 -1.66*
M anuf/Tertiary 2.62 1.53
Ban on profit repatriation Prim ary 2.70 1.56 1.40
M anuf/Tertiary 2.11 1.51
H igher tax on dividend repatriation Primary 2.85 1.27 2 .11**
M anuf/Tertiary 2.16 1.12
Host country screening procedure Prim ary 1.90 0.85 0.25
M anuf/Tertiary 1.84 0.93
Notes: The mean for the factors is the mean o f  the factor scores: the mean o f the individual 
host country factors is the average o f  the scale o f 1 (= N ot at all a problem ) to  5 (A serious 
problem ); p<0.1* p<0,05** p<0.01***
6.4.7 Capital Structure and JV Size
Table 6.7 shows the influence of JV size on capital structure. There is a reasonable 
support for hypothesis 4 indicating that the size of the JV is an influencing factor on
the capital structure. Capital structure factor, that is, debt and equity, has mean scores 
that are statistically significant (p<0.1). The large JVs have higher mean score than 
medium and small firms. This is not surprising in that large firms tend to have huge 
assets and in most cases well diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. These 
arguments suggest that large JVs should be able to support whatever capital structure 
ie, debt or equity the partners choose to finance the JV. This finding is consistent with 
the previous research findings by the Gupta, 1969; Scott and Martin, 1976; Ferri and 
Jones, 1979.
Table 6.7
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Capital Structure: Size of the JV
Capital structure Group Mean SD F-value
Debt & Equity Small 34.02 8.90 2.47*
Medium 37.50 9.73
Large 41.65 10.65
Debt Small 34.56 20.01 1.34
Medium 43.38 19.29
Large 42.36 22.80
Equity Small 32.70 10.46 0.86
Medium 33.94 15.13
Large 35.84 19.41
Notes: Overall mean for JV Size=36.92; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
Small denotes equal to/less than $5 million; Medium denotes equal to/less 
than $10 million; Large denotes above $10 million
6.4.8 Capital Structure and JV Sector of Operation
Table 6.8 also shows no support for hypothesis 5 in that capital structure does not 
vary with the sector of JV operation. Only one of the items constituting the capital
structure, that is, debt capital is significantly different (p<0.1). This finding appears 
consistent with the findings of Sekely and Collins (1988) which found minimal 
industry influences on the debt ratio. However, the findings appear to contradict some 
of the earlier works, notably Remmer et al (1974), Toy et al (1974), Errunza (1979) 
and Aggarwal (1981) who found industry effect to be significant although not in 
every case examined. However, it is important to point out that the assumption of 
perfect and complete capital markets that underlie the modern theory of capital 
markets frequently do not hold in countries outside the United States and some 
Western European countries (Errunza, 1979). The differences between the capital 
structure and different industries may occur not because of the industry influence but 
the desire to conform to local financial norms. This explanation may therefore 
reconcile this result with the previous studies.
150
Table 6.8
Capital Structure: Sector of the JV
Capital structure Group Mean SD F-value
Debt & Equity Primary 37.92 13.42 .008
Manufacturing 37.79 9.75
Tertiary 37.45 8.94
Debt Primary 39.79 17.14 2.65*
Manufacturing 53.29 22.24
Tertiary 29.38 13.90
Equity Primary 37.0 23.34 1.03
Manufacturing 31.46 14.69
Tertiary 37.50 9.52
Notes: Overall mean for sector of operation = 37.70 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001
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6.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the sources and barriers to finance of IJVs in Ghana and 
Nigeria. There is a paucity of research on how IJVs are financed. This is against the 
backdrop that IJVs in Africa are faced with acute shortage of capital. In particular, 
distorted economic policies discourage and limit the scope for domestic savings. This 
together with high interest rates on foreign debts has substantially reduced Africa’s 
capacity to finance investment.
The findings of this study indicate that IJVs in Ghana and Nigeria show a pronounced 
tendency to finance operations through equity contributions from the partners with 
relatively little being generated from other sources such as loans from IJV parents and 
loans with parent company guarantees. These sources are very important where IJVs 
have difficulties borrowing from external sources as the availability of such loans 
largely depend on the parents or parents’ prestige and credit standing. Given the fact 
that IJVs enjoy relatively greater latitude of obtaining sources of finance compared 
with domestic JVs, it is suggested that other sources such as commercial paper, 
supplier’s credit and export credit guarantees, which are rarely used by firms in 
Ghana and Nigeria should be explored.
The study also finds that the size of the initial capital required to form an IJV and the 
choice of the host partner organisation type are significantly related as the host 
government is likely to attract the funds required than the private partner. This 
therefore renders support for H2. The implication of this is that despite the fact that 
the past decade has witnessed some reforms in the private sectors in Ghana and
Nigeria, more needs to be done in terms of legislative reforms and liberalisation to 
enable the sector raise finance readily at both domestic and international level. HI, 
however, is not supported indicating that equity capital contributions from foreign 
partners do not differ significantly from host partners’ equity contributions.
The findings clearly highlight exchange rate risk, poor infrastructure, political 
instability and transfer risk as the major barriers to JV finance in Ghana and Nigeria. 
Although the liberalisation of FDI policies cut across virtually the whole of Africa, 
more still needs to be done to reduce the remaining restrictions, improve both 
financial and physical infrastructure, and the confidence of foreign investors on 
whom many SSACs rely on for capital. Specifically, the spread of armed conflicts, 
corruption, weak policies and governance should be addressed as a matter of priority. 
It must be emphasised that democracy and economic progress go hand in hand and 
can be reinforcing as there is no alternative to political stability as a prerequisite for 
increased finance and growth.
The results also indicate that the following barriers: exchange risk, transfer risk, 
installed ownership limit and taxes on repatriation of dividend vary with the JV sector 
of operation. However, political instability, which appears to be one of the most 
important barriers does not vary with the sector of operation. It appears that the sector 
of operation is not susceptible to a specific political interference as all are treated 
equally.
The results of this study support the argument that the size of the IJV has an effect on 
the capital structure which is consistent with previous research findings (Scott and
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Martin, 1976; Gupta, 1969; Ferri and Jones, 1979). On the other hand, the sector in 
which the JVs operate has no influence on the capital structure.
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The following chapter discusses measures and determinants of JVs performance in 
Ghana and Nigeria.
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CHAPTER 7
PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: EVIDENCE 
FROM GHANA AND NIGERIA.
7.1 Introduction
International joint ventures (IJVs) are a critical concern for international business 
because of their growing strategic importance (Geringer, 1990). Yet, despite their 
increasing importance, a considerable number of IJVs are reported to have 
performed poorly with estimated rates of instability and unsatisfactory performance 
ranging from thirty-seven percent to over seventy percent (Janger 1980; Harrigan 
1985; Deloitte, Haskins and Sells International, 1989; Beamish and Delios, 1997). It 
is therefore not surprising that performance of JVs has been a prominent theme of 
research over the past two decades (see Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1988; Geringer and 
Hebert, 1989; 1991; Geringer, 1990; Makino, 1995; Beamish and Delios, 1997; 
Glaister and Buckley, 1998).
The literature indicates that a number of studies have focused on JV performance in 
specific countries and regions in both developed and developing countries (see 
Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1984; Glaister and Buckley, 1998). However in the context 
of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), performance of joint ventures has received scant 
attention. This is against the backdrop that many sub-Saharan African countries 
adopted a deliberate policy to promote joint venture formation in the 1970s to gain 
control over key sectors of the economy. For example, Biersteker (1987) reported 
that the Nigeria Enterprise Promotion decrees 1972 and 1977 led to one of the most 
comprehensive mandatory joint venture programmes throughout the third world. 
Under the 1972 and 1977 decrees, large foreign firms were required to make forty to 
sixty percent of their equity available to Nigerians, to form equity JVs. Another
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important strategy, which has been used to gain control over JVs in SSA, is the 
possession of key natural resources such as oil and mineral deposits by the host 
countries. The control of these key inputs creates a dependence situation, which acts 
as a source of bargaining power for the sub-Saharan African countries. According to 
Bacharach and Lawler (1980), the possession of bargaining power is aligned with 
control and consequently influences JV performance outcomes. It is pertinent to 
note that the desire by many SSA governments to use JVs as vehicles to own and 
control key sectors of their economies has implications for JV performance. It is 
therefore important to investigate the performance of joint ventures in Africa.
The chapter builds on the existing literature by examining new data and providing 
new empirical insights into JV performance in SSA. The basic goals of this chapter 
are: (i) to identify measures employed to assess performance; (ii) to examine 
managerial factors, and in particular the effects of control on JV performance.
The rest of this chapter is organised into three sections. The next section sets out the 
hypotheses of the study. The third section presents the results and discussion. A 
summary and conclusions are in the final section.
7.2 Hypotheses
7.2.1 Assessment of JV Performance
Previous research has used perceptual ratings of managers to measure JV 
performance (see Killing, 1983 and Beamish, 1988) with data often obtained from 
one of the partners. The choice of one partner respondent is motivated by the 
difficulties in obtaining data from all partners due to logistical and cost barriers 
(Geringer and Hebert, 1991). A key issue is whether data collected from one partner
constitutes a reliable measure of JV performance and accurately reflects the JV 
parents’ opinion on performance. Geringer and Hebert (1991) reported that it is 
assumed one parent will be aware of the other parent’s or JV manager’s satisfaction 
and assessment of performance. Likewise, JV managers are likely to be informed of 
the parents’ level of satisfaction through formal disclosure such as the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM), and more informal disclosure in the course of the parents’ 
involvement in the management of the JV. Glaister and Buckley (1998) examined 
the correlation between the UK partners’ satisfaction of JV performance and the UK 
partners’ perception of foreign partners’ satisfaction and international alliances 
general managers’ satisfaction. They found a positive and strong correlation 
between the three elements. This leads to the first hypothesis:
HI: There will be a positive and significant correlation between the JV  managers’ 
assessment o f JV  performance and the JV  manager’s perception o f the partners ’ 
assessment o f  performance.
7.2.2 Host Government and Performance Relationship
The pressure of international competition is so demanding that the managers of joint 
ventures have to be able to take swift and unencumbered decisions (Friedmann and 
Kalmanoff, 1961). The possession of a majority of shares generally confers on its 
holder the majority of votes in the company's board, but this is not necessarily 
always the case (Friedmann and Kalmanoff, 1961). For instance, the government of 
Ghana holds a golden share which entitles it to veto certain decisions in a JV 
between the government and Lonrho of which the government is a minority partner 
(West Africa, 1997).
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In many developing countries the sharing of management or control at board level 
with a government may have certain disadvantages. According to Friedmann and 
Buguin (1971), if civil servants are on the board, each major question may be 
referred to the ministries for a decision, as a result, the whole operation may be 
slowed down. On the other hand, Friedmann and Buguin (1971) argue that in a 
private sector partnership JV, managers can get together and quickly decide what 
has to be done for the best solution of any specific difficulty. Raveed and Renforth 
(1983) suggest that joint ventures between private-sector and state-owned firms are 
more likely to become entangled in internal politics than JVs between private sector 
partners. In the light of the above, it is hypothesised that:
H2: Perception o f JV  success will be positively related to the organisational type o f  
host partner (government or private).
7.2.3 Control and Performance
Control in an international joint venture can be defined as the process through 
which parent companies ensure that the way the JV is managed conforms to their 
interest (Schaan, 1983). According to Geringer and Hebert (1989), control is a 
complex concept involving several dimensions: (i) mechanisms of control (equity 
ownership, representation in management bodies, technical superiority, and 
management skills, etc); (ii) extent of control (whether one or more partners play an 
active role in decision-making); and (iii) focus of control (the scope of activities 
over which parents exercise control). These dimensions are complementary and 
interdependent (Hu and Chen, 1996).
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The relationship between control and JV performance has been a focus of 
controversy. Killing (1983) suggests that dominant control JVs tend to be more 
successful than equally shared management ventures. Shared ownership often 
inflicts managerial conflicts (Gomes-Casseres, 1989), thus exerting a negative effect 
on performance. This line of reasoning is in agreement with transaction cost theory. 
Co-ordination between partners entails significant costs that make many alliances 
transitional rather than stable arrangements (Porter, 1990). Reducing the risks 
associated with co-ordination can minimise transaction costs and stabilise the JV 
(Inkpen, 1995). Dominant ownership, therefore, provides a mechanism for keeping 
transaction costs to a minimum and achieving JV stability (Hennart, 1988). 
However, the suggested relationship between dominant ownership and success as 
observed by Killing has not always been consistent with empirical evidence. 
Tomlinson (1970) reported that when parents showed a more relaxed attitude to 
control over JVs, the level of profits were higher. Franko (1971) also found that JVs 
were more stable when parents demanded less control. Blodgett (1991), using 
ownership to measure control and stability to measure performance, found that 50- 
50 shared management arrangements had a greater chance for long life than 
majority owned ventures. Also using financial ownership as the indicator of 
decision-making control, Bleeke and Ernst (1991) concluded that alliances with an 
even split of ownership were more likely to succeed than those in which one partner 
held a majority interest. Blodgett and Bleeke and Ernst all offered commitment as 
the supporting rationale for the findings. When partners have equal ownership, there 
will be pressure on both sides to make accommodation to the JV to protect their 
investments and therefore, both partners will be committed to making the JV 
successful. In a majority - owned JV, one partner may have the ability to configure
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the venture in a manner that is undesirable to the other partner(s) (Bleeke and Ernst, 
1991).
Beamish (1984) reported that among twelve IJVs formed in less developed 
countries performance was negatively related with the level of control from foreign 
partners. Reynolds (1984) in his investigation of U.S. JVs in India concluded that 
control had not become an issue. In a study on JVs in developed countries, Kogut
(1988) found no relationship between control and performance. Geringer and Hebert
(1989); pointed out that the direction of the control - performance relationship to be 
inconclusive, and was yet to be tested and clarified in the existing literature. This 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: Perception o f the extent ofjoint venture success will not be related to parents' 
level o f  control.
7.2.4 Motives and Congruity of Goals
Potential conflict between the goals of MNCs and their host countries causes a 
variety of risks. Kim (1983) pointed out that the primary goal of the MNC is to 
maximise the wealth of its stockholders. On the other hand, most host countries 
desire to develop their economies through greater utilisation of local factors of 
production, to maintain more control over key industries through less reliance on 
foreign capital and know-how, and to strengthen their international position through 
fewer imports and more exports.
It has been pointed out by Beamish and Delios (1997) that when management 
exhibits a consensus, or congruity, about the objectives of the organisation, high
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performance is expected to result, and the converse is true. Beamish and Delios 
(1997) further argued that congruity of goals and objectives between partners is a 
pre-requisite of satisfactory performance. This is because performance of an 
organisation may be judged by the achievement or non - achievement of the goals 
and objectives set by the owners. In line with this reasoning, it is proposed that:
H  4: The greater the motives and goals converge between the partners o f the JV  the 
greater the perceived success o f the JV.
7.2.5 Parent Capability and Performance
The characteristics of the partners to the joint venture may affect its performance. 
The past JV experience of the parent firms is likely to have a positive impact on 
performance (Sim and Ali, 1998). For example, if the partners to a JV are shown to 
have experience and a high level of competence and reputation in managing a JV 
the more likely it is that it will be successful. Makino and Delios (1996) indicated 
that the impact on success might be contingent on the level of partners’ experience. 
In addition, joint ventures between parents reputed to be competent may provide 
opportunities to exercise market power or pre-empt competitors particularly in 
oligopolistic industries. In line with this reasoning it is expected that partners’ 
capabilities will affect JV performance, which is reflected in the following 
hypothesis.
H5: Perception o f joint venture success will be positively related to partners’ 
capabilities.
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7.2.6 Capital and Performance.
Capital funds constitute a base for expansion, a cushion for loss absorption, and a 
basis for the maintenance of solvency. Capital adequacy also enhances the market 
confidence which is critical if a firm is to survive and continue to do business 
(Mould, 1987). For example, a shortfall in funding by the state-owned Nigeria 
National petroleum corporation (a majority partner in the country's six oil producing 
JVs) made the government’s targets of raising production and proven reserves by 
twenty five per cent by the year 2000 look unattainable {Financial Times 1996). 
Also the JV between the government of Ghana and Lonrho went to the London 
stock exchange to sell about thirty five per cent of the Ghanaian government stake 
to raise more capital to increase productive capacity {West Africa, 1997). All of this 
points to the importance of capital adequacy. Therefore it is hypothesised that:
H6: Perception o f joint venture success will be positively related to the capital 
adequacy o f the venture.
The study considers the managers’ ex post assessment of their evaluations of the 
extent to which the JVs have met overall objectives or various expectations, 
compare host government/private sector as a partner and performance on a number 
of dimensions. This research used a perceptual rating to measure JV success. 
Similar measures have been used in previous joint venture studies (see Beamish, 
1988; Killing, 1983).
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7.3 Data Analysis
To examine the hypothesised relationships, two different sets of statistical tests were 
conducted. First, two separate correlation coefficients were computed using SPSS in 
order to test hypothesis HI and the following hypotheses H3, H4, H5, and H6 and 
these hypotheses were further tested by multiple regression. Second, a t-test was 
conducted to test the differences associated with hypothesis H2.
7.4 Dependent variable
7.4.1 JV successful performance
Following Sim and Ali (1998), JV performance (SUCCESS) was measured using a 
composite index (an arithmetic average score). Respondents assessed success on a 
number of factors perceived to be important to actual performance objectives of the 
JV on a 5 point Likert-type scale (1 = “not at all important”; 5 = “very important”). 
The items included traditional business and human resource performance measures 
such as sales growth, market share, profitability, share price, labour productivity, 
extent of technology transfer and overall performance of the JV. These factors it is 
believed measure the true economic health of the JV.
7.5 Independent Variables
The manner in which the independent variables are measured is shown in Table 1.
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Table 7.1
Measurement of Independent Variables
Independent variables: Measurement
Capital adequacy: (CAPITAL) Ordinal measure developed on the basis of importance 
of capital factor to the performance of the JV
Partners capabilities: (PARTCAP) Ordinal measure developed on the basis of importance 
of partners’ capabilities to the performance of the JV
Congruity of partners motives 
and goals (PARTMG)
Ordinal measure on the basis of importance of motives 
and goals congruity to performance of the JV.
Level of control (CONTROL) Measured by the proportion of ownership share 
allocated to each partner based on equity contributions. 
A set of dummy variables to indicate who makes the 
overall decisions: (l=Foreign Partner; 2=Host partner; 
3=both partners).
7.6 Results and Discussions
Table 7.2 shows the criteria used to measure JV performance by firms in the 
sample. In all 10 individual measures were identified with profitability being used 
by over four-fifths of the JVs sampled. Despite the criticisms levelled against 
profitability as a short-term financial measure, which are distorted by transfer 
pricing policies and manipulative accounting practices, it remains a popular 
yardstick of JV performance. The next two most important measures, used by over 
half of the JVs are level of turnover and market share. The least used measures are 
share price and number of discoveries. In the case of share price, the reason why it 
is not popular may stem from the fact that few of the JVs are listed on the stock 
exchange. The number of discoveries appears to be used mostly by the mineral 
exploration JVs and may explain why few JVs use it. It is important to note that 
none of the JVs used a single measure to evaluate performance. Most of the JVs 
were found using profitability and other measures. This in part, provides a further
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justification for the appropriateness of the use of composite index to define the 
dependent variable above.
Table 7.2
Frequency Distribution of Performance Criteria Utilised by the 
Joint Ventures
Performance Criteria No. of Firms Percentage
Profitability 37 90.2
Level of Turnover 27 65.9
Market share 25 61.0
Cost control 20 48.8
Labour productivity 19 46.3
Reputation 16 39.0
Quality control 16 39.0
Technology transfer 6 14.6
Share price 5 12.2
Number of discoveries 4 9.8
Table 7.3 shows the correlation between the respondents’ own assessment of
)
satisfaction of performance (SATJVM) and the respondents’ assessment of 
satisfaction of foreign partner (SATFP) and the satisfaction of host partner 
(SATHP). There is positive and fairly strong correlation between all three elements 
(all significant at 0.01) which therefore supports hypothesis 1. The relationship 
appears stronger between the JV management and the foreign partner than it is 
between the JV management and the host partner. Table 7.3 also shows the 
correlation between the foreign partner and the host partner, which is also 
significant. The correlation suggests that the JV management could provide a fairly 
reliable data source for each parents’ level of satisfaction.
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Table 7.3
Spearman Rank Order Correlation between JV Managers’ Subjective 
Measures of Performance
SATJVM SATHP
SATHP 0.63**
SATFP 0.81** 0.60**
Notes: EJVs (N=41)
SATJVM: Subjective measure of satisfaction of JV performance made by JV 
manager
SATHP: Assessment by JV manager of host partner’s measure of satisfaction of JV 
performance
SATFP: Assessment by JV manager of foreign partner’s measure of satisfaction of 
JV performance 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001
Table 7.4 shows the results of the paired sample t-test conducted to compare the 
overall performance and other dimensions between JVs with host government 
partners and JVs with private sector partners. The results support hypothesis 2. In 
terms of overall performance, provision of finance and ability to take faster 
decisions, JVs with private sector partners performed better than JVs with host 
government partners (p<0.01). In contrast the JVs with host government partners 
have a higher mean score than JVs with private sector partners with regard to local 
influence (p<0.05). These findings are contrary to the widely held notion in many 
sub-Saharan African countries that entrepreneurial functions could be better 
performed by the state than by the private sector (see IMF, 1990). This view gave 
rise to the extensive government intervention in the economies of many sub- 
Saharan Africa countries. More recently, policy makers have adopted the view that 
future development in Africa rests with the private sector, as witnessed by the 
increasing adoption of privatisation in SSACs. The policy shift of business from the 
state to private sector is supported by the findings of this study, in that private sector
166
JV partners appear to be associated with better performance outcomes than are state 
sector JV partners.
Table 7.4
EJV Performance: Host Government Partners Versus Private Partner
Partners Paired
Host Government Private Difference
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD T-value
Provision of finance 2.51 0.87 3.63 0.88 -1.12 1.21 -6.99**
Local contact/influence 3.70 0.93 3.35 0.79 0.35 1.31 2.01*
Ability to take faster decisions 2.56 1.18 4.14 0.69 -1.58 1.16 -10.24**
Overall performance 3.02 0.72 3.91 0.58 -0.90 0.88 -7.68**
Notes: *p<0.05; p<0.01
Table 7.5 shows a summary of the means, standard deviations, correlation matrix 
for the independent variables and the dependent variable (SUCCESS). Bivariate 
relationships shown in Table 7.5 indicate support for the following independent 
variables: capital adequacy (p<0.01); partners’ capabilities (p<0.01); the congruity 
of goals and motives between partners (p<0.01), and level of parent control 
(p<0.01). The JV success is negatively correlated with the level of control.
Table 7.5
Pearson Correlation Matrix of the Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable Mean SD A B C D
A. CAPITAL 4.42 0.78
B. PARTCAP 4.28 0.75 0.31**
C. PARTMG 4.49 0.63 0.26* 0.08
D CONTROL 1.16 0.37 0.08 -0.03 0.12
E. SUCCESS 3.92 0.37 0.35** 0.36** 0.34** -0.32**
Notes: Significance Levels; *P<0.05; **P<0.01 (1-tailed)
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Multiple regression was conducted to predict JV success. Table 5 shows that the F- 
value was significant (p<0.01) and that the regression explained well over 30 
percent of the variation in the JV success. The total amount of variation explained 
by the model is substantial and similar to other joint venture studies (Awadzi, 1987; 
Sim and Ali, 1998). The regression procedure suggests that adequacy of capital 
(p<0.05), partners’ capabilities (p<0.05) and congruity of goals and motives 
between partners (p<0.01) have a positive impact on perceived JV success and 
support hypotheses H4, H5 and H6. However, the level of control has a significant 
negative impact on the perceived JV success (p<0.01), providing no support for 
hypothesis 3.
The finding that partners’ capabilities impact positively on JV performance lends 
support to the key notion in the JV literature that the choice of a particular partner 
influences the mix of skills, resources, operating policies and procedures and overall 
competitive viability of a JV (Geringer, 1991). In other words, partners’ 
organisational and strategic traits influence the effectiveness, efficiency, operational 
skills and the resources needed for the JV success. It is therefore suggested that 
understanding partners’ capabilities prior to the JV formation and giving a greater 
weight when selecting a partner increase the likelihood of JV success.
Congruity of motives and goals between the parents is an important determinant of 
joint venture success. Killing (1982) pointed out that the main reason for poor 
performance of JV stems from the fact that there is more than one parent and they 
would disagree on just about everything. It may be argued that if both partners have 
a clear vision of the same goals and motives the greater the perceived success of the 
JV and this provides support for Beamish and Delios’s findings (1997).
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Another finding which is not surprising is the positive and significant impact of 
capital adequacy on JV success. The scarcity of financing has been a significant 
impediment for most businesses in SSA (IMF, 1990). The insufficient short-term 
finance to meet the working capital requirements put many business under 
enormous strain. This may be due to the following: i) lack of capital markets where 
funds could be raised; ii) bankers’ application of conventional criteria concerning 
collateral, rather than assessing the business capacity to use funds productively; iii) 
the few financial markets available give borrowing priority to the 
government/public sector. The on-going financial markets liberalisation in many 
African countries therefore is a step in the right direction.
The anticipation that there would be no relationship between the level of control and 
performance was not supported by the results. The finding that the level of control 
is negatively related to the perceived JV success is consistent with Beamish’s 
finding (1984). However, it is at variance with that of Tomlinson, 1970; and Killing 
1983.
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Table 7.6
Multiple Regression Results
Number of cases 57
R Square .385
Adjusted R .338
Standard Error .2978
DF 4,55 
F-value 8.149**
Variables in Model Beta T-value
CAPITAL .223 1.881*
PARTCA .251 2.191*
PARTMT .303 2.677**
CONTROL -.360 -3.281**
(Constant) 2.412 6.217**
Durbin-Waston 1.780
Notes: Beta denotes Standardised regression coefficient of the variable in the model 
Significance Level: *p<0.05; **p<0.01
7.5 Summary and Conclusions
This study attempts to identify several determinants of joint venture performance in 
West Africa. The findings suggest that three factors have a positive bearing on the 
success of JVs, these are capital adequacy, partners’ capabilities, congruity of 
motives and goals of the partners.
The finding that capital adequacy has an influence on the success of JV is not 
surprising given the universal scarcity of capital in Africa (IFC, 1989). The problem 
of capital is exacerbated by the lack of capital markets where funds could be raised. 
Although a number of African countries have made strides in recent years in 
establishing equity markets, despite this, capital market development is taking place 
slowly.
An important conclusion to be drawn is that JV performance in SSA is dependent to 
a great extent on partner related factors such as partners’ capabilities and the 
congruity of motives and goals. The managerial and policy implications are self 
evident, suggesting that attention should be paid to these two factors when selecting 
partners to a joint venture. Firms should look for partners with technical and other 
relevant capabilities and at the same time exhibit the tendency of sharing to a higher 
degree the same vision, motives and goals or commonality of purpose. This 
conclusion is consistent with Bleeke and Ernst’s findings (1995), who pointed out 
that if JVs involve two strong partners rather than two weak companies joining 
forces the greater the JV is likely to succeed. This is because such JVs are based on 
genuine collaboration in which both partners build on each other’s capabilities 
rather than trying to fill gaps. The positive impact of congruity of motives and goals 
on performance can be related to the research work of Anderson (1990) which 
argues that an indicator that is uniquely important to JVs is harmony among 
partners. This harmonious relationship can be manifested, not only, in good 
interpersonal relations but in commonality of goals and motives of the partners 
which in part leads to JV success.
Over the past four decades the private sector has been downplayed in many sub- 
Saharan African countries (IMF, 1990). In part, this occurred because indigenous
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entrepreneurs were presumed to be scarce and foreign investors mistrusted. 
Government intervention in the economy was widely embraced in Africa. More 
recently, spurred by evidence of public sector inefficiency and distortion caused by 
excessive government intervention, increasingly policy makers now believe that 
future development in Africa rests with the private sector. However, the pace of 
change is slow. The finding that private sector partners to JVs are perceived to 
perform better than host government partners across a number of dimensions is a 
signal to policy makers that the reappraisal of development strategies should put 
emphasis on the private sector as an engine of growth in sub-Saharan Africa.
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A summary and conclusion to the whole study is provided in the following chapter.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a summary of the research findings and discusses the managerial 
and policy implications regarding joint venture formation in Ghana and Nigeria. The 
chapter is organised into six sections. The next section outlines the research aims and 
background to the study. The third section provides an overview of the methodology. 
Section four summaries the main findings and the managerial and policy implications. 
The contribution of the study is in section five. This is followed by the limitations of the 
study. The final section outlines areas for further research.
8.2 Research Aims and Background to the Study
Foreign direct investment by MNCs is playing an increasingly important role in the 
development efforts of many developing countries. It is argued that FDI does not only 
provide finance which is scarce in many developing countries but also stimulates 
economic growth and the industrialisation process by facilitating access to technologies 
and management know-how not available to the host economy. On the other hand, 
critics point out that FDI by MNCs is a vehicle for (capitalist) exploitation of the poor 
developing countries by the rich developed countries. Public policy makers, however, 
increasingly see joint ventures as a means of not only acquiring the much needed capital 
and technology but also as a means of maximising the gains that foreign direct 
investment offers. As a matter of deliberate policy, Ghana and Nigeria have in the past 
instituted an extensive joint participation programmes through legislation and 
administration of investment codes. Despite the predominance of JVs as a popular form
of organisation in sub-Sahara Africa, JVs have received limited research attention. The 
purpose of this study was to examine:
a) strategic motives and host country location factors influencing JV formation in 
Ghana and Nigeria; b) the sources of finance and problems of funding international joint 
ventures in Ghana and Nigeria; c) the capital structure of international joint ventures in 
Ghana and Nigeria; d) assessment and performance issues of international joint ventures 
in Ghana and Nigeria.
The aims of this study were addressed through three separate but related analyses using 
a variety of analytical approaches.
8.3 Summary of the Methodology
In order to achieve the purposes of the study, two types of data were collected and 
examined, secondary data and primary data. The secondary data, which consists of both 
aggregate data and project level information, were derived from the records of the 
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Ghana 
Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC). The secondary data was used to analyse trends 
over time, ownership type of FDI, geographical location of projects and distribution by 
sector. It is pertinent to point out that due to the unavailability of project level data on 
FDI in Nigeria the analysis of secondary data with respect to Nigeria was limited to 
aggregate inflows and the share of the inflows as a percent of capital formation.
As the research was an exploratory study, it was necessary to collect and analyse as 
many data as possible in order to gain a deeper understanding of the JVs. The secondary 
data collection was important in this regard and provided an analysis of the patterns of 
activity and distribution of FDI in Ghana and Nigeria. However, it should be recognised
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that the secondary data did not provide sufficient and detailed information in respect of 
the key dimensions of JV activity in Ghana and Nigeria. Therefore there was a need to 
collect primary data. Primary data collection constituted the main purpose of the field 
study.
After evaluating the arguments for and against the various survey methods, a 
combination of mail and self-administered questionnaire methods were considered the 
most appropriate. The questionnaire was delivered and collected personally in Ghana, in 
the case of Nigeria the questionnaire was posted.
The research population of interest is international joint ventures in Ghana and Nigeria. 
A listing of such JVs was obtained from secondary sources (Ghana Investment 
Promotion Centre, 1996; Franklin, 1996; Redasel’s companies of Nigeria, 1996). 
Together the above listings served to provide a sample frame for the primary data 
collection. To select the final sample for the survey, three restrictions were applied 
before adopting a random sampling technique to select 160 cases. The restrictions 
employed were: i) the JVs should have a minimum capital of US $200,000; ii) the 
proportion of foreign equity shareholding should be more than 10 percent; iii) the JVs 
should have been established before 1994.
The design of the questionnaire was based on the recommendations of Dillman (1978) 
and Oppenheim (1992). Consistent with their advice, the layout was divided into a 
series of sections with each relating to a particular study variable. A pre-test of the 
questionnaire was conducted in two stages. The first stage involved two UK academics 
who had previously conducted research in sub-Saharan African countries and the 
second involved twenty JV executives in Ghana and Nigeria. In order to maximise the
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response rate the study followed several procedures suggested by Churchill (1991), 
Cragg (1991) and Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (1996). These included pre­
notification, a suitable covering letter, the guarantee of confidentiality and anonymity, 
the promise of a copy of the major findings as an incentive to respond, and a self- 
addressed envelope in the case of the mailed questionnaire to Nigeria.
In summer 1998, a total of 160 questionnaires were either posted or delivered 
personally. After one reminder, a total of 57 usable questionnaires were returned, 
representing a response rate of 35.6 percent. Potential non-response bias was checked 
by implementing t-test procedures to test the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between early and late response along a number of key descriptive variables such as 
host partner type, JV sector of operation and origin of foreign partner. The tests 
indicated no evidence of non-response bias along the chosen characteristics.
8.4 Summary of the Main Findings
The study has sought to create a deeper understanding of four key dimensions of JVs in 
Ghana and Nigeria: strategic motives for JV formation, host country location factors, 
finance of JVs and performance of JVs. To this end hypotheses were developed for each 
of the key dimensions of JV activity and analysed using a variety of approaches. Table
8.1 summarises the hypotheses, statistical tests used and the degree of support for the 
hypotheses.
176
Table 8.1
Summary of Hypotheses, Tests and Results
Subject Hypotheses Statistical Test Used Degree of Support
Strategic Motives and 
Location Factors in 
Ghana and Nigeria
Hla:The relative importance of motives for JV formation will 
vary with the organisational type of the host country partner
Two-sample t-test No Support
(Chapter 5) Hlb:The relative importance of location factors will vary with 
the organisational type of the host country partner
Two-sample t-test No Support
H2a: The relative importance of motives will vary with the 
level of ownership of the joint venture
ANOVA Weak support
H2b: The relative importance of host country factors will vary 
with the level of ownership of the joint venture
ANOVA No support
H3a: The relative importance of strategic motives will vary 
with the origin of the foreign partner
ANOVA No support
H3b: The relative importance of location factors will vary with 
the origin of the foreign partner
ANOVA Weak support
H4a: The relative importance of strategic motives will vary 
with the type of JV business sector activities.
ANOVA Reasonable support
H4b: The relative importance of host country location factors 
will vary with the type of JV business sector activities.
ANOVA Moderate support
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Table 8.1 (continued)
Subject Hypotheses Statistical Test Used Degree of Support
I JVs in Ghana and 
Nigeria: Sources and 
Barriers to Finance and 
Capital structure 
(Chapter 6)
H I: The largest source of capital to I JVs in Ghana and Nigeria 
will be contribution from the foreign partner.
H2: The choice of organisation type of host partner (Private 
or government) will not be independent of the size of capital 
outlay required to form an IJV
Paired t-test
Contingency Table 
Analysis
No support 
Support
H3: The barriers to finance and the sector of joint venture 
operation will not be independent.
t-test No support
H4: The capital structure and the size of a joint venture will not 
be independent.
t-test Reasonable support
H5: Capital structure will vary with the type of industry of the 
joint venture.
t-test No support
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Table 8.1 (continued)
Subject Hypotheses Statistical Test Used Degree of Support
Performance IJVs: 
Evidence from Ghana and 
Nigeria 
(Chapter 7)
H I: There will be positive and significant correlation between the 
JV managers’ assessment of JV performance and the JV manager’s 
perception of the partners’ assessment of performance.
H2: Perception of JV success will be related to the organisational 
type of the host partner (government or private).
Spearman Correlation 
Paired sample t-test
Strong support 
Strong support
H3: Perception of joint venture success will not be related to parents’ 
level of control.
Multiple regression No support
H4: The greater the motives and goals converge between the partners 
of the JV the greater the perceived success of the JV.
Multiple regression Support
H5: Perception of joint venture success will be positively related to 
partners’ capabilities.
Multiple regression Support
H6: Perception of joint venture success will be positively related to 
capital adequacy of the venture.
Multiple regression No Support
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8.4.1 Foreign Direct Investment in Ghana and Nigeria: Patterns of Activity, 
Distribution and the Role of Government Policy
The data derived from the records of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) 
and the United Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) were used to 
analyse the trends and distribution of FDI. A review of the changing role of government 
policy towards FDI for the period 1960-1997 in Ghana and Nigeria was made. The main 
findings are as follows:
FDI in Ghana
a) After falling to a mere trickle in the 1980s, Ghana’s FDI inflows rose to about $20 
million in 1991, a level roughly more than two times that of a yearly average for the 
period between 1985-1990. Likewise the stock of FDI has grown substantially, 
nearly three times between 1990 and 1995, compared with less than one-and-a half 
times for Africa as a whole for the same period.
b) In the 1980-1992 period, Ghana’s share of FDI in gross fixed capital formation 
recorded some growth but below the average of the African continent. In 1993, the 
share increased dramatically to 14 percent, reaching the highest level in the decade 
at over 30 percent in 1994 before falling to 15.6 in 1996. Not only did Ghana’s 
share exceed the average share for Africa as a whole, but the domestic share of FDI 
in gross fixed capital formation rose to over 22 percent, higher than the share of 
GNP in gross fixed capital formation in the previous years.
c) From the perspective of foreign investors, the more preferred mode of entry or 
ownership arrangement for FDI was through the EJV. From the mid-1980s to the 
early 1990s around 97 percent of the FDI projects were in the form of EJVs. This 
percentage has steadily declined from 1992 with the most recent figures indicating 
that EJVs comprise around two-thirds of approved projects, with WOS comprising 
about one-third of FDI projects. The decline in percentage of EJVs from 97 percent 
to 65 percent may be partly explained by the abolition of restrictions of the 
maximum percentage of FDI ownership by foreign investors in most of the sectors 
of the economy.
d) The majority of the approved projects are located in the Greater Accra region-the 
most developed region among the ten regions in Ghana in terms of infrastructure. 
Not surprisingly, the least developed regions in terms of infrastructure recorded very 
low investment inflows and in the case of the most recently created, the Upper West 
region, none at all. This finding points to the significance of infrastructure in FDI 
location decisions.
e) The majority of the FDI projects were in the tertiary sector. This represents a change 
from the past when the primary sector was the most attractive sector for foreign 
investors due to the abundance of natural resources in Africa.
f) The capital structure of FDI projects indicates that foreign investors prefer to finance 
projects with debt capital rather than equity capital. Perhaps the reason for the 
preference of debt/loan capital to equity may be due to the perceived risk relative to the 
benefit of financing projects using fixed debt in Ghana.
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g) The majority of the approved projects are from the United Kingdom, followed by 
Germany, India, and the USA. With regard to the regional source, Western Europe 
dominates the FDI inflows in Ghana, followed by Asia/Pacific and the Middle East. 
Without exception, the joint venture entry mode was preferred by each of the 
regional sources of FDI.
FDI in Nigeria
h) Despite the ‘stop-and-go progress’ in the reforms program, Nigeria has recorded an 
increase in FDI inflows. This may be due to the availability of vast oil and gas 
deposits, the investment of which is not affected substantially by the investment 
policies in place. However, Ani (1996: 7) noted that apart from FDI going into the 
oil sector, no tangible private investment has flowed into Nigeria since the 1972 
indigenisation decree.
i) Foreign investment policy in Nigeria has undergone wide swings from liberal to 
restrictive regimes in three phases since 1960. These were largely driven by 
availability of capital, which was initially closely linked to oil revenues. To create 
an enabling business environment in which FDI inflow could thrive, the government 
has repealed the indigenisation decrees of 1972 and 1977 and the exchange control 
Act 1962. Further steps have also been taken to reform the economy and specifically 
through the privatisation, government is withdrawing from those areas of the 
economy in which the private sector has better competence.
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8.4.2 Joint Venture Formation in Ghana and Nigeria: Strategic Motives and 
Location Factors
This study considers the strategic motivation and host country location factors that 
influence JV formation in Ghana and Nigeria. From the literature and prior discussions 
with potential respondents during the development phase of the questionnaire, a list of 
10 strategic motives and 15 location influences were identified. The study first 
established the relative importance of strategic motives and location factors by 
determining the rank of each set. Second, an attempt was made to provide parsimonious 
sets for strategic motives and location factors by means of exploratory factor analysis. 
Hypotheses were tested by considering differences in means of the importance of 
strategic motives and location factors over a number of key characteristics of the sample 
including host partner type, ownership level, sector of the JV and nationality of the 
foreign partner.
i) Strategic Motives
The findings show that the main strategic motives for JV formation in Ghana and 
Nigeria were concerned with market development and power, risk and cost sharing, 
access to low cost labour and economies of scale. The findings were unexpected in that 
institutional and policy barriers such as ownership limits for foreign investors in 
specific sectors, investment screening and monitoring processes that tend to deter 
foreign investors from investing or entering into the markets of many developing 
countries, including Ghana and Nigeria, were still prevalent. This is even so after 
extensive liberalisation in recent years. Under such circumstances JV provides a means 
for faster entry to meet the foreign investors quest to expand internationally.
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With regard to risk and cost sharing, the findings tend to provide support for the earlier 
research findings of Bhattacharya et al (1997) which reported that Africa, including 
Ghana and Nigeria, is perceived to be a risky place to do business. To reduce this 
perceived risk foreign investors prefer to enter into JV with the local partner. Access to 
low cost labour is also an important factor in foreign investors’ decisions to invest in 
Ghana and Nigeria.
Due to the potential for conceptual and statistical overlap among the 10 strategic 
motives identified, factor analysis was conducted to produce a parsimonious set of 
distinct, non-overlapping strategic motives. The analysis yielded four factors which 
explained almost 72.5 per cent of the observed variance in the sample. The four factors 
were identified as follows: market development, market power, partner synergies and 
production efficiency.
Tests of hypotheses H la to H4a for this part of the study indicate that the relative 
importance of strategic motives vary most with the sector of JV activity and to a weak 
extent with the ownership level of the JV. However, strategic motives tend not to vary 
with the host partner type and nationality of the foreign investor.
ii) Location Factors
The study identifies national policy and regulation, political stability and macro 
economic stability as the highest ranked host country location factors in Ghana and 
Nigeria. Others include market potential, comparative cost and location advantages and 
business facilitation.
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This finding underscores the importance foreign investors attach to government policy 
and regulation which includes profit and capital repatriation, protection offered against 
nationalisation, government policy towards foreign investors and ease of employing 
foreign labour. This finding tends to support conclusions drawn by Chhibber and 
Leechor (1993) and Selassie (1995) who pointed out that investment regulation and 
control, inconsistent policies towards foreign investors and regulation over profit and 
capital repatriation remain a major obstacles to investments inflow in SSA.
Political stability and macro-economic stability are regarded as very important location 
factors to foreign investors. Several researchers including Bhattacharya et al (1997) 
have pointed out that potential investors choose locations with stable political and 
macroeconomic environments. In sub-Saharan Africa many countries suffer from civil 
strife, erratic monetary policies, large structural fiscal deficits and weaknesses in the 
financial system. Factors such as access to natural resources, availability of low cost 
inputs, availability of capable partners and level of industry competition are deemed 
important location factors. Availability of incentives, availability of information on 
investment opportunities and level of infrastructure development influence the decisions 
to locate JVs in Ghana and Nigeria. Infrastructure in Ghana and Nigeria remains poor 
and information on investment opportunities are scarce. The limited size of the national 
markets of most SSACs both in terms of number of consumers and purchasing power 
has dampened the foreign investors desire to form JVs in Ghana and Nigeria.
Due to potential for conceptual and statistical overlap among the 15 identified location 
factors, an attempt was made to provide a parsimonious list of location factors studied
by means of exploratory factor analysis. This produced a group of five interpretable 
factors which explained 68.7 per cent of the observed variance in the sample data. The 
five factors were identified as follows: market potential, country risk, government 
policy and regulation, comparative cost and location advantages and business 
facilitation.
Tests of hypotheses H lb to H4b for this part of the study indicate that the relative 
importance of the host country location factors vary most with the sector of JV activity 
and to a weak extent with the nationality of foreign investor. The study found a lack of 
support for the relative importance of the host partner type and ownership level of JV.
8.4.3 Financing International Joint Ventures in Ghana and Nigeria: Sources of 
Funds, Barriers and Determinants of Capital Structure
The main goals of this part of the study were to examine: 1) how JVs are financed; 2) 
the barriers to JV finance; and 3) the determinants of capital structure for JVs in Ghana 
and Nigeria. The findings are summarised below:
1) Sources o f  JVfinance
The study identified two main sources of JV capital: i) equity contributions from the 
partners and ii) debt/loan capital. The findings indicate that JVs in Ghana and Nigeria 
are financed predominantly by equity contributions made by the partners. This is 
followed by funds generated through loans/debt capital from banks and other financial 
institutions. The study provides no support for hypothesis 1 in that equity contributions 
from the foreign partners are not significantly different from the equity contributions 
from the host country partners.
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The study tends to support H2. The size of JV capital is associated with the organisation 
type of the host partner, which appears consistent with what prevailed in the 1970s 
when JVs with a huge initial capital outlay had the government as a partner.
2) Barriers to JVfinance
The findings of this study clearly highlight exchange risk, poor infrastructure, political 
instability and transfer risk as the most important barriers to JV finance in Ghana and 
Nigeria.
Due to potential for conceptual overlap, an attempt was made to identify a parsimonious 
set of variables to determine the primary underlying factors. The solution yielded two 
interpretable factors, which made good conceptual sense. The factors, “investment risks 
and infrastructure” and “host government control”, together the two factors accounted 
for a total of 60.12 percent of the variance.
The findings show weak support for hypothesis 4 in that exchange risk, transfer risk 
installed ownership limits and higher tax on dividend repatriation vary with the sector of 
JV operation.
3) Capital Structure Determinants
The findings indicate that the size of the JV influences the capital structure and this is 
consistent with the research findings of Gupta (1969), Scott and Martin (1976) and Ferri 
and Jones (1979). However, the sector of JV activity has no influence on the capital 
structure.
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8.4.4 Performance of International Joint ventures: Evidence from Ghana and 
Nigeria
The final phase of the study sought to examine performance measures, to compare JV 
performance where host government is a partner with private sector organisation 
partner, and to investigate factors influencing JV performance in Ghana and Nigeria.
i) Measures o f Performance
In all 10 individual measures of performance were identified, with profitability being 
used by the majority of the JVs sampled. Despite the criticisms levelled against 
profitability as a short-term financial measure, distorted by transfer pricing policies and 
manipulative accounting practices, it remains a popular yardstick of JV performance. 
The next two most important measures, used by over half of the JVs, were level of 
turnover and market share. The least used performance measures were share price and 
number of discoveries. The number of discoveries appears to be used mostly by the 
mineral exploration JVs and may explain why few JVs use this measure. It is important 
to note that none of the JVs used a single measure to evaluate performance. Most of the 
JVs used profitability and other measures. This in part provides a further justification 
for the appropriateness of the use of composite index to measure performance as 
adopted in this study.
ii) Government versus Private Sector Partner
The findings indicate that JVs with a private sector partner performed better than JVs 
with a government partner. This supports hypothesis 2 and is contrary to the
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traditionally held notion in SSA that entrepreneurial functions can be better performed 
by the state than by the private sector.
iii) Determinants o f JV  Success
The study identifies capital adequacy, partners’ capabilities and congruity of motives 
and goals of the partners as important determinants of JV success. The anticipation that 
there would be no relationship between the level of control and JV success was not 
supported. The finding that the level of control is negatively related to the perceived JV 
success is consistent with the findings of Beamish (1984).
8.5 Contribution of the Study
The main thrust of this research was to provide an empirical investigation of a number 
of key dimensions of international joint venture activity in Ghana and Nigeria, namely 
strategic motives, location-specific factors, finance and performance. The contributions 
of this study can be found in the relevant chapters. At this point, it is useful to highlight 
the following contributions:
Sectors studied
During the past three decades, many SSACs have instituted JVs through changes in 
legislation and administration of investment codes. Yet JVs, which are the predominant 
form of business in SSACs, have been the subject of relatively little research. Where JV 
research has been undertaken in SSA, the studies have covered one or two sub-sectors, 
usually, manufacturing and/or agriculture. The extractive industries, particularly oil, 
gold and diamond mining, traditionally have been associated with joint ventures 
because of the technology and the initial large capital required. More recently, the
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tertiary sector (for example, banking, insurance) has witnessed a rising wave of JV 
formation in SSA. Simply put, little serious attention has been given to JV formation in 
all the sectors in which JVs operate. This study has attempted to rectify this by 
examining all sectors in which JVs are known to operate in primary, secondary and 
tertiary.
Empirical Contributions
It is important to emphasise that to date no empirical studies have reported on the trends 
of activity, distribution of FDI and the role of government policy over a long period of 
time in Ghana and Nigeria. Through the analysis of the FDI trends in Ghana and 
Nigeria, the study examined patterns and distributions and the role of government 
policy in promoting foreign investment.
Other important aspects of the study, that is, strategic motives and location factors of JV 
formation have received scant attention in the prior literature on JVs in SSACs. An 
important contribution of this study has been the examination of the relative importance 
of strategic motives and location factors influencing the foreign investors’ decisions to 
engage in JVs in Ghana and Nigeria. Most of the empirical work on location factors in 
the prior literature has been analysed in the broader context of FDI. JVs are one 
organisational form of FDI and critical factors influencing JVs may be obscured if 
analysed in the general context of FDI. The study further considered how strategic 
motives and location factors vary with the nationality of foreign partner, sector of JV 
activity, host partner type and ownership level.
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Few prior studies have specifically examined how JVs are financed, determinants of 
capital structure and barriers to JV finance. This part of the study makes a contribution 
in these areas as follows: First, it identifies the sources of JV capital and the impact of 
initial capital outlay on the choice of host JV partner. Second, it identifies barriers to JV 
finance and the relative importance of the barriers. Third, the study throws further light 
on the determinants of the capital structure of JVs.
A further contribution of the study is the analysis of JV performance measures, a 
comparison of JV performances with different partner types and the factors influencing 
JV success. One novelty of the study is the adoption of a combination of traditional 
business and human resources performance measures such as sales growth, market 
share, profitability, labour productivity, extent of technology transfer and overall 
performance to measure JV success.
8.6 Managerial and Policy Implications of the Study
The results of this research have several normative implications for policy makers and 
managers. From the perspective of policy makers, Ghana and Nigeria have huge natural 
resources such as mineral wealth, a good supply of agriculture land suitable for crops 
and livestock production and forest resources. With a combined internal market of over 
130 million people and the potential of an extended market as trade barriers in West 
Africa are being brought down through the integration of individual nation states into 
the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), these natural assets 
collectively provide a ‘pull factor’ for inward FDI. Yet during the 1980s with the 
exception of FDI inflows into the oil sector, the presence of natural resources in Ghana 
and Nigeria did not attract any huge FDI inflows. The implication of this to policy
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makers is that the presence of natural resources is not a sufficient condition for FDI to 
take place. Other factors such as macroeconomic stability, political stability, good 
governance, good infrastructure, provision of incentives and investment promotion are 
also important and play a crucial role in attracting FDI.
The fact that the findings of this research indicate that the key strategic motives and 
factors influencing JV formation are concerned with overcoming government-mandated 
barriers, risk and cost sharing, level of infrastructure development, political stability, 
macroeconomic stability and national policy and regulation strengthen the issues raised 
above. Therefore policy makers in Ghana and Nigeria should give priority to policies 
which bear on these issues. First and foremost, Ghana and Nigeria should consolidate 
the economic reforms by removing the remaining obstacles in order to create a more 
congenial environment to sustain the FDI capital inflows. Second, policy makers in 
Ghana and Nigeria must implement far-reaching improvements in corporate governance 
to avoid capricious interference with private sector activity as occurred in Nigeria 
recently where a minister dissolved the board of a company and asked the senior 
managers to report to him directly (see, Financial Times, 1997). The maintenance of 
democracy and the implementation of a transparent legal system capable of gaining the 
confidence of foreign investors should also be addressed fully. Another important area 
that deserves greater attention is the provision of physical infrastructure such as 
electricity, water, good quality roads and transport network. The incidence of power 
cuts in Ghana and Nigeria, for example, highlights the need to shift budgetary priorities 
towards infrastructure development.
The strong preference for private sector partners rather than host government partners 
may be due to the fact that private sector partners perform better than host government
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partners. This strengthens the argument that development strategies in SSA should put 
emphasis on the private sector as an engine of growth.
The study also has a number of implications for managers of the JVs. The formation of 
a JV confers a number of advantages including cost and risk sharing, sharing of 
complementary knowledge, local contact and flexibility in raising capital. In risky 
locations like countries of sub-Saharan Africa these advantages could be more to JV 
managers, and are more readily obtained through JVs than through other modes of 
entry.
Three factors were found to influence JV performance in Ghana and Nigeria, namely 
capital adequacy, partners capabilities, and congruity of motives and goals. This implies 
that attention should be paid to these factors when selecting a partner to the joint 
venture. Specifically firms should look for partners with technical and other relevant 
capabilities and which at the same time exhibit the tendency of sharing to a high degree 
the same vision, motives, goals and commonality of purpose.
8.7 Concluding Remarks
The findings of this study show that a number of factors, including consistent 
government policies towards foreign investors, political stability, and macro-economic 
reforms are important motivators for FDI inflows in Ghana and Nigeria in general and 
JV formation in particular. A conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that if 
SSACs fully commit themselves to implement economic reforms, FDI in SSACs would 
be a positive sum game. As the attractiveness of SSACs partly depend on the number
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and extent of economic reform measures taken, all SSACs would benefit from increased 
FDI inflows by implementing reforms.
Ghana and Nigeria have started the formidable task of reforming at all levels of their 
economies. More needs to be done in terms of good governance which puts emphasis on 
respect for the rule of law; transparency and accountability in all aspects of economic 
life; unambiguous commitment of social equity to minimise conflict and civil strife, and 
changes in the economic structure and institutions to build a competitive and efficient 
economy. At the micro level, it is recommended that Ghana and Nigeria, will need to 
take action on many fronts:
♦ Improve infrastructure
♦ Strengthen financial system, develop capital markets by accelerating the pace of 
privatisation and broadening the domestic investor base.
♦ Formulate an appropriate regulatory framework and a more liberal investment 
regime by involving the business community in the decision making process.
♦ Introduce competitive labour market policies while creating and maintaining 
institutions for upgrading human capital;
♦ Reform the judiciary system and contain the corruption;
♦ Accelerate the privatisation process and recognise the development of the private 
sector as an engine of growth and;
♦ Accelerate the integration of the Economic Community of West African States to 
provide a wider and more sustainable opportunity for JVs and other businesses 
whose operations might have been undermined by small and fragmented national 
markets.
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Another important conclusion that has emerged from this study is the decline in relative 
importance of natural resources as an FDI determinant in Ghana and Nigeria. 
Traditionally, JVs were motivated by the availability of natural resources sought by 
foreign investors. Although, it may be argued that natural resources still explain much 
of the inward FDI, particularly in the oil sector. However MNCs are increasingly 
seeking locations where the governments have relatively good policies towards foreign 
investment, sound physical and human infrastructure, together with a stable political 
and macroeconomic environment. It is therefore concluded that with business 
environment changing, particularly with the forces of globalisation and increased 
competition, these factors would tend to play a decisive role than they once did.
8.8 Limitations of the Study
As with any research project, there are certain limitations to this study. The focus of this 
study has been primarily on understanding and measuring empirically the factors which 
influence JV formation in Ghana and Nigeria, how JVs are financed and what factors 
determine performance. The study addresses research questions and hypotheses which 
are based upon prior empirical and theoretical studies undertaken by others and usually 
not relating to SSA. The main criticism of the study may be that while there is much 
emphasis on empirical and exploratory research there has been little in the way of 
theory development. While the aims of this study did not specifically include theory 
development, an extension of the study would be to develop theory in future.
Other limitations of the study are related to the data and measurement issues.
Secondary Data Limitation
The secondary data primarily involved the examination of data from official sources: 
the GIPC database and that of UNCTAD. There are some inherent problems with the 
GIPC database. First, the GIPC database on FDI projects is based on the approved 
figures which may differ from the projects actually on the ground. It is estimated that 
about 10 percent of the approved projects did not materialise. Second, the number of 
years for which data was availability varied between cases. Third, project level data was 
not available for Nigeria and therefore the analysis was restricted to aggregate data from 
UNCTAD only.
Primary Data and Methodological Limitations
The primary data were collected by means of self-administered questionnaires to JVs 
managers in Nigeria and Ghana. This is therefore a cross-sectional study with a single 
respondent in each participating JV. The questionnaires broadly covered key 
dimensions of JV activity including general information, strategic motives, host country 
factors, finance and performance. The problem that comes into sharp focus is the use of 
a single respondent with a presumption that the respondent is knowledgeable over all 
aspects of the JV under consideration in this study.
Recognising the inherent weaknesses in research that relies on a single respondent to 
collect information across a range of key dimensions of the JV, a few interviews were 
conducted with JV parents in Ghana and the UK to corroborate the survey results. Not 
surprisingly, on some issues opinions were quite different, but in general responses 
were similar to that of the JV managers. It should be stressed, however, that a better 
research methods approach would involve obtaining data from multiple respondents
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within each parent firm on each dimension of activity. Clearly, the limitation of this 
study in relying on single respondents assumed to be knowledgeable across a range of 
dimensions of JV activity should be borne in mind when interpreting the results of the 
study.
The data were collected between July 1998 and November 1998, with the formation of 
some of the JVs in the sample formed before 1975. Consequently, another limitation 
may be memory decay, with the veracity of responses particularly those relating to JV 
motives and location factors giving room for doubt. In mitigation, as the questionnaire 
demanded quite detailed responses from the respondents, it is unlikely that they would 
have persisted with the questions unless the events could be readily recalled. Moreover, 
recollection would be easier the more involved the respondent was with the JV and the 
more important the activity was perceived at the time.
Another potential limitation of this study is related to the manner of data collection. 
Data were collected in Ghana by means of personal delivery and collection of the 
questionnaire, while in Nigeria the questionnaires were mailed to the respondents. 
Ghana’s response rate was twice that of Nigeria which may be due to the unreliability of 
the postal system in Nigeria, but also because personal collection is likely to encourage 
response. While the findings of this study are generalisable to West Africa, the strength 
of the findings is partially weakened by the relatively few responses from IJVs in 
Nigeria. It is also important to point out that the nationality of the individual respondent 
was not investigated and this might have affected the response and should therefore be 
regarded as a potential limitation of this study.
197
8.9 Areas for Further Research
The results of this study have improved our understanding on a number of key 
dimensions of JV activity in Ghana and Nigeria. Still, there are many interesting areas 
which merit further attention.
First, a similar study on strategic motives and host country location factors on JVs in 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors would be useful, and could complement the 
findings of this study to give a more complete understanding of JV formation in West 
Africa. In particular, while the variations in importance of several of the strategic 
motives and location factors appear to be justifiable, the fundamental reasons for their 
variations in importance are not always readily apparent. Further investigation of the 
relative importance of strategic motives and location factors appears warranted. Second, 
the survey for this study was conducted with upper level managers of the JVs on the 
assumption that they had a good knowledge of the formation and development of the 
JV. In future research obtaining data from representatives of the JV partners in order to 
corroborate JV managers’ views on strategic motives and location factors would 
enhance the findings.
This study has yielded some interesting results on factors influencing JV performance. 
As the study analysed only a few factors influencing JV performance, further research is 
warranted on a broader set of factors to further improve our understanding of 
performance. In particular, more attention should be placed on behavioural factors and 
inter-partner relations such as parent firms’ commitment to JV operations, inter-partner
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trust, long-term relationship, the autonomy of the JV, the degree of inter-partner conflict 
and control. These factors may be crucial to successful performance of JVs in Africa.
With regard to the financing of JVs, it should be noted that while this study reported 
some important findings, the study is clearly exploratory and should be regarded as a 
first step in increasing our understanding of how JVs are financed. Future research is 
urged to build on this study by conducting research in a larger sample, particularly in 
the areas of how JVs are financed and the effects of host country influences such as 
inflation, risk and culture on the capital structure of JVs.
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Appendix 1
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY.
MULTINATIONAL JOINT VENTURES IN GHANA
We would like to assure you once again that information and views expressed will 
be kept in confidence and no individual person or company will be identified in the 
survey findings.
BACKGROUND OF THE JOINT VENTURE
1) Name of the joint venture (JV).....................................................................................
2) Your job title..................................................................................................................
3) Nature of JV business (please provide a brief note of the activities of the JV).
4) When was the JV formed? Year.............................................................................
5) Which of the following sector(s) best describes the activities of the JV? (please tick) 
(1) Agriculture [ ] (2) Manufacturing [ ]
(3) Building & Construction [ ] (4) Mining (extractive) [ ] 
(5) Service [ ] (6) Export Trade [ ] 
(7) Other (please specify).................................................................................................
2 0 0
6) How many foreign partner(s) did the JV have on formation?
Number........................................................
7) Country of origin of the foreign partner(s) (please tick) 
(1) United States [ ] (2) Britain [ ]
(4) France [ ] (5) Holland [ ]
(3) Germany 
(6) Italy [ ]
(7) Other (please specify).....................................................................................................
8) How would you classify the Ghanaian partner (please tick)
(1) Private Company [ ] (2) Government [ ] (3) Quasi - Government [ ]
(4) Public Company [ ] (5) Other (please specify)...................................................
OWNERSHIP
9) What was the level of ownership of the Ghanaian partner in the JV when it was 
formed (please tick)
(1) More than 50% [ ] (2) Co-ownership (50-50) [ ] (3) Less than 50% [ ]
10) Has the level of ownership of the Ghanaian partner in the JV changed since the JV 
was first established? (please tick)
(1) Yes, increased [ ] (2) Yes, decreased [ ] (3) No, remains unchanged [ ]
IF YES:
11) What is the current level of ownership? (state in percentages) 
(1) Ghanaian partner..................................  (2 ) Foreign partner(s),
2 0 1
LOCATION FACTORS
12) How important were the following factors in the foreign partner's decision to 
choose Ghana as a location for the JV? (please circle according to the importance)
Not at all 
important
(1) Market size
(2) Political stability
(3) Macro-economic stability
(4) Level of infrastructure development
(5) Government policy towards foreign investment
(6) Availability of incentives
(7) Repatriability of profits and capital
(8) Level of industry competition
(9) Availability of low cost inputs
(10) Purchasing power of customers
(11) To gain access to natural resources
(12) Protection offered against nationalisation
(13) Information availability on investment 
opportunities
(14) Ease of employing foreign labour
(15) Availability of capable partners
(16) Other (please specify)......................................
Very
important
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
2 0 2
STRATEGIC MOTIVES.
13) As far as the foreign partner was concerned, how important were the following 
motives for entering into JV? (please circle)
Not at all 
important
(1) To gain access to finance
(2) To overcome government-mandated barrier
(3) To gain access to partner's technology
(4) To gain access to management know - how
(5) Risk and Cost sharing
(6) To obtain economies of large-scale production
(7) To facilitate international expansion
(8) To have access to host partner natural resources
(9) To have access to low cost labour
(10) To co-opt existing competitor in order to
reduce competition
(11) To enable product diversification
(12) Other (please specify).......................................
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Very
important
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
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14) As far as the Ghanaian partner was concerned, how important were the following 
motives for forming the JV? (please circle according to their importance)
Not at all 
important
(1) To gain access to finance
(2) To conform to host government policy
(3) To gain access to partner's technology
(4) To gain access to partner's management 
know-how
(5) Risk and Cost sharing
(6) To obtain economies of large-scale production
(7) To facilitate international expansion
(8) To gain faster entry into export market
(9) To enable product diversification
(10) To compete more effectively against 
a common competitor
(11) To co-opt existing competitor in order to 
reduce competition
(12) Other (please specify)....................................
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Very
important
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
FINANCE AND CAPITALISATION
15) What is the total amount of the JV paid up capital? (please state in figures)
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16) What is the percentage of paid up capital owned by
(1) Ghanaian partner..................................... % (2) Foreign partner(s). .%
17) What proportion of the JV's capital is generated from the following sources? ( 
please state in percentages).
(1) Foreign loans................................% (2) Foreign equity...................................  %
(3) Host country loans......................  % (4) Host country equity........................%
(5) Retained earnings........................  % (6) Export credit ..............................%
(7) Others (please specify)..............................................................................................0//°
18) How do you assess the following restrictions on the foreign partner with regard to 
the finance of the JV (please circle according to their importance)
Not at ail 
a problem
(1) Installed foreign ownership limit
(2) Ban on profit repatriation by foreign partner
(3) Higher tax rates on dividend repatriation 
by a foreign partner
(4) Investment screening procedure of 
foreign partners by host government
(5) Political instability
(6) Transfer risk
(7) Exchange risk
(8) Level of infrastructure development
(9) Other (please specify)
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
A serious 
problem
4
4
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
19) When selecting a foreign partner how much importance did the Ghanaian partner 
place on the provision of finance by the foreign partner? (please circle)
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Not at all Very
important important 
1 2 3 4 5
20) To what extent do you agree that JVs with large initial capital requirements are 
likely to have the host government as a partner at the time of formation? (please circle)
Strongly Strongly
disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5
21) To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence the choice of 
capital structure of a JV? (please circle)
Strongly Strongly
disagree agree
(1) Availability of stock market in the
host country 1 2 3 4 5
(2) Cost of capital in the host country 1 2 3 4 5
(3) The level of control equity/debt capital
gives to each partner 1 2 3 4 5
(4)Government intervention in the form of
directed credit 1 2 3 4 5
(5) Higher tax rates on dividend repatriation
by a foreign partner 1 2 3 4 5
(6) Rate of inflation 1 2 3 4 5
(7) Rate of return on capital 1 2 3 4 5
(8) Other (please specify)....................................  1 2 3 4 5
22) To what extent do you agree that higher tax rates imposed on dividend repatriation 
by a foreign partner is likely to lead the partner to contribute more funds as loans rather 
than as equity? (please circle)
Strongly
disagree
Strongly
agree
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1 2 3 4 5
23) How important do you think that the following would be in increasing the inflow of 
foreign investment finance for JVs? (please circle)
Not at all 
important
(1) Removal of ownership restrictions 1 2 3 4
(2) Free repatriation of profit 1 2 3 4
(3) Active promotion of investment opportunities 1 2 3 4
(4) Lower risk of political instability 1 2 3 4
(5) Reduced transfer risk 1 2 3 4
(6) Guarantees against nationalisation/expropriation 1 2 3 4
(7) Other (please specify).........................................  1 2 3 4
Very
important
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
MANAGEMENT OF THE JV
24) How many people constitute the JV management team? Number:
25) How many members of the JV management team come from:
(1) Ghanaian partner........................................  (2) Foreign partner...........
(3) Third party (independent of JV)................... (4) Other (please specify)
26) Who appointed the first general manager of the JV? (please tick)
(1) The Ghanaian partner [ ] (2) Foreign partner [ ]
(3) Other (please specify)..........................................................................................................
27) Who was responsible for the subsequent appointment of the general manager? 
(please tick)
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(1) The Ghanaian partner [ ] (2) Foreign partner
(3) Other (please specify)................................................................................................
28) To what extent do you agree that equity ownership matches the level of control of 
the JV exercised by: (please circle)
Strongly Strongly
disagree agree
(1) The Ghanaian partner 1 2 3 4 5
(2) The foreign partner 1 2 3 4 5
29) Who has the power of veto over the decisions of the JV managers?
(please tick)
(1) The Ghanaian partner has veto [ ] (2)Foreign partner has veto [ ]
(3) Both partners have veto [ ] (4) None of the partners has veto [ ]
JV PERFORMANCE
30) Has the JV been terminated? (please tick).
(1) Yes [ ]
(2) No [ ] If "No" go to Q34
31) IF YES
When was the JV terminated? 19...............
32) What was the reason for the JV’s termination? (please tick)
(1) Expiration of the fixed number ofyears for which the JV was set up [ ]
(2) JV’s poor performance [ ]
(3) Host government policy to nationalise the JV [ ]
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(4) JV fulfilled its purpose [ ]
(5) Other (please specify)....................................................................................  [ ]
33) How successful was the terminated JV? (please circle)
Not at all Very
successful successful
1 2 3 4 5
For the terminated JVs please answer the following questions for the time the JV 
was in existence.
34) How does your company measure the performance of the JV? (please tick)
(1) Level of turnover [ ] (2) Level of profitability [ ]
(3) Market share [ ] (4) Share price [ ]
(5) Extent of technology transfer [ ] (6) Level of cost control [ ]
(7) Labour productivity [ ] (8) Reputation [ ]
(9) Quality control [ ]
(10)Other (pleas specify) .........................................................................................................
35) How satisfied are the following with the level of the JV performance? (please 
circle)
Very Very
dissatisfied satisfied
(1) Ghanaian partner 1 2 3 4 5
(2) Foreign partner 1 2 3 4 5
(3) JV managers 1 2 3 4 5
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36) How important are the following in the actual performance objectives of the JV 
(please circle)
Not at all Very
important important
(1) Sales level 1 2 3 4 5
(2) Market share of the JV product 1 2 3 4 5
(3) Management of the JV 1 2 3 4 5
(4) Share price 1 2 3 4 5
(5) Profitability 1 2 3 4 5
(6) Extent of technology transfer 1 2 3 4 5
(7) Labour productivity 1 2 3 4 5
(8) Capital adequacy 1 2 3 4 5
(9) Congruity of goals and motives
between partners 1 2 3 4 5
37) How important have the following factors been in the performance of the JV?
(please circle)
Not at all Very
important important
(1) Provision of adequate capital 1 2 3 4 5
(2) Level of control exercised by each partner 1 2 3 4 5
(3) Non-interference in JV management by
the host government 1 2 3 4 5
(4) Partners' level of commitment to JV 1 2 3 4 5
(5) Partners' capabilities 1 2 3 4 5
2 1 0
(6) Congruity of goals and motives between partners 1 2 3 4 5
(7) Other (please specify) 1 2 3 4 5
38) To what extent do you agree with the following statements
Strongly
disagree
(1) The closer the views of the partners 
regarding the objectives of the JV the greater
the potential success of the JV 1 2
(2) The closer the views of the partners 
regarding the motives for formation of the JV
the greater the potential success of the JV 1 2
(3) The closer the views of the partners regarding 
the way in which the JV should be managed the
greater the potential success of the JV 1 2
Strongly
agree
4 5
4 5
4 5
39) Which of the following would you most prefer as a local partner in the host 
country? (please tick all that apply)
(1) Host government [ ] (2) Local private company [ ]
(3) Local public company [ ]
(4) Other (please specify)......................................................................................................
40) What is the reason for your preference (please tick)
(1) Financial capabilities [ ] (2) Management capabilities [ ]
(3) Local contact/ influence [ ]
(4) Other ( please specify)............................................................................................... [ ]
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41) Please evaluate the following factors with regard to the different partners:
(1) Host government.
Very poor Excellent
(1) Ability to take fast decisions 1 2 3 4 5
(2) Ministers non interference in JV management 1 2 3 4 5
(3) Provision of finance 1 2 3 4 5
(4) Local contact/ influence 1 2 3 4 5
(5) Overall performance 1 2 3 4 5
b) Local private investor
(1) Ability to take faster decisions
(2)Provision of finance
(3) Local contact/influence
(4) Overall performance
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
42) To what extent do you agree with the following?
Strongly
disagree
(1) control exercised by the partners will be
lower in well performing JVs 1
(2) control excercised by the partners will be
higher in poor performing JVs 1
Strongly
agree
2 1 2
COMPANY DETAILS
If you or your company would like to receive a copy of the summary of the research 
findings please give your details below:
Name:...........................................................................................................................................
Company:.....................................................................................................................................
Address:.......................................................................................................................................
Telephone Number:.........................................................................................................
The completed questionnaire will be collected by hand two weeks after dellivery. 
Once again, thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire
For further enquires, please contact:
Agyenim Boateng
Leeds University Business School
Blenheim Terrace Leeds LS 2 9JT.
Prof. Keith Glaister
Leeds University Business School
Blenheim Terrace Leeds LS2 9JT.
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Appendix 2
17 June, 1998.
Dear Sir/Madam
We are undertaking research on aspects of multinational joint venture activity in 
Ghana. To help in this research we would like to request that you complete the 
attached questionnaire. We wish to stress that the replies to the questions will be 
treated in the strictest confidence. Neither you nor your organisation will be 
identified at any stage of the analysis, nor in the publication of results.
The questionnaire is designed to be completed by someone who has a good 
knowledge of the formation and development of the joint venture. We have a 
number of aims in carrying out the research, but we are particularly concerned to 
know about aspects of the motivation for the joint venture, financing, management 
and the performance of the joint venture. Please note that the questionnaire is still 
relevant even if the joint venture has been terminated
Very little systematic data exist on Ghanaian joint venture activity and it is intended 
that the findings will be useful, not only to academics interested in this area, but 
also to practising managers. Again, we would stress, however, that the result will be 
presented in highly aggregate form and no other person or organisation will be able 
to identify your responses.
The questionnaire will occupy a short period of your time, but your answers will be 
enormously valuable to the research project. When the analysis is complete we will 
be pleased to send you a summary of the findings.
The questionnaire will be collected from you by hand two weeks after delivery. 
Thank you for your co-operation.
Yours faithfully,
Mr Agyenim Boateng
Doctoral Candidate, Leeds University Business School
Prof. Keith W. Glaister
Professor of International Strategic Management 
Leeds University Business School
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Appendix 3
30 August, 1998
Dear Sir,
You may recall that I wrote to you recently concerning research that I am 
undertaking on certain aspects of Nigeria international joint venture activity and 
enclosing a questionnaire. As this research work is very important to me, I would 
like to make a further request that you complete the questionnaire. I enclose a 
second copy of the questionnaire in case the first one has been mislaid. I would 
again like to stress that the replies to the questions will be treated in the strictest 
confidence. Neither you nor your organisation will identified at any stage of the 
analysis, nor in the publication of results.
The questionnaire is designed to be completed by someone who has a good 
knowledge of the background of the joint venture, including the way it has been 
managed. I have a number of aims in carrying out the research, but I am particularly 
concerned to know about aspects of the motivation for the joint venture, finance, 
management and the performance of the joint venture.
Very little systematic data exists on Nigeria joint venture activity and I hope that the 
findings will be useful, not only to academics interested in this area of research, but 
also to practising managers. Again, I would stress, however, that the results will be 
presented in highly aggregate form and no other person or organisation will be able 
to identify your responses.
When the study has been completed, I shall be pleased to send to you a summary of 
the results. If you would like me to do this, please write your name and address on 
the final page of the questionnaire. The questionnaire will only occupy a short 
period of your time, but your answers will be enormously valuable to me. When 
you have completed the questionnaire, please return it in the attached addressed 
envelope.
Thank you for your co-operation.
Yours faithfully,
Mr Agyenim. Boateng
Doctoral Candidate
Leeds University Business School
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Reliability Analysis for Strategic Motives
Scales and Variables Corrected item: 
Total Correlation
Cronbach’s 
alpha
STRATEGIC MOTIVES .70
Factor 1: Market Development .70
Facilitates international expansion .61
Overcome government -mandated barriers .55
Factor 2: Market Power .67
To reduce competition .55
To enable product Diversification .58
Factor3: Partner Synergies .78
Risk and cost sharing .51
To gain access to finance .41
To gain access to partner’s technology .72
Access to management know-how .67
Factor 4: Production efficiency .65
To obtain economies of large scale prod. .65
To have access to low cost labour .55
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Appendix 5
Reliability Analysis for Host Country Location Factors
Scales and Variables
HOST COUNTRY LOCATION FACTORS
Corrected item: 
Total Correlation
Cronbach’s
Alphas
.75
Factor 1:
Market potential .69
Market size .70
Purchasing power of customers .65
Factor 2:
Country risk .67
Political stability .62
Economic Stability .65
Factor 3:
Government policy & regulation .72
Repatriability of profit and capital .61
Protection offered against nationalisation .75
Government policy towards investors .67
Ease of employing foreign labour .67
Factor 4:
Comparative cost & location advantages .79
Access to natural resources .86
Availability of low cost inputs .71
Availability of capable partners .69
Level of industry competition .71
Factor 5:
Business facilitation .75
Availability of incentives .71
Information availability on investment .80
Level of infrastructure development .74
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Appendix 6
Reliability Analysis for Barriers to Finance
Scales and Variables Corrected item: 
Total Correlation
Cronbach
Alphas
BARRIERS TO FINANCE .78
Factor 1:
Investment risk and infrastructure .70
Exchange risk .74 .62
Transfer risk .62 .66
Political instability .50 .77
Poor infrastructure .62 .70
Factor 2:
Host Country Controls .69
Installed ownership limit .77 .71
Ban on profit repatriation .69 .62
Higher tax on dividend repatriation .71 .63
Host country screening procedure .74 .65
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Appendix 7
Reliability Analysis for Host Government and Private Sector Partners
Scales and Variables Corrected item: 
Total Correlation
Cronbach’s
Alpha
PERFORMANCE .77
Host Government Partner: .75
.74 .60
.72 .71
.63 .74
.67 .69
Private Sector Partner .74
.50 .67
.63 .61
.64 .82
.60 .70
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group 
of sixteen countries, namely, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Guinea, Cote d’ Ivoire, The 
Gambia, Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Benin, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Mauritania and Cape Verde. ECOWAS was established by the Treaty of 
Lagos in May 1975. The overall objective of ECOWAS is to promote co-operation 
and integration in order to create an economic and monetary union for encouraging 
economic growth and development of West Africa.
The Authority of Heads of State and Governments of Member States constitute the 
supreme institution of the Community and is composed of Heads of State and/or 
Government of Member States. The Authority is responsible for the general 
direction, control of ECOWAS and takes all measures to ensure its progressive 
development and the realisation of its objectives.
Although there has been slow in the progress in the integration of markets, 
remarkable progress is been made in other areas such as free movement of persons, 
construction of regional road networks, development of telecommunication links 
between the states and maintenance of peace and regional security.
The results in the thesis are generalisable to ECOWAS as effectively this is the 
same as West Africa.
Appendix 8
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INVESTMENT LEGISLATION IN GHANA
FDI policy in Ghana was first guided by the pioneer industries program from the 
late 1950s until 1963 (IMF, 1975). In 1963, the Capital Investment Board was 
established to deal with matters related to investments in Ghana. This Board was 
abolished when the Capital Investment Decree 1973 was issued. The 1973 decree 
restated the conditions under which new foreign investment would be permitted in 
Ghana. The White Paper accompanying the decree indicated that Ghana's 
investment policy was based on the principle of self - reliance and the doctrine of 
"capturing the commanding heights of the economy". It was explained that this 
doctrine implied that Ghanaians should have effective control over the significant 
areas of the economy.
Under the 1973 decree sectors such as public utilities, infrastructure projects and the 
manufacturing of arms and ammunition were reserved for the state alone. Sectors 
reserved for joint participation by government and foreign investors were as 
follows: timber and mining, commercial radio and television, oil production, 
shipping, retailing and distribution, servicing agencies, meat processing, estate 
development and agricultural projects. Joint ownership by Ghanaians with foreign 
investors were permitted for an enterprise involved in these projects whose capital 
was less than $500,000 or whose turnover was less than $1 million, when Ghanaian 
equity participation was to be a minimum of 40 percent. The 1973 decree accorded 
virtually no prominence to foreign wholly owned subsidiaries.
Appendix 9
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In 1975, the Investment Policy decree was promulgated which resulted in the 
compulsory indigenisation of all or some of the equity of commercial and 
manufacturing enterprises (Bennel, 1984). This decree again strengthened the 
Ghanaian government's favourable policy on JVs as against foreign wholly owned 
subsidiaries.
In 1981, the investment code bill replaced the Investment Policy decree 1975. The 
object of the 1981 code was to consolidate and re-enact existing legislation relating 
to investments in Ghana such as the Capital Investment Decree 1973, and the 
Investment Policy Decree 1975 with such amendments as would, it was hoped, 
attract large- scale foreign investments in Ghana. The bill further re-defined the 
areas in which foreign investors were allowed to participate and reduced some of 
the levels of state or Ghanaian participation required by the existing legislation 
where experience had shown the relevant provision to be too rigid and a 
disincentive to new investment.
The first schedule of the 1981 code reserved almost all the commercial and 
industrial enterprises for Ghanaians. The second schedule required the state to own 
not less than 45 per cent of the capital of every mineral enterprise. Part B of the 
second schedule allowed for a limited foreign investment participation of not more 
than 45 percent in some manufacturing, commercial and agricultural sectors. Again 
it is pertinent to note from the above that the 1981 investment code clearly 
discouraged foreign wholly owned subsidiaries.
The 1981 investment code was replaced by the investment code of 1985. The 1985 
code attempted to relax and open up most of the sectors for foreign participation. 
Enterprises wholly reserved under the 1985 code include operation of taxi service 
and car hire, sale of motor vehicles under hire purchase, estate agency, transport, 
advertising and public relations, bakery and manufacture of suitcases, garments and 
building materials. It is also important to note that, foreign investors were required 
to contribute a minimum equity capital of $60,000 in the case of JV with a 
Ghanaian firm and in the case of foreign wholly owned subsidiary $100,000.
Section 21(3) of the code placed an additional requirement on foreign wholly 
owned subsidiaries by requiring the Ghana Investment Centre which was in charge 
of registering foreign investors only, to approve foreign WOS where it was a net 
foreign exchange earning enterprise.
In 1994, the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act came into being thereby 
replacing the 1985 code. The 1994 Act is by far the most liberal of all the 
investment codes to date in that it removes virtually all the restrictions on foreign 
ownership, capital and dividend transfer by a foreign investor with the exception of 
manufacturing of garments, suitcases, advertising and public relations, mining, 
bakery, retail and wholesale trade. The necessity of minimum capital requirements 
of a foreign investor was maintained although at lower levels. Under this Act, 
foreign partners are required to contribute a capital of not less than $10,000 in the 
case of JV and $50,000 in the case of foreign WOS.
2 2 2
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